由於會計資訊與企業存有緊密之關聯性，再加上企業外部的報表使用者屬於相對資訊弱勢者，企業之管理當局因此存有許多不同動機及機會進行盈餘管理。會計師受託查核公司財務報表並對報表表示意見，在健全資本市場的任務中擔任極為重要的角色，社會大眾對會計師之職責賦予相當大的期待。但繼美國安隆案後，各國財務報導相關弊案連續爆發卻使會計師的專業遭受嚴重質疑，因此，弊案爆發或會計師受主管機關懲處後，先前被懲處會計師所簽證之其他受查公司，不論有無類似弊病，都會被人以放大鏡來觀察。然而，究竟會計師對於實質盈餘管理之抑制效果是否得以發揮？會計師懲戒制度實施結果是否合乎立法初衷而得以督促提升報表之盈餘品質？則尚無一致結論，亦為本研究欲探討的議題。 / Grahem et al.（2005），Roychowdhury（2006）及Cohen et al.（2008）等文獻均認為沙氏法頒布後，公司管理階層用以操縱盈餘之行為，從過去進行應計項目盈餘管理，改為偵察度較困難、法律上可非難性較低之實質盈餘管理。本研究即參考Roychowdhury之研究，以異常裁決性費用、異常生產成本、異常營運活動現金流量之絕對值捕捉實質盈餘管理程度，依據欲探討之問題設定兩大研究假說，以獨立樣本觀察懲戒會計師事件發生前後期實質盈餘管理之變化，探討懲戒會計師制度對於實質盈餘管理之影響。研究結果發現，以異常裁決性費用與異常生產成本衡量實質盈餘管理之程度時，受懲戒會計師之客戶在經查核後之財務報表中，報導實質盈餘管理之程度更為嚴重；以異常營運活動現金流量為實質盈餘管理之代理變數，則因受干擾影響而無法在各假說下得出顯著之結果。 / 因會計師之查核關卡對於實質盈餘管理之抑制效果有限，目前企業報表中所報導數據之解讀，有賴報表使用者多予比較各科目前、後期波動，考量各數值之間之關連性，並推敲公司可能使用之盈餘管理行為以及相關企業風險。懲戒制度之目的在於避免專業人士怠忽其職、違規行事而侵害大眾利益，其不僅處分已違法之會計師，對於其他會計師亦有警惕之意味，因此實有其存在之必要，本研究結果建議主管機關參考相關研究，制訂更為完善的制度以增進大眾利益，符合社會期待。 / Since accounting information is instrumental to many decisions that a company and its stakeholders make, management has plenty of motives to manage earnings reported on the financial statements. The users will probably as a result misinterpret the data, and thus, sustain direct or indirect losses. Accountants are asked to express their opinions toward the financial reports, and have played an important role in the capital market. Investors rely on what accountants assure in their audit to make decisions. However, after the Enron scandal broke out, so many frauds erupted that accountants’ professionalism and assurance quality were being questioned. Sanctions may be due to the profession’s self-regulation system or based on judgment of the regulators. Nevertheless, does the CPA sanction system actually restrain the real earnings management behavior of auditee companies? Can the system really enhance the earnings quality of client accounting information? The answers to these questions are unknown, and they are the subject of this study. / Managers have altered their application to manage earnings from accruals to real activities since the issuance of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Based upon the research model developed by Roychowdhury (2006), this study uses abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal production, and abnormal operating cash flow as proxies for earnings management. I classify samples into two periods, i.e., before and after changing accountants to analyze whether the sanction has affected the application of real earnings management. The results do not support that the auditor sanction system in Taiwan is effective in reducing the real earnings management behavior of auditee firms. / In short, one purpose of CPA sanction is to enforce professional conduct on all members of the profession. It not only punishes the accountants that break laws, but also alerts other fellow auditors. Therefore, the sanction system is necessary. The regulators should refer to research findings and examine the effect of the sanction system on real earnings management. In the mean time, it is advisable that statements users put more emphasis on analyzing and comparing the fluctuations of the figures and ratios between periods. After all, reading carefully through financial statements and numbers is the ultimate way to stop real earnings management.

本研究主要探討中國上市公司內部控制品質與盈餘管理是否有關聯。在本研究中分別使用兩種盈餘管理方式進行實證，結果顯示內部控制品質和盈餘管理程度呈顯著負相關，意即內部控制品質越好，越能抑制公司管理者進行盈餘管理。精確來說，良好的內部控制品質可以抑制管理者利用裁決性應計數美化財務報表，意即好的內部控制可以減少應基礎盈餘管理；在實質盈餘管理方面，本研究發現良好的內部控制品質可以減緩管理者透過過度生產向上盈餘管理，降低管理階層增加裁決性費用已達到預期盈餘目標以及抑制公司透過操控銷貨以影響盈餘之情況，意即好的內部控制能有效減少管理者進行實質盈餘管理。整體而言，本研究結果發現好的內部控制，能有效減少管理者進行應計基礎及實質盈餘管理。 / The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether there is a relationship between internal control and earnings management. In this thesis, I use two types of earnings management: accrual-based and real activities earnings management and I find that there is a significantly negative relationship between quality of internal control and earnings management. Specifically, my results show that high-quality internal control inhibits managers from earnings management through discretionary accruals, implying that high-quality internal control could lower the level of accruals-based earnings management. Moreover, I document that high-quality internal control could reduce upwards real earnings management through increase production, decrease influence through decreasing manipulation discretionary expenses and lessen level of abnormal cash flow. Collectively, I find that high-quality internal control can lower the level of real and accrual-based earnings management behaviors.