Given the importance of historical dividend policy to firms, I investigate whether dividend payers manipulate earnings through real activities to smooth dividend levels and dividend payout ratios. Using Compustat’s Execucomp database, I find evidence that dividend policy impacts both upward and downward real earnings management. I find that payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities to mitigate the shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to prior year dividends when pre-managed earnings are lower than dividends paid in the prior year, suggesting that dividend levels are an important earnings benchmark. I document a stronger relationship between changes in pre-managed earnings and real earnings management for payers than for non-payers, suggesting that dividend policies impact real earnings management. Consistent with the importance of dividend policy in real earnings management, I show that dividend payers that follow conservative dividend policies manipulate earnings to a greater extent than dividend payers that do not follow conservative dividend policies.

Real earnings management has been a subject of increasing debate ever since the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley act in the united states. As research has pointed towards real earnings management increasing this has sparked discussions on whether real earnings management is damaging to companies, or if it is benefiting them, or if it lies somewhere in between. Forthis paper we wanted to examine how the financial incentives of a CEO would affect the usage of real earnings management. Are CEO’s being poorly motivated, and as a result harming their companies? To guide the paper,we decide to formulate our research question thusly: How do different forms of CEO compensation affect real earnings management? In this paper we attempt to find correlations between indicators of realearnings management and threedifferent forms of CEO compensation. For our indicators we follow to a paper by Roychowdhury, titled “Earnings Management Through Real Activities Manipulation”and calculate abnormal cash flow from operations, and abnormal production. These indicate usageof overproduction, reduction of discretionary expenses, and moving sales across periods (Roychowdhury, 2006). For forms of CEO compensation,we measure them as a ratio of total compensation. We track salary, bonuses, and stock ownership. In our results we can see that all three of these are significantly correlated to both of our real earnings management indicators. Bonuses have a positive correlation to abnormal production, and a negative correlation to abnormal cash flow from operations. Salary is positively correlated to both our indicators, and ownership is negatively correlated to both our indicators. Our final conclusion is that yes, the makeup of a CEO’s compensation has a significant effect on the usage of real earnings management within the company.

Background & Subject discussion: Financial reporting and earnings affect stakeholders’ decisions and is a vital component in firm’s information disclosure. Management possesses considerable influence over financial reports. Earnings consist of a cash-flow and accrual component. Earnings can be affected by managers’ judgment and decision either by accrual-based earnings management or real activities manipulation. Earnings management affects the relevance and reliability of financial reporting and is widely researched. Europe is consolidating and accounting and audit standards are harmonizing. Real activities manipulation is unobserved in Europe. Increased attention and regulations of earnings management are inducing more creative methods to alter earnings, such as stock repurchases. Purpose: The main purpose of this study is to investigate if real activities manipulation can be observed in Europe and to what extent in relationship to accrual-based activities to avoid reporting small losses. An underlying purpose is to study different methods of RAM, including some newer approaches to detect hypothesized RAM by stock repurchases. An additional purpose is to evaluate the different utilized detection methods to clarify effectiveness. The final purpose is to consider possible effects of EM on reliability and relevance of financial reporting. Conclusion: The result concludes that earnings management are performed by real activities manipulation. Stock repurchases, decreased discretionary expenses and production cost all indicate earnings management to avoid reporting earnings below a specific benchmark. The result questions the reliability and relevance of reported earnings.

<p>Earnings management could be motivated by either managerial opportunism or efficient contracting. To discriminate between these motivations, I use a measure of product market competition that analytical research predicts will discipline managers and better align their interests with those of shareholders. Thus, if earnings management reflects managerial opportunism, then an increase in competition will decrease earnings management; and if it reflects efficient contracting, then an increase in competition will increase earnings management. Consistent with earnings management indicating managerial opportunism, I show that an increase in competition decreases real earnings management in the form of overproduction to avoid reporting negative earnings or a negative change in earnings.</p> / Dissertation

The earnings game and myopic performance focus induce managers to use judgment and influence to alter the reported earnings. Earnings management is the umbrella term for such manipulative actions, by accruals management or real activates management. The implicit market reactions by the stock returns indicate the effect of EM and if the behaviors are opportunistic or informative for the stakeholders. Accounting variables explain less of the stock return variation and speculative short-term news drives the variation of stock return. Research Question: Can earnings management indicators improve the forecasting of stock returns? The main purpose of the study is to investigate whether EM can be utilized to forecast returns from improving the forecasting of earnings. The authors will include both AM and RAM measures to investigate the different inherent forecasting abilities, adding to the asset pricing research and valuation area. The authors aim to enhance the explanation of cross-sectional variation of stock returns from accounting variables. The authors aim to develop a model more specified to explain the future stock returns from the accounting relationships. An additional purpose is to include transactions with the firm (stock repurchases) to potentially increase the signaling value of the manipulation behaviors. The theoretical framework consists of a discussion of theories and empirical findings regarding the accounting characteristic and relationship with stock returns. Earnings management is explained in-depth along with the empirical findings related to the concept. The capital market perspective is explained by the efficient market and behavioral finance. The chapter is concluded by concepts explaining the relationship and explanations for earnings management and the impact of information. The sample consists of 3545 firms from NASDAQ and NYSE for the years 1992-2012, which equates to around 40 000 observations. We utilize 11 different EM indicators, constructed to capture abnormal components which indicate manipulative actions. The EM indicators’ association with future stock returns is tested by yearly and industry-yearly firm characteristics framework regressions. The firm characteristic framework is developed to control for firm characteristics and evaluate the standalone effect of EM. The result is expanded by investigating earnings persistence, correlations, robust regression and portfolio sorts. The results suggest that total accruals, discretionary accruals, unexpected core earnings, production cost and stock returns are associated with subsequent stock returns. Abnormal SG&amp;A expenses, Abnormal R&amp;D expenses and abnormal cash flows from operations are not associated with stock returns. Earnings are downward manipulated prior and during stock repurchases. The change in ATO and PM diagnostic captures AM but not RAM. The concluding remarks are that EM indicators are associated with future stock returns and improve the forecasting of stock returns via a more accurate forecast of earnings.

This thesis presents two essays on real earnings management and future performance. The first essay draws on empirical studies that examine the three types of real earnings management activities in the United Kingdom (UK) for firms that are more likely to manipulate their earnings to avoid missing earnings targets. These targets include the zero earnings, and last year’s earnings. Also drawing from empirical studies, the second essay investigates the impact of real earnings management on firms’ future operating performance in the UK. In the first essay, I examine earnings management through real activities manipulation by using a sample of UK firms over the period 2009-2013. According to the transaction cost theory and opportunistic perspective of earnings management, the results of the first essay reveal that managers in UK suspect firm-years that manage earnings upward utilise more real earnings management activities to achieve earnings benchmarks opportunistically. Specifically, I find that (1) firms which manage upward earnings have unusually low cash flows from operations by offering price discounts or/and more lenient credit terms to increase sales; (2) firms that manage upward earnings have unusually low discretionary expenditures by cutting/reducing expenditures spending to improve reported margin and (3) firms which manage upward earnings, incur unusually high production costs by producing more products to report lower costs of goods sold in order to achieve their targets. Further, I find evidence that UK firms’ meeting/beating earnings benchmarks around zero earnings and last year’s earnings engage in sales-based manipulation and reducing/cutting discretionary expenses simultaneously; they also engage in overproducing products and reducing discretionary expenses at the same time. Furthermore, I do not find, however, evidence that managers in UK firms are associated with high real earnings management through sales-based manipulation to meet/beat last year’s earnings. On the other hand, I find evidence that manager in UK firms engage in income-increasing earnings management through accounting choice (e.g., accrual-based earnings management) to meet an earnings target. Motivated by agency conflicts of real earnings management (e.g., opportunistic and signalling perspectives), the second essay investigates whether there is an association between UK firms that manipulate their business operations to meet earnings benchmarks (e.g., zero earnings, last year’s earnings) and subsequent operating performance. I implement Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) regression analysis to examine the effects of the magnitude of real earnings management on firms’ future performance. Empirical test results show that manipulation of operating activities such as sales, discretionary expenditures, and production costs to meet earnings benchmarks has a significant positive consequence for firms’ subsequent operating performance and signals firms’ good future performance. Further, I find evidence that firms that manipulate their operating activities in the absence of meeting/beating earnings benchmarks experience a decline in their subsequent operating performance. The findings of this research lend support to our understanding of the process that management follows to evaluate costs and benefits of real earnings management.

Emerging research on real earnings management [REM] has expressed the concern that firms deviating from normal business practices may endure a negative impact on future cash flows and performance. This dissertation (in three essays) investigates the phenomenon of real earnings management in its association with: 1) enterprise resource planning systems [ERPs]; 2) audit report lags [ARLs]; and 3) future firm performance. In the first investigation I hypothesize that the increased monitoring associated with the implementation of an ERP will result in a decline in REM. In the second investigation I hypothesize that higher levels of REM will evoke greater auditor scrutiny and be associated with longer ARLs. In the third investigation I hypothesize that managerial actions that would ordinarily be classified as REM: reductions in discretionary expenditures or overproduction, are not REM but indicative of enhanced efficiencies when found in concert with prior period restructurings or expected future sales growth respectively. In each of the three investigations, my hypotheses are confirmed.

<p>I start with a sample of 26,998 CEOs from the Compustat Executive Compensation (ExecuComp) database starting January 1, 1991 and ending January 1, 2009. I then match the sample with the FAA’s Airmen Certification database using the CEO’s first name, middle initial, and last name. Names with a match are coded as pilots and names without a match are coded as non-pilots. Following Roychowdhury (2006) I remove all firms in regulated industries (SIC codes between 4400 and 5000) as well as banks and financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6500). The resulting sample consists of 255 pilot-CEOs and 3,935 non-pilot-CEOs. I then merge the CEO dataset to the Compustat Fundamentals Annual database to obtain a final sample consisting of 1,038 CEO-pilot firm-years and 18,455 CEO-non-pilot firm-years. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.</p><p><a></a> </p><div><br><div><p><br></p></div></div>

In this thesis the relationship between company performance and top management stock ownership in the Swedish market was examined. As well as conducting research on the influence real earnings management has on company performance, and how real earnings management relates to the top management stock ownership. The study was based on a quantitative approach with secondary data that was retrieved from Eikon Refinitiv database, where the data stretched back from 2018-2020. This research found no clear relationship between the main concepts under investigation, that is stock ownership of top management and stock returns. The authors explain this by the sampling method in this research only include companies with share holdings. Furthermore, compared to other studies looking this research considers multiple market capitalizations who may operate differently. Finally, there is a suspicion in the field of research that the relationship between the two is not of a linear nature as such a linear methodology will not find any clear results. In conclusion, this research could be added to the list that does not find a relationship between the above stated variables to the literature which could further be applied to the Swedish market. In terms of real earnings management, a strong negative influence was found on share returns. The authors suggest that this finding can be used as a basis to form investment strategies through monitoring the occurrence of REM to predict when insiders are going to buy and sell. Through pursuing this strategy, it may be possible to create superior return as this study found support for the semi-strong form of market efficiency. Unfortunately, this study found no clear guidance of resolving agency issues. Rather it was concluded that shareholdings in the top management does not resolve agency problems given the occurrence of REM. The management most likely benefit from this through trading the company stock. However, further investigation on the topic should be conducted as it seems that alignment using holdings become more or less effective at certain levels of management share ownership. Furthermore, the notion that American ways of agency alignment may not be appropriate in the Swedish market was considered but no clear conclusion could be made in this research.

Aktiebolagslagen (2005:551) 4 kap. 5§ är ett avsteg från likhetsprincipen eftersom aktier med olika röstvärden tillåts. Vi undersöker om svenska noterade företag med röststarka aktier använder mer eller mindre resultatmanipulation än andra företag. Eftersom ägare i företag med röststarka aktier enklare kan erhålla kontroll torde agentproblem mellan företagsledning och ägare minska. Dock riskerar nya agentproblem uppstå mellan kontrollerande ägare och minoritetsägare. Dessutom värderas företag med röststarka aktier lägre än andra företag, vilket skapar incitament att sänka kostnaden för eget kapital genom resultatmanipulation. Vi undersöker resultatmanipulation med tre mått för periodiseringsbaserad respektive operativ resultatmanipulation. Resultaten indikerar att företag med röststarka aktier använder mer periodiseringsbaserad resultatmanipulation än andra företag. Däremot illustrerar operativ resultatmanipulation en tvetydig bild. Vi uppmanar att dessa operationella mått tolkas med försiktighet, då åtgärder kan drivas av olika bakomliggande motiv.