本研究將總經理之異動分為自願性與非自願異動二種，主要探討董事會之特性與、控制股東與總經理發生非自願性異動間之關聯性，並且強調從董事會獨立性及最終控制者對董事會之控制力觀點，探討董事會解除總經理職務之決策行為。除此之外，本研究尚探討總經理異動後影響董事會選任繼任總經理之決策行為，主要從董事會之獨立性與異動前績效兩項觀點。研究樣本為民國八十八年至九十二年之台灣上市公司，探用Logit model來檢驗假說。 在總經理發生非自願性異動方面，實證結果顯示，當前期的績效愈差時，總經理發生非自願性異動的機率愈高，本研究並將董事會特性分為股權結構及董事會獨立性兩種，並加入最終控制者觀點，實證結果顯示，獨立董事的比率愈高，總經理發生非自願性異動的機率愈高，惟其結果不具統計上的重大性。總經理之持股比率佔董事全體持股比率較高時，愈容易發生總經理非自願性異動，但不具有統計上的重大性。當董事長與總經理為同一人時，較不易發生總經理非自願性異動。此外，在最終控制者方面，實證結果顯示，當控制股東席次控制權愈高時，總經理發生非自願性異動的機率愈低，控制股東的盈餘分配權與席次控制權的偏離程度愈大時，總經理發生非自願性異動的機率愈低，但不具統計上的重大性。 在繼任總經理特性與董事會特性關聯性方面，實證結果顯示，當異動前績效愈差時，董事會愈傾向於選用外部繼任者，但不具有統計上的重大性。獨立董事比率愈高，董事會愈傾向於選用外部繼任者。 　　整體而言，績效是影響我國上市公司總經理發生非自願性異動的重要原因之一，除此之外，董事長兼任總經理之情形，讓董事長有能力去阻止他們被撤換，進而降低總經理非自願性的離職機率。由於我國上市公司特殊的股權結構，使得控制股東掌控了董事會並且積極參與公司經營，造成董事會流於形式，無形中降低了董事會的監督職能，而設置獨立董事是提高董事會職能發揮的重要機制之一，在本研究中，雖未發現獨立董事的設置對於董事會的監督職能之顯著助益，但發現設置獨立董事在決定繼任者方面，能提出專業建言，使得董事會選任繼任總經理能有更廣泛的人選，而非侷限於公司內部。 / This research CEO turnover will divide into voluntary turnover and non- voluntary turnover. This research discusses the relationship among corporate performance, characteristics of board of the directors, non- voluntary CEO turnover and controlling shareholders. This research emphasizes the board of directors independence and the controlling shareholders’ controlling force over the board of directors and discusses the board of directors’ policy-making behavior of firing CEO.In addition, this research also discusses how does the board of directors appoint succeed CEO.The sample consists of all public companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation over the four-year period 2000-2003.According to previous studies, the characteristics of the board of directors are ownership structure and independence. This research also considerate the controlling shareholders. This research provides evidence on the relationship between non- voluntary CEO turnover and corporate performance. The likelihood of non- voluntary CEO turnover is significantly negatively related to the pre-performance. Non- voluntary CEO turnover rate is low when the chairman of the board and CEO are the same person. In addition, this research provides evidence on the relationship between the board of directors independence and the characteristics of the succeed CEO.When the fraction of outside directors is high, the board of directors comparatively possibly appoints the outsider successor.

台灣投資市場以散戶居多，控制股東常把持董事會運作，因此容易出現控制股東損害小股東權益之情形。不健全之公司治理是否提供一個管理當局較容易操縱盈餘的環境，並進而導致企業爆發財務危機，即為值得深究之議題。本研究以民國87年6月至91年12月間曾發生財務危機之上市公司為研究樣本，以產業、市值規模及成立年數為條件採1:1配對方式組成控制樣本，探討兩組樣本公司間在盈餘管理幅度、盈餘管理誘因及公司治理變數上之差異及前述因素與財務危機發生之關聯性。 以DeAngelo(1986)模型衡量異常應計項目，實證結果顯示，財務危機公司於危機發生前二年內有進行盈餘管理之現象。此外，危機發生前二年度，有較高比例的危機公司進行現金增資；於危機發生前一年度，危機公司內部人出脫股票的情形亦較正常公司嚴重，顯示管理當局似乎利用美化財務數字，以吸引外部投資者，一旦危機即將爆發則大量抛售手中持股，以獲利了結。 在公司治理議題上，本研究利用La Porta et al. (1999)及Claessen et al.(2000)之最終控制者概念，衡量並分析股權結構和董事會組成特性。實證發現，兩組樣本間之股份控制權、盈餘分配權及其偏離程度並無顯著差異，亦未發現危機公司有較顯著傾向採用金字塔結構或交叉持股來控制被投資公司。兩組樣本之最終控制者參與管理的比例相當，家族控股的型態居五成以上。以最終控制者觀點衡量之董監席次控制權則在兩組樣本上呈現顯著差異，實證分析顯示危機公司之最終控制者實際持股率不高，可享受之盈餘分配率較低，但卻擁有比控制樣本公司更高的董監席次控制權。 此外，本研究更進一步發現，在公司治理不佳、盈餘管理誘因愈強的情況下，企業發生財務危機之可能性較高，顯示公司治理之重要性。 / The Association of Earnings Management and Corporate Governance－on Companies Experiencing Financial Distress Abstract Small shareholders are the majority of the investors in Taiwan capital market. And also that controlling shareholders dominate the operation of board of directors, which might render occasions for controlling shareholders to expropriate easily the interests of the small shareholders. It is worth examining whether weaker corporate governance structure would provide management with cozy environment for earnings manipulation, and firms would therefore be inclined to experience financial distress? A group of firms listed in TSE experienced financial distress over the period of June 1998 to December 2002 and a control sample, using industry, market value and setup years as the matching criteria, compose the sample of this research. Specifically, this research examines the cross-group differences in earnings management and corporate governance, and the impact of the magnitude of earnings management and corporate governance structure on the occurrence of financial distress. Based on the accrual model in DeAngelo (1986), the empirical findings indicate that the management of financially distressed firms manipulates earnings two years earlier before the event day. As compared to the control sample, the financially distressed firms are found to issue more seasonal equity offerings and the insiders sell more of their shares one year prior to the event. It appears that management employs a strategy to manipulate earnings upward two years ahead in order to raise the capital and then cash themselves out before the bad news are disclosed to the market. This research adopts the concept of ultimate controlling shareholders used by La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) to analyze the ownership structure and the composition of boards of directors. In general, we find no evidence that there are significant cross-group differences found in voting rights, cash flow right and the deviation from the two. Neither do we find that financially distressed firms are more inclined to adopt the pyramid structures or cross-holdings as means to enhance their influences. However, we find significant cross-group differences in seating rights. The result therefore suggests that with lower share-holding rights and cash flow rights, the ultimate owners of financially distressed firms exercise their influence on major decisions through procuring higher seating rights. In addition, this research finds that the occurrence of financial distress is associated with weaker corporate governance structure and higher magnitude of earnings management.