Le but de cette thèse consiste à démontrer que la rémunération des dirigeants est d'une nature contractuelle car l'ensemble des relations juridiques au sein de l'entreprise l’est. Il ne s'agit pas d'un postulat idéologique mais de la conséquence d’une déduction faite après avoir étudié la nature de l’ordre juridique français, à savoir une démocratie libérale où un Etat de droit-au sens moderne du terme-protège une économie de marché. Donc en présence d’une économie de marché, les relations inter-entreprises sont forcément des relations fondées sur le contrat. Par conséquent, toute rémunération de n’importe quel dirigeant de toute entreprise privée indépendamment de sa forme juridique (entreprise sociétaire personnifiée, non personnifiée, entreprise en nom) est forcément d’une nature conventionnelle. Reconnaître ce point de vue permettrait de faire une réforme du droit des sociétés et d’en finir avec la vision institutionnelle de l’entreprise qui est inexacte dans une économie où l’Etat n’est pas propriétaire des moyens de production. Aujourd’hui, les mandataires sociaux des grandes entreprises ont une rémunération parfois conséquente qui n’est pas véritablement contrôlée : ni par un contrôle institutionnel (défaillant car contre-nature), ni par une logique de marché (car non reconnue par beaucoup de juristes). / The remuneration of corporate officers is a highly publicized subject, particularly because of the impression, rightly or wrongly, of the important amounts received by corporate officers of numerous large companies. The legal relationship under which corporate officers perceive their remuneration does not appear to be precisely defined within the framework of positive law. There are two types distinct natures of remunerations. While one has a contractual nature, the other one is institutional by nature. The nature would depend on several criteria including the legal form of the company studied, whether the company is listed or not, and the type of remuneration paid. This analysis, inherited from the French corporate law history of the twentieth century, does not seem accurate to us. The private enterprise is first and foremost an economical reality, before being apprehended by the law. In a legal order such as ours, i.e. a liberal democracy and a market economy, the private enterprise, whether it is represented by a legal personality or not, is always structured by the private property and the contract. Property and exchange (through contracts) translate the principle of individual liberty within the civil law. The private enterprise of a legal order, which recognizes the economic freedoms, is first the exercise of the entrepreneurial freedom, alone or with others. Any power exercised within a private enterprise roots in a legal act of private law, generally a contract. The company with a legal person allows the realization of various legal effects, including the protection of the company assets. The legal autonomy of the company, authorized by law, should however not hide the fact that the company is not independent from those who founded it or their successors. The company officer, the one in charge of the company management, derives its power and remuneration from a contract. This remuneration, as the object of a contractual obligation, has always the same cause, i.e. the compensation for a management work, in the broad sense of the term.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:theses.fr/2018BORD0396 |
| Date | 18 December 2018 |
| Creators | Dalus, Noël |
| Contributors | Bordeaux, Deboissy, Florence |
| Source Sets | Dépôt national des thèses électroniques françaises |
| Language | French |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, Text |
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