本研究將總經理之異動分為自願性與非自願異動二種,主要探討董事會之特性與、控制股東與總經理發生非自願性異動間之關聯性,並且強調從董事會獨立性及最終控制者對董事會之控制力觀點,探討董事會解除總經理職務之決策行為。除此之外,本研究尚探討總經理異動後影響董事會選任繼任總經理之決策行為,主要從董事會之獨立性與異動前績效兩項觀點。研究樣本為民國八十八年至九十二年之台灣上市公司,探用Logit model來檢驗假說。
在總經理發生非自願性異動方面,實證結果顯示,當前期的績效愈差時,總經理發生非自願性異動的機率愈高,本研究並將董事會特性分為股權結構及董事會獨立性兩種,並加入最終控制者觀點,實證結果顯示,獨立董事的比率愈高,總經理發生非自願性異動的機率愈高,惟其結果不具統計上的重大性。總經理之持股比率佔董事全體持股比率較高時,愈容易發生總經理非自願性異動,但不具有統計上的重大性。當董事長與總經理為同一人時,較不易發生總經理非自願性異動。此外,在最終控制者方面,實證結果顯示,當控制股東席次控制權愈高時,總經理發生非自願性異動的機率愈低,控制股東的盈餘分配權與席次控制權的偏離程度愈大時,總經理發生非自願性異動的機率愈低,但不具統計上的重大性。
在繼任總經理特性與董事會特性關聯性方面,實證結果顯示,當異動前績效愈差時,董事會愈傾向於選用外部繼任者,但不具有統計上的重大性。獨立董事比率愈高,董事會愈傾向於選用外部繼任者。
整體而言,績效是影響我國上市公司總經理發生非自願性異動的重要原因之一,除此之外,董事長兼任總經理之情形,讓董事長有能力去阻止他們被撤換,進而降低總經理非自願性的離職機率。由於我國上市公司特殊的股權結構,使得控制股東掌控了董事會並且積極參與公司經營,造成董事會流於形式,無形中降低了董事會的監督職能,而設置獨立董事是提高董事會職能發揮的重要機制之一,在本研究中,雖未發現獨立董事的設置對於董事會的監督職能之顯著助益,但發現設置獨立董事在決定繼任者方面,能提出專業建言,使得董事會選任繼任總經理能有更廣泛的人選,而非侷限於公司內部。 / This research CEO turnover will divide into voluntary turnover and non- voluntary turnover. This research discusses the relationship among corporate performance, characteristics of board of the directors, non- voluntary CEO turnover and controlling shareholders. This research emphasizes the board of directors independence and the controlling shareholders’ controlling force over the board of directors and discusses the board of directors’ policy-making behavior of firing CEO.In addition, this research also discusses how does the board of directors appoint succeed CEO.The sample consists of all public companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation over the four-year period 2000-2003.According to previous studies, the characteristics of the board of directors are ownership structure and independence. This research also considerate the controlling shareholders.
This research provides evidence on the relationship between non- voluntary CEO turnover and corporate performance. The likelihood of non- voluntary CEO turnover is significantly negatively related to the pre-performance. Non- voluntary CEO turnover rate is low when the chairman of the board and CEO are the same person. In addition, this research provides evidence on the relationship between the board of directors independence and the characteristics of the succeed CEO.When the fraction of outside directors is high, the board of directors comparatively possibly appoints the outsider successor.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0091353035 |
Creators | 陳慧玲 |
Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
Language | 中文 |
Detected Language | English |
Type | text |
Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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