本論文為關於營利與非營利機構之營運管理策略之兩篇理論性質的文章。
第一篇文章旨在探討營利機構之實質盈餘管理策略。本研究檢驗在產品市場競爭下，公司如何透過實質盈餘管理策略來滿足盈餘目標之要求以及公司之實質盈餘管理動機會如何影響市場競爭對手之行為。本文考慮一個兩期非合作之R&D競爭寡占模型。本文假設存在資訊不對稱；具有私人資訊的廠商為追求獲利最大亦或追求盈餘目標達成兩種類型。本文透過完美貝氏均衡 (perfect Bayesian equilibrium) 解出分離均衡 (separating equilibrium) 與混和均衡 (hybrid equilibrium)。
本研究指出追求獲利最大類型之廠商可以藉由影響競爭對手之猜測來進一步左右追求盈餘目標達成類型之目標達成之可能性。在分離均衡中，當外在成本衝擊未超過預期時，追求獲利最大類型之廠商無誘因藉由R&D 投資水準之提升來規避負向成本衝擊以影響市場對手猜測並且進一步提升其產品市場競爭力。因此，追求盈餘目標達成類型之盈餘目標無法達成。
在混和均衡中，當外在成本衝擊超過預期時，追求獲利最大類型之廠商有誘因採取混合策略以誤導市場對手之猜測;該類型之廠商可以藉由部分模仿盈餘目標達成類型之R&D 投資策略以混淆競爭對手之信念並且提升其產品產出、獲利水準。在此，追求盈餘目標達成類型之盈餘目標能夠達成。本研究之結果有別於傳統R&D盈餘管理實證文獻中，公司內部當局有誘因透過R&D支出的減少用以滿足公司短期之盈餘目標 (Barber et. al., 1991; Bushee, 1998; Graham, 2005) 。本研究指出公司可以藉由R&D 投資水準之提升，以創造“cookie jar” 並且有助於公司獲利提升與盈餘目標之達成。此外，本研究與盈餘奇異現象之實證研究 (earnings kinky) 結論一致: 公司可以藉由盈餘管理策略來達成盈餘目標，但是盈餘目標之達成不盡然是透過盈餘管理策略 (Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003)。
第二篇文章旨在探討非營利機構提供非獲利性質服務之策略性之影響。本研究指出非獲利性質服務之提供不僅有助於非營利機構於獲利性質服務之競爭優勢的提升，相對於營利機構。當所有權與經營權分離時，若市場需求彈性為不具彈性時，非獲利性質服務之提供對非營利機構之經理人而言，可以做為一個策略工具藉以促使該機構之所有人提供一個於獲利部分過分補償之薪酬水準。此外，隨著非獲利性質服務之外生價格的提升，當非營利性質服務之外生價格的提升對於非營利機構之所有人與經理人利益衝突影響之間接效果大於對獲利性質服務價格影響之直接效果時，非營利機構之所有人仍然會提供一個獲利部分過分補償之薪酬水準。這會有助於非營利機構於獲利性質服務之競爭優勢的提升。 / This dissertation consists of two theoretical studies on the operation strategies of for-profit and non-profit firms.
Chapter 1 addresses how firms use real earnings management to meet or beat their earnings targets, and how this influences sequential product market competition. We study this issue in a two-period non-cooperative R&D competition with one-sided asymmetric information in which the informed firm could be either the maximizing type or the target-meeting type (or target-beating). We show that the maximizing type of the informed firm’s R&D investment level could influence rival firm’s conjecture about the informed firm’s type which in term affects the success of meeting or beating the target for the target-meeting type of the informed firm.
We find that the privately informed firm can increase its R&D investment in the first period to meet or beat the earnings target. This can help the firm increase profits in a sequential product market competition. More precisely, once the cost uncertainty realized is realized to exceed expectations, the maximizing type of the informed firm could hide its identity by adopting a mixed strategy and setting its R&D investment and output level higher than in the separating equilibrium. Contrary to popular claims that meeting or beating short earnings targets induces an R&D investment reduction (Barber et. al., 1991; Bushee, 1998; Graham, 2005), we show that R&D overinvestment can give an opportunity to create some reserves, i.e., a cookie jar, to be used later to earn a higher profit and reach later targets. Our result is also supporting the observation of firms meeting or beating the earnings target, but not necessarily using earnings management (Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003).
Chapter 2 shows that the provision of not-for profit service would not only give not-for-profit organizations a competitive advantage over for-profit organizations. Under the separation of control and ownership, we illustrate that once market demand is inelastic, the provision of not-for-profit service serves as a strategic device for the manager of a not-for-profit organization and thus induces the owner of a not-for-profit organization to overcompensate his manager regarding the margin of profit. Moreover, as the regulated price of not-for-profit service increases, a not-for-profit organization could still over-compensate his manager in regard to profit, when the indirect effect on increasing preference difference between the owner and manager of the not-for-profit organization dominates the direct effect on market price. Thus, a not-for-profit organization could charge more in for-profit service.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0094352505 |
| Creators | 宋豪漳, Sung, Hao Chang |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 英文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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