2010年3月18日，一場震撼面板產業界的併購案正式拍板定案。群創以1：2.05的換股比率全數以換股交易併購奇美電，群創為存續公司，合併後公司名稱為奇美電子。從此，奇美電子成為全台灣第一大面板廠。首先個案文章裡闡述了面板產業概況，其中包括國內與國外的廠商之間的關係；接著便描述鴻海與其子公司群創以及奇美實業與其子公司奇美電子的企業沿革與特色；之後再提及兩家公司併購後可能帶來的好處與遭遇的困難；文章最後便在討論此併購案之中所衍伸的一些疑問：
1. 諸如為何當初群創會選擇以百分之百的換股交易來收購奇美電?
2. 促成此次併購案的原因為何?背後動機是因為單純的資源共享抑或是有嶄新的商業模式?
3. 以及兩家企業文化的不同是否是扮演此次併購案中另一種要角色?
針對第一個問題，本篇研究分別從量化與質化的面向去探討背後可能原因。就量化部分，我們使用成本效益分析來衡量企業合併的可行性，當併購效益大於併購成本時，則我們認為此併購是可行的。為了探討現金與換股方式的區別，於是各自計算後得出總併購成本，藉此來比較兩者差異。研究結果發現換股交易時所產生的併購成本小於以現金交易的方式；而質化部分的探討是從群創當時現金部位的角度切入，我們認為在金融海嘯過後使得群創現金不足，這可能是導致群創選擇完全以換股併購的原因。
至於第二個問題，我們同樣是以量化與質化兩個角度做切入，量化部分是以迴歸分析來找出併購背後的動機，實證結果顯示併購原因並非為了行銷或研發創新。就質化面相來探討的話，則部分動機是由於群創與奇美電的銷售範圍與主打產品可能有互補的作用，因此奇美會選擇與群創合併而非友達。
最後一個問題則是較無數字的佐證，因此只能從質化部分探討。鴻海的企業文化向來以軍事化管理以及擴展事業版圖的野心著稱；相較之下奇美的企業文化則放較多心力在注重員工與社會上。這也是可能導致群創為此併購案的主併公司而非奇美。
最後在教學手冊有提出幾點當作延伸探討的部分，諸如第一題研究方法的討論、第二題是否有其他方法來檢定其他種類的商業模式創新，以及最後的企業文化所帶來的影響也可透過訪談的方式做更多方面的了解。 / On March 18th,2010, a merge deal that shocked the whole display industry had been made. Innolux used a 100% stock swap rate of 1:2.05 to take over ChiMei; while the new combined company’s name changed into “ChiMei Innolux”. This new born company became the largest display company hereafter. At first, we have a brief introduction about the display industry in the beginning of the case, and then we narrow down the focus on both Innolux and ChiMei, which are our main players in the whole story. In the end, we bring up some questions that hide behind this deal:
1. Why was this deal made by a fully stock swap instead of any cash transaction included?
2. What’s the reason of acquisition in this case? Resource sharing or business model renewing?
3. Was the corporation culture between these two companies accounts for anything?
As for the first question, we try to find out the answer by using both quantitative and qualitative aspects. In quantitative thought, we adapt cost-profit analysis to elaborate the feasibility of this whole deal, and the results show that using fully stock swap is the best way in any scenario; in qualitative thought, we find out that due to the financial crisis impact in 2008, Innolux couldn’t afford to accomplish the deal with cash.
On Question 2, again, we split up the ways into quantitative and qualitative ones. First we use regression analysis to sort out the incentives that drove Innolux to acquire ChiMei. And it shows that this deal was not made for either marketing or R&D innovation; under qualitative perspective, we think that because of both customer and product complementary, these two companies discovered the potential benefit of merging.
The last question, however, is relatively hard to put the test into numbers, so we only have the discussion on the culture of two companies and see what the conflict might be.
In the end of teaching notes, we reserve some points that may need for further discussion.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0099357013 |
| Creators | 陳鼎超 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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