This thesis investigates conditions for formal negotiation onset. The cases that are investigated are found in the overarching conflict between the Government of Colombia and the guerilla group, Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). The thesis argues that ideology and ecological rationality set the framework for disputant negotiation strategies and that disputants decide whether to progress negotiations to an elevated stage based on their perceived relative strategic position. It is hypostasized, firstly, that the disputants go to formal negotiations when the guerilla perceives itself in a favorable entrapment position, and the government perceives that the guerilla is not in a favorable entrapment position. Secondly, it is hypothesized that disputants go to formal negotiations when there are no perceptions of opponent devious objectives. The findings show weak support for the hypotheses.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-413153 |
| Date | January 2020 |
| Creators | Jansson, Alexander |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för freds- och konfliktforskning |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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