I investigate the way in which Australian managers issue their earnings forecasts, and the impact this has on the reaction of equity investors and security analysts. Using a sample of 233 management earnings forecasts issued from 1994 to 2001, I find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts when they have bad earnings news than good earnings news. I find that a vast majority of forecasts are ???framed??? by the use of an accompanying earnings benchmark. Forecasts are issued with varying degrees of specificity (or precision) and also with variation in additional accompanying disclosures. Forecasts issued with negative framing (forecast earnings less than benchmark earnings) are more likely to be accompanied by statements about factors external to the firm in explaining performance, while forecasts issued with positive framing (forecast earnings greater than benchmark earnings) are more likely to be accompanied by additional verifiable forecasts of components of earnings. I find the market reaction to earnings forecasts released with positive framing is higher than for forecasts released with negative framing, after controlling for forecast news and other forecast properties. I also examine security analysts??? forecasts around the release of management earnings forecasts and find that after the release of a management earnings forecast, analyst activity increases, but that analysts??? forecasts become less accurate and more biased. Neither the extent of analyst activity nor changes in analysts??? forecast accuracy or bias is related to forecast framing.

I investigate the way in which Australian managers issue their earnings forecasts, and the impact this has on the reaction of equity investors and security analysts. Using a sample of 233 management earnings forecasts issued from 1994 to 2001, I find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts when they have bad earnings news than good earnings news. I find that a vast majority of forecasts are ???framed??? by the use of an accompanying earnings benchmark. Forecasts are issued with varying degrees of specificity (or precision) and also with variation in additional accompanying disclosures. Forecasts issued with negative framing (forecast earnings less than benchmark earnings) are more likely to be accompanied by statements about factors external to the firm in explaining performance, while forecasts issued with positive framing (forecast earnings greater than benchmark earnings) are more likely to be accompanied by additional verifiable forecasts of components of earnings. I find the market reaction to earnings forecasts released with positive framing is higher than for forecasts released with negative framing, after controlling for forecast news and other forecast properties. I also examine security analysts??? forecasts around the release of management earnings forecasts and find that after the release of a management earnings forecast, analyst activity increases, but that analysts??? forecasts become less accurate and more biased. Neither the extent of analyst activity nor changes in analysts??? forecast accuracy or bias is related to forecast framing.

This study examines whether short-sellers and financial analysts develop complementary information about future earnings and returns and assesses whether investors can improve predictions made by each of these intermediaries using information provided by the other. The first main result is that the relative short interest ratio (shares sold short divided by total shares outstanding) contains information that is useful for predicting future earnings, beyond (i.e., incremental to) the information in analyst forecasts. I also find that analysts do not fully incorporate short interest information into their forecasts and demonstrate that analyst forecasts can be improved (i.e., can be made to be less biased and more accurate) by adjusting for short interest information. The second main result is that analyst forecast revisions contain information that is useful for predicting future abnormal returns, beyond the information in the relative short interest ratio. I demonstrate that portfolios of stocks formed based on consistent signals from short-sellers and analysts produce abnormal return spreads that are significantly larger than spreads produced by portfolios formed using signals from short-sellers alone. Collectively, the evidence suggests that short-sellers and analyst provide complementary information about future firm performance that is useful to investors.

This study examines whether short-sellers and financial analysts develop complementary information about future earnings and returns and assesses whether investors can improve predictions made by each of these intermediaries using information provided by the other. The first main result is that the relative short interest ratio (shares sold short divided by total shares outstanding) contains information that is useful for predicting future earnings, beyond (i.e., incremental to) the information in analyst forecasts. I also find that analysts do not fully incorporate short interest information into their forecasts and demonstrate that analyst forecasts can be improved (i.e., can be made to be less biased and more accurate) by adjusting for short interest information. The second main result is that analyst forecast revisions contain information that is useful for predicting future abnormal returns, beyond the information in the relative short interest ratio. I demonstrate that portfolios of stocks formed based on consistent signals from short-sellers and analysts produce abnormal return spreads that are significantly larger than spreads produced by portfolios formed using signals from short-sellers alone. Collectively, the evidence suggests that short-sellers and analyst provide complementary information about future firm performance that is useful to investors.

The primary aim of this study is to investigate the stock return volatility surrounding management earnings forecasts. Disclosure by managers of expected earnings are particularly important communications, and as such, it is important to understand the capital market implications surrounding them. In doing so, the research questions are essentially aimed at examining the stock return volatility, first, at the release of a management earnings forecast, and second, at the eventual announcement of the realised earnings for that period. The first test investigates whether there is an increase in volatility surrounding a management earnings forecast for those firms who release them compared to a matched-firm sample of firms without a management earnings forecast at that date, and then further examines that result based on different forecast antecedents and forecast characteristics. Next, this study tests, for firms who do release a management earnings forecast during the year, whether stock volatility is lower than firms who do not release a management earnings forecast at the eventual earnings announcement date. In brief, the evidence using the Garman and Klass [1980] ???best analytic scale-invariant estimator??? of volatility in an Australian context, between 1993 and 2003, finds that stock return volatility is greater for bad news forecasts, forecasts of low specificity, and forecasts issued by firms perceived ex ante as being of lower credibility using both permutation analysis and modelling daily volatility. At the earnings announcement date, however, there is no evidence that stock return volatility is lower for firms that issue management earnings forecasts during the year. Overall, this result challenges the information asymmetry argument in the literature that disclosure will reduce volatility in the long-run.

Prior research has established that stocks with high dispersion of earnings forecasts or short interest are associated with low subsequent returns. Assuming dispersion of forecasts is a proxy for divergence of opinions and short interest is a proxy for short selling constraints, these results have been traditionally attributed to correction for overpricing created by binding short selling constraints. This argument is provided by Miller (1977), and states that prices reflect an optimistic view when investors with pessimistic views can not trade due to short selling constraints, and that the more opinions diverge, the more stocks become overpriced. I test whether dispersion of forecasts exacerbates overpricing, but find evidence contrary to Miller’s theory. When dispersion of forecasts increases, prices decrease. I offer an explanation based on analysts’ reluctance to quickly revise their forecasts downward. I show that some analysts’ sluggish response to bad news results in dispersion of forecasts. The inertia in downward forecast revisions also leads to market underreaction to bad news. Therefore, the negative relationship between dispersion and subsequent returns may be attributable to analysts’ sluggish response to bad news. I also examine the return predictability of firms with high short interest and low institutional ownership. Short interest seems to predict not only future stock returns but also future earnings news, especially for firms with lower institutional ownership. Therefore, the return predictability of short interest seems to be associated with value relevant information short sellers seem to have gathered.

In this thesis, I examine the factors associated with analysts’ voluntary practice of issuing cash flow forecasts and earnings forecasts on the same day. I draw on Hughes and Pae’s (2004) management partial disclosure equilibrium and predict how an analyst decides to issue a cash flow forecast revision along with and according to her bad news and good news earnings forecast revision. In particular, I predict that analysts strategically choose to supplement earnings forecasts with positive cash flow news when they deliver bad news earnings forecasts. Consistent with my prediction, I find that analysts are more likely to issue cash flow forecast revisions in the opposite direction to their earnings forecast revisions when they issue downward earnings forecast revisions than when they issue upward earnings forecast revisions. The results suggest that analysts may not make their decisions to issue cash flow forecasts as objectively as they ought to do in their role as independent information intermediaries. Rather, analyst decisions to issue cash flow forecasts are akin to managers’ strategic decisions to voluntarily disclose supplemental information to affect investors’ confidence in their primary news (earnings forecasts). / Thesis (Ph.D, Management) -- Queen's University, 2009-05-27 16:20:09.248

Information transparency enhances corporate governance. In an attempt to reduce the information asymmetry between business insiders and outsiders and to allow outsiders to have more information for decision making by disclosing more corporate information voluntarily, the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) and Over-The-Counter Securities Exchange (OTCE) requested the Securities & Futures Institute (SFI) to implement an information disclosure and evaluation system for all publicly traded and OTC companies listed in TSEC. This study investigates the effects of the system on decision behavior of the investors, analysts, and auditors. Empirical results indicate that investors¡¦ ability of future earnings evaluation increases, analysts¡¦ earnings forecasts are more accurate, and the earnings forecasts dispersion among the analysts decreases after the system has been implemented. However, the implementation of the system has no effects on the types of audit opinion issued by auditors. Besides, the analysts¡¦ earnings forecasts are more accurate for the ¡§more transparent¡¨ companies. However, the differences of future earnings evaluation, earnings forecasts dispersion among the analysts and types of audit opinion between ¡§more transparent¡¨ and ¡§less transparent¡¨ companies are not significant. These results may provide implication to authorities for making related policies.

The top management team is important to understand as the executives within the top management team would have long-term implications for a firm's investment, operating and financing decisions which would affect the firm value. As these executives may have pre-existing connections outside the current firm, they are likely to be affected by these connections within the top management team. In this dissertation, I draw upon the literature in sociology that discusses different mechanisms of connections; 1) better information transfer, 2) cohesion and better coordination, and 3) favorable treatment to see how the connections within the top management team affects different decisions for the firm using data from 1999 to 2013. First, I find that the executives with connections to the CEO are less likely to be forced out and those with social connections to the CEO enjoy less sensitivity of involuntary turnover to performance. Notably, I find that this is consistent with CEOs favorably treating the connected executives rather than CEOs keeping connected executives for the benefits. Second, I find that firms with greater percentage of executives with connections to the CEO have greater accruals earnings management and lower likelihood of detection of accounting manipulations. I also show that the connections have an effect only when the joint tenure between the CEO and the executives are short. Finally, I document that firms with more closely connected top management team issue management earnings forecasts in a more precise form and issue more frequent and accurate forecasts. I show that this matters more when the top management team’s external network size is small. / Business Administration/Accounting

This thesis consists of three studies on corporate governance issues of Chinese listed companies. In the first study, I investigate the role of board secretaries in management earnings forecasts. Individuals in this senior executive position are responsible for coordinating information disclosure. I find that their legal and accounting expertise and foreign experience help improve management earnings forecast quality. The quality of forecasts, as indicated by forecast occurrence, frequency, precision and accuracy, is positively associated with board secretaries' duality role and equity holdings, whereas it is negatively associated with their political connections. The quality of forecasts is found to increase the compensation of board secretaries. Finally, I show that the equity holdings of board secretaries reduce litigation risks and increase corporate philanthropic giving. Based on the notion that women cooperate more with women than with men, my second study examines the gender interaction effect between female top managers and female board directors in Chinese firms. I show that this gender interaction is positively associated with the firm's accounting return but negatively associated with its stock price return. Earnings management, which can lead to overstated accounting numbers but unfavourable stock market reactions, partly explains the opposite results. Furthermore, I find that only the newly appointed female top managers engage in this earnings management. Overall, the findings suggest that the pressure on women to perform leads to 'women helping women', which is detrimental to shareholders' value. Women are underrepresented on corporate boards. By employing the large variation in socioeconomic development across provinces of China, the third study shows that the barriers to board gender diversity are deeply rooted in societal gender role attitudes. I find that corporate boards tend to be more gender diverse in a province where there is a smaller gender difference in educational achievement in STEM disciplines, where there is a stronger belief that women and men possess equal intrinsic abilities, or where female political leaders are present in the provincial government or communist party. However, I find little evidence that female labour force participation or childcare provision would affect board gender diversity. Collectively, the findings suggest that it is the gender equality attitudes rather than the supply of average female labour that contribute to gender-diverse corporate boards.