由於會計資訊與企業存有緊密之關聯性，再加上企業外部的報表使用者屬於相對資訊弱勢者，企業之管理當局因此存有許多不同動機及機會進行盈餘管理。會計師受託查核公司財務報表並對報表表示意見，在健全資本市場的任務中擔任極為重要的角色，社會大眾對會計師之職責賦予相當大的期待。但繼美國安隆案後，各國財務報導相關弊案連續爆發卻使會計師的專業遭受嚴重質疑，因此，弊案爆發或會計師受主管機關懲處後，先前被懲處會計師所簽證之其他受查公司，不論有無類似弊病，都會被人以放大鏡來觀察。然而，究竟會計師對於實質盈餘管理之抑制效果是否得以發揮？會計師懲戒制度實施結果是否合乎立法初衷而得以督促提升報表之盈餘品質？則尚無一致結論，亦為本研究欲探討的議題。 / Grahem et al.（2005），Roychowdhury（2006）及Cohen et al.（2008）等文獻均認為沙氏法頒布後，公司管理階層用以操縱盈餘之行為，從過去進行應計項目盈餘管理，改為偵察度較困難、法律上可非難性較低之實質盈餘管理。本研究即參考Roychowdhury之研究，以異常裁決性費用、異常生產成本、異常營運活動現金流量之絕對值捕捉實質盈餘管理程度，依據欲探討之問題設定兩大研究假說，以獨立樣本觀察懲戒會計師事件發生前後期實質盈餘管理之變化，探討懲戒會計師制度對於實質盈餘管理之影響。研究結果發現，以異常裁決性費用與異常生產成本衡量實質盈餘管理之程度時，受懲戒會計師之客戶在經查核後之財務報表中，報導實質盈餘管理之程度更為嚴重；以異常營運活動現金流量為實質盈餘管理之代理變數，則因受干擾影響而無法在各假說下得出顯著之結果。 / 因會計師之查核關卡對於實質盈餘管理之抑制效果有限，目前企業報表中所報導數據之解讀，有賴報表使用者多予比較各科目前、後期波動，考量各數值之間之關連性，並推敲公司可能使用之盈餘管理行為以及相關企業風險。懲戒制度之目的在於避免專業人士怠忽其職、違規行事而侵害大眾利益，其不僅處分已違法之會計師，對於其他會計師亦有警惕之意味，因此實有其存在之必要，本研究結果建議主管機關參考相關研究，制訂更為完善的制度以增進大眾利益，符合社會期待。 / Since accounting information is instrumental to many decisions that a company and its stakeholders make, management has plenty of motives to manage earnings reported on the financial statements. The users will probably as a result misinterpret the data, and thus, sustain direct or indirect losses. Accountants are asked to express their opinions toward the financial reports, and have played an important role in the capital market. Investors rely on what accountants assure in their audit to make decisions. However, after the Enron scandal broke out, so many frauds erupted that accountants’ professionalism and assurance quality were being questioned. Sanctions may be due to the profession’s self-regulation system or based on judgment of the regulators. Nevertheless, does the CPA sanction system actually restrain the real earnings management behavior of auditee companies? Can the system really enhance the earnings quality of client accounting information? The answers to these questions are unknown, and they are the subject of this study. / Managers have altered their application to manage earnings from accruals to real activities since the issuance of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Based upon the research model developed by Roychowdhury (2006), this study uses abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal production, and abnormal operating cash flow as proxies for earnings management. I classify samples into two periods, i.e., before and after changing accountants to analyze whether the sanction has affected the application of real earnings management. The results do not support that the auditor sanction system in Taiwan is effective in reducing the real earnings management behavior of auditee firms. / In short, one purpose of CPA sanction is to enforce professional conduct on all members of the profession. It not only punishes the accountants that break laws, but also alerts other fellow auditors. Therefore, the sanction system is necessary. The regulators should refer to research findings and examine the effect of the sanction system on real earnings management. In the mean time, it is advisable that statements users put more emphasis on analyzing and comparing the fluctuations of the figures and ratios between periods. After all, reading carefully through financial statements and numbers is the ultimate way to stop real earnings management.

本研究旨在探討家族企業及非家族企業兩種不同的公司治理型態，其董事會各組成區塊與企業進行實質盈餘管理之間的關聯性。實質盈餘管理係以異常營運活動現金流量、異常生產成本及異常裁決性費用為衡量指標，並以2004年至2011年間我國初次上市櫃(IPO)的電子產業為樣本範圍。 實證結果發現，在家族企業中：(1)最終控制者控制席次過半及經理人董事席次比率愈高，愈可顯著抑制企業進行實質盈餘管理。(2)外部董事席次比率愈高，對企業進行實質盈餘管理有反向助長之傾向。(3)獨立董事席次愈多，愈能顯著監督企業進行實質盈餘管理，唯在企業以裁決性支出方式操弄盈餘方面較無監督能力。在非家族企業中：(1)最終控制者控制席次過半及外部董事席次比率的增加，對抑制企業從事實質盈餘管理無顯著效果。(2)獨立董事席次的增加可顯著抑制企業操弄盈餘。(3)經理人董事席次比率愈高，愈顯著助長企業進行實質盈餘管理。 / This thesis aims to discuss the relationship between board composition and real earnings management (hereafter, REM) under family business and non-family business. This study uses abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses as a measure of real earnings management. Data is collected from electronics industry in Taiwan which applied for Initial Public Offerings (IPO) from 2004 to 2011. The empirical results show that in family business: (1) If the ratio of board seat-control of ultimate controller is over 50 percents, or the ratio of board seats of manager is higher, it is helpful to restrain firms from manipulating earnings by REM.(2) Once the ratio of board seats of outside directors is higher, it is prone to promote firms to do REM.(3) Once the board seats of independent directors are more, it is significant to reduce the degree of REM. However, they seem to have no abilities to restrain firms from manipulating earnings by varying discretionary expenses. In non-family business: (1) The board seat-control of ultimate controller over 50 has nothing to do with decreasing the degree of REM. Also,the increase of the ratio of board seats of outside directors is not significantly to suppress the degree of REM. (2)The increase of board seats of independent directors is effectively to reduce the extent of REM. (3) If the ratio of board seats of manager is higher, it will push firms to manipulate earnings by REM.

本研究主要探討中國上市公司內部控制品質與盈餘管理是否有關聯。在本研究中分別使用兩種盈餘管理方式進行實證，結果顯示內部控制品質和盈餘管理程度呈顯著負相關，意即內部控制品質越好，越能抑制公司管理者進行盈餘管理。精確來說，良好的內部控制品質可以抑制管理者利用裁決性應計數美化財務報表，意即好的內部控制可以減少應基礎盈餘管理；在實質盈餘管理方面，本研究發現良好的內部控制品質可以減緩管理者透過過度生產向上盈餘管理，降低管理階層增加裁決性費用已達到預期盈餘目標以及抑制公司透過操控銷貨以影響盈餘之情況，意即好的內部控制能有效減少管理者進行實質盈餘管理。整體而言，本研究結果發現好的內部控制，能有效減少管理者進行應計基礎及實質盈餘管理。 / The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether there is a relationship between internal control and earnings management. In this thesis, I use two types of earnings management: accrual-based and real activities earnings management and I find that there is a significantly negative relationship between quality of internal control and earnings management. Specifically, my results show that high-quality internal control inhibits managers from earnings management through discretionary accruals, implying that high-quality internal control could lower the level of accruals-based earnings management. Moreover, I document that high-quality internal control could reduce upwards real earnings management through increase production, decrease influence through decreasing manipulation discretionary expenses and lessen level of abnormal cash flow. Collectively, I find that high-quality internal control can lower the level of real and accrual-based earnings management behaviors.

本論文為關於營利與非營利機構之營運管理策略之兩篇理論性質的文章。 第一篇文章旨在探討營利機構之實質盈餘管理策略。本研究檢驗在產品市場競爭下，公司如何透過實質盈餘管理策略來滿足盈餘目標之要求以及公司之實質盈餘管理動機會如何影響市場競爭對手之行為。本文考慮一個兩期非合作之R&D競爭寡占模型。本文假設存在資訊不對稱；具有私人資訊的廠商為追求獲利最大亦或追求盈餘目標達成兩種類型。本文透過完美貝氏均衡 (perfect Bayesian equilibrium) 解出分離均衡 (separating equilibrium) 與混和均衡 (hybrid equilibrium)。 本研究指出追求獲利最大類型之廠商可以藉由影響競爭對手之猜測來進一步左右追求盈餘目標達成類型之目標達成之可能性。在分離均衡中，當外在成本衝擊未超過預期時，追求獲利最大類型之廠商無誘因藉由R&D 投資水準之提升來規避負向成本衝擊以影響市場對手猜測並且進一步提升其產品市場競爭力。因此，追求盈餘目標達成類型之盈餘目標無法達成。 在混和均衡中，當外在成本衝擊超過預期時，追求獲利最大類型之廠商有誘因採取混合策略以誤導市場對手之猜測;該類型之廠商可以藉由部分模仿盈餘目標達成類型之R&D 投資策略以混淆競爭對手之信念並且提升其產品產出、獲利水準。在此，追求盈餘目標達成類型之盈餘目標能夠達成。本研究之結果有別於傳統R&D盈餘管理實證文獻中，公司內部當局有誘因透過R&D支出的減少用以滿足公司短期之盈餘目標 (Barber et. al., 1991; Bushee, 1998; Graham, 2005) 。本研究指出公司可以藉由R&D 投資水準之提升，以創造“cookie jar” 並且有助於公司獲利提升與盈餘目標之達成。此外，本研究與盈餘奇異現象之實證研究 (earnings kinky) 結論一致: 公司可以藉由盈餘管理策略來達成盈餘目標，但是盈餘目標之達成不盡然是透過盈餘管理策略 (Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003)。 第二篇文章旨在探討非營利機構提供非獲利性質服務之策略性之影響。本研究指出非獲利性質服務之提供不僅有助於非營利機構於獲利性質服務之競爭優勢的提升，相對於營利機構。當所有權與經營權分離時，若市場需求彈性為不具彈性時，非獲利性質服務之提供對非營利機構之經理人而言，可以做為一個策略工具藉以促使該機構之所有人提供一個於獲利部分過分補償之薪酬水準。此外，隨著非獲利性質服務之外生價格的提升，當非營利性質服務之外生價格的提升對於非營利機構之所有人與經理人利益衝突影響之間接效果大於對獲利性質服務價格影響之直接效果時，非營利機構之所有人仍然會提供一個獲利部分過分補償之薪酬水準。這會有助於非營利機構於獲利性質服務之競爭優勢的提升。 / This dissertation consists of two theoretical studies on the operation strategies of for-profit and non-profit firms. Chapter 1 addresses how firms use real earnings management to meet or beat their earnings targets, and how this influences sequential product market competition. We study this issue in a two-period non-cooperative R&D competition with one-sided asymmetric information in which the informed firm could be either the maximizing type or the target-meeting type (or target-beating). We show that the maximizing type of the informed firm’s R&D investment level could influence rival firm’s conjecture about the informed firm’s type which in term affects the success of meeting or beating the target for the target-meeting type of the informed firm. We find that the privately informed firm can increase its R&D investment in the first period to meet or beat the earnings target. This can help the firm increase profits in a sequential product market competition. More precisely, once the cost uncertainty realized is realized to exceed expectations, the maximizing type of the informed firm could hide its identity by adopting a mixed strategy and setting its R&D investment and output level higher than in the separating equilibrium. Contrary to popular claims that meeting or beating short earnings targets induces an R&D investment reduction (Barber et. al., 1991; Bushee, 1998; Graham, 2005), we show that R&D overinvestment can give an opportunity to create some reserves, i.e., a cookie jar, to be used later to earn a higher profit and reach later targets. Our result is also supporting the observation of firms meeting or beating the earnings target, but not necessarily using earnings management (Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003). Chapter 2 shows that the provision of not-for profit service would not only give not-for-profit organizations a competitive advantage over for-profit organizations. Under the separation of control and ownership, we illustrate that once market demand is inelastic, the provision of not-for-profit service serves as a strategic device for the manager of a not-for-profit organization and thus induces the owner of a not-for-profit organization to overcompensate his manager regarding the margin of profit. Moreover, as the regulated price of not-for-profit service increases, a not-for-profit organization could still over-compensate his manager in regard to profit, when the indirect effect on increasing preference difference between the owner and manager of the not-for-profit organization dominates the direct effect on market price. Thus, a not-for-profit organization could charge more in for-profit service.