本文以事件研究法探討在公司治理程度不同的公司發布盈餘預測時，
不同類型的投資人在事件窗期中所反映的投資行為。首先以獨立董事與監
察人佔董監席次比例、董監事持股比例、大股東持股比例、經理人持股比
例、機構投資人持股比例、盈餘股份比以及董事長是否兼任總經理作為判
別公司治理程度的指標。再以公司發布盈餘預測的時點做區別，分別以當
年度首度預測是否由公司本身發布，與之後調高以及調低預測做為事件日。
實證結果顯示，當公司治理佳者發布盈餘預測時，外資會出現較多的買超
行為且獲得較高的異常報酬，散戶則持相反動作；而公司治理差者發布盈
餘預測時，散戶的買賣超變化量一般而言會較法人大，出現短期進出的情
形較多，且外資在其調高盈餘預測時，也不會馬上進行買進。整體而言，
外資在公司發布盈餘預測時所做出的交易行為，大致上與公司的治理程度
有正向關係，散戶則大多報持短線進出的態度。 / This study examines how different types of investors behave when entities with different corporate governances announce earnings forecasts. Using seven corporate governance indicators to categorize all of the samples and analyzing how the abnormal return, the results suggests foreign institutional investors are gaining more abnormal return by buying more stocks after earnings announcements of the entities with better corporate governance, and would not interact right after earnings announcements of the entities with worse corporate governance, when the individual investors are going the opposite way to the foreign institutional investors.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0096357026 |
| Creators | 蘇育真 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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