醫療財團法人在台灣醫療界的實力日漸茁壯，已不容我們所輕忽，此外國內外對非營利醫院的董事會結構組成之探討文獻相當缺乏，有鑑於此，本文的目的即是在對此領域作研究以對有關政府單位和未來的學者提供參考借鏡。 本文以台灣醫療財團法人為研究對象，主要分兩部分探討：第一部分主要探討醫療財團法人之董事會治理結構與經營績效關聯。第二部分主要探討醫療財團法人文化背景差異對公益支出是否有影響。 而實證結果顯示：第一部分中我們發現醫療財團法人董事會結構組成中，院長或執行長身兼董事、外部董事比例越高、設置常務董事皆與醫務利益率有正面關聯，而醫事背景董事比例越高和設置監察人皆與醫務利益率呈負面關聯。第二部分中我們發現宗教和企業團體創設背景的醫療財團法人對公益支出都有顯著的影響力。研究教育支出與慈善醫療支出分配方面卻值得我們注意，尤其企業財團背景在研究支出的迴歸結果極為顯著。

隨著經濟自由主義時代來臨，面對全球性的競爭及各國市場逐漸開放，公營事業民營化已是各國政府的重要財經政策之一。過去有關民營化對企業經營績效影響之研究頗為豐富，其中國外文獻大多贊成民營化對企業經營績效有顯著提昇之影響，然而國內相關文獻之研究結果，則較為紛歧。本文以西元1989年我國正式推動民營化政策以來，採用釋股方式完成移轉民營之21家上市公司為研究對象，來探討民營化企業獲利能力及經營績效的影響因素。由實證結果得知，政府持股比率、專業機構投資人持股比率、經理人持股比率、獨立董事人數、員工股票分紅等因素，對公司經營績效呈顯著正相關；然而董監事持股比率、董事會規模等因素，則對公司經營績效呈顯著負相關。 / In the era of economic liberalization and globalization, privatization has become one of the most important economic policies around the world. During the past two decades, most studies have indicated that the performance of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) has improved after they were privatized. However, studies on SOEs of Taiwan have received controversial results. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ownership structure and board composition on the performance of privatized firms in Taiwan that experienced full or partial privatization through public share offerings during the period 1989 to 2008. The results show that the ratio of government holdings, the ratio of institutional investors holdings, the ratio of managers holdings, the number of independent directors and share option schemes have significantly positive effects on firm performances. The results also suggest that the scale of board of directors and the ratio of directors holdings have significantly negative effects.

本研究旨在探討家族企業及非家族企業兩種不同的公司治理型態，其董事會各組成區塊與企業進行實質盈餘管理之間的關聯性。實質盈餘管理係以異常營運活動現金流量、異常生產成本及異常裁決性費用為衡量指標，並以2004年至2011年間我國初次上市櫃(IPO)的電子產業為樣本範圍。 實證結果發現，在家族企業中：(1)最終控制者控制席次過半及經理人董事席次比率愈高，愈可顯著抑制企業進行實質盈餘管理。(2)外部董事席次比率愈高，對企業進行實質盈餘管理有反向助長之傾向。(3)獨立董事席次愈多，愈能顯著監督企業進行實質盈餘管理，唯在企業以裁決性支出方式操弄盈餘方面較無監督能力。在非家族企業中：(1)最終控制者控制席次過半及外部董事席次比率的增加，對抑制企業從事實質盈餘管理無顯著效果。(2)獨立董事席次的增加可顯著抑制企業操弄盈餘。(3)經理人董事席次比率愈高，愈顯著助長企業進行實質盈餘管理。 / This thesis aims to discuss the relationship between board composition and real earnings management (hereafter, REM) under family business and non-family business. This study uses abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses as a measure of real earnings management. Data is collected from electronics industry in Taiwan which applied for Initial Public Offerings (IPO) from 2004 to 2011. The empirical results show that in family business: (1) If the ratio of board seat-control of ultimate controller is over 50 percents, or the ratio of board seats of manager is higher, it is helpful to restrain firms from manipulating earnings by REM.(2) Once the ratio of board seats of outside directors is higher, it is prone to promote firms to do REM.(3) Once the board seats of independent directors are more, it is significant to reduce the degree of REM. However, they seem to have no abilities to restrain firms from manipulating earnings by varying discretionary expenses. In non-family business: (1) The board seat-control of ultimate controller over 50 has nothing to do with decreasing the degree of REM. Also,the increase of the ratio of board seats of outside directors is not significantly to suppress the degree of REM. (2)The increase of board seats of independent directors is effectively to reduce the extent of REM. (3) If the ratio of board seats of manager is higher, it will push firms to manipulate earnings by REM.

員工認股權之發行，可降低企業代理成本，並達激勵員工之效果。過去研究指出，公司股權結構及董事會組成特性的不同，將對員工認股權獎酬政策產生影響。據此，本研究以員工認股權證發行比例及員工認股權價值，作為衡量員工認股權獎酬指標，並以民國九十年至九十五年間發行員工認股權之台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，探討員工認股權與公司治理間之關聯性。實證結果顯示如下： 一、董監事持股率與員工認股權獎酬無顯著關係。 二、經理人持股率與員工認股權價值呈顯著負相關。 三、內部董事持股率與員工認股權證發放比例及價值皆具有顯著正相關，並與後者呈先增後減之倒U型關係。 四、機構投資人持股率與員工認股權證發行比例呈顯著負相關，與價值呈顯著正向關係。 五、董事會規模與員工認股權證發放比例及價值皆呈顯著正相關。 六、董事長兼任總經理及獨立董事席次比例皆對員工認股權價值具顯負相關。 / Employee stock option plans are often used to alleviate agency cost and to serve as a tool for motivation. Previous studies have indicated that different ownership structure and composition of board members have impact on employee stock option compensation policy. Accordingly, this study used the ratio of stock option granted to the common shares outstanding and the market value of the total option shares granted as the indication of stock option compensation to test whether employee stock option plans are related in some way to corporate governance. Sample firms are selected from listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC firms granting stock options during the period of 2001 to 2006. Empirical results are as follows: 1.There is no significant relationship between the percentage of stock holdings of board members and employee stock option plan. 2.The percentage of top management stock holdings is negatively associated with the market value of employee stock option with statistical significance. 3.Internal directors’ stock holding ratio is positively associated with the employee stock option ratio and market value. Specifically, the relation between the internal directors’ stock holding ratio and the market value of the employee stock option is convex. 4.The institutional investors’ stock holding ratio is negatively associated with employee stock option ratio but positively associated with market value of employee stock option. 5.The board size is positively associated with both the ratio and market value of the employee stock option. 6.Both the duality of Chairman/CEO and the percentage of independent directors are negatively associated with the market value of employee stock option.

公司治理的研究,其主要的目的是了解董事會組成,董事會規模,外部董事, 董事及CEO薪酬誘因,CEO改組,外部大股東,外國股東,機構投資人,控制權和股權集中性,併購,法律制度及執行,法源…等變數對以ROA,ROE,會計盈餘,Tobin’s Q和股市報酬率所代表的公司績效之影響。與公司治理有關的重要指標包括股份控制權,現金流量權,董監事席次的控制權,控制權與股權的偏離,次大股東,金字塔結構,交叉持股,優先投票權,外部董事比例等。 本論文共計8章40節,引述國外文獻約500篇並由國際公司治理的實證結果來探討我國五家金控：開發金、台新金、復華金、富邦金、兆豐金的公司治理,最後提出九點結論和建議。