台灣投資市場以散戶居多，控制股東常把持董事會運作，因此容易出現控制股東損害小股東權益之情形。不健全之公司治理是否提供一個管理當局較容易操縱盈餘的環境，並進而導致企業爆發財務危機，即為值得深究之議題。本研究以民國87年6月至91年12月間曾發生財務危機之上市公司為研究樣本，以產業、市值規模及成立年數為條件採1:1配對方式組成控制樣本，探討兩組樣本公司間在盈餘管理幅度、盈餘管理誘因及公司治理變數上之差異及前述因素與財務危機發生之關聯性。 以DeAngelo(1986)模型衡量異常應計項目，實證結果顯示，財務危機公司於危機發生前二年內有進行盈餘管理之現象。此外，危機發生前二年度，有較高比例的危機公司進行現金增資；於危機發生前一年度，危機公司內部人出脫股票的情形亦較正常公司嚴重，顯示管理當局似乎利用美化財務數字，以吸引外部投資者，一旦危機即將爆發則大量抛售手中持股，以獲利了結。 在公司治理議題上，本研究利用La Porta et al. (1999)及Claessen et al.(2000)之最終控制者概念，衡量並分析股權結構和董事會組成特性。實證發現，兩組樣本間之股份控制權、盈餘分配權及其偏離程度並無顯著差異，亦未發現危機公司有較顯著傾向採用金字塔結構或交叉持股來控制被投資公司。兩組樣本之最終控制者參與管理的比例相當，家族控股的型態居五成以上。以最終控制者觀點衡量之董監席次控制權則在兩組樣本上呈現顯著差異，實證分析顯示危機公司之最終控制者實際持股率不高，可享受之盈餘分配率較低，但卻擁有比控制樣本公司更高的董監席次控制權。 此外，本研究更進一步發現，在公司治理不佳、盈餘管理誘因愈強的情況下，企業發生財務危機之可能性較高，顯示公司治理之重要性。 / The Association of Earnings Management and Corporate Governance－on Companies Experiencing Financial Distress Abstract Small shareholders are the majority of the investors in Taiwan capital market. And also that controlling shareholders dominate the operation of board of directors, which might render occasions for controlling shareholders to expropriate easily the interests of the small shareholders. It is worth examining whether weaker corporate governance structure would provide management with cozy environment for earnings manipulation, and firms would therefore be inclined to experience financial distress? A group of firms listed in TSE experienced financial distress over the period of June 1998 to December 2002 and a control sample, using industry, market value and setup years as the matching criteria, compose the sample of this research. Specifically, this research examines the cross-group differences in earnings management and corporate governance, and the impact of the magnitude of earnings management and corporate governance structure on the occurrence of financial distress. Based on the accrual model in DeAngelo (1986), the empirical findings indicate that the management of financially distressed firms manipulates earnings two years earlier before the event day. As compared to the control sample, the financially distressed firms are found to issue more seasonal equity offerings and the insiders sell more of their shares one year prior to the event. It appears that management employs a strategy to manipulate earnings upward two years ahead in order to raise the capital and then cash themselves out before the bad news are disclosed to the market. This research adopts the concept of ultimate controlling shareholders used by La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) to analyze the ownership structure and the composition of boards of directors. In general, we find no evidence that there are significant cross-group differences found in voting rights, cash flow right and the deviation from the two. Neither do we find that financially distressed firms are more inclined to adopt the pyramid structures or cross-holdings as means to enhance their influences. However, we find significant cross-group differences in seating rights. The result therefore suggests that with lower share-holding rights and cash flow rights, the ultimate owners of financially distressed firms exercise their influence on major decisions through procuring higher seating rights. In addition, this research finds that the occurrence of financial distress is associated with weaker corporate governance structure and higher magnitude of earnings management.

自2007年金融海嘯爆發以來，至目前2012年的歐債危機，銀行部門就不斷成為風暴的中心。雖然金融危機並非金融海嘯或歐債危機的起因，但卻像是一種經濟衰退放大的機制。如何針對銀行部門進行有效的監管，自上世紀末90年代就已經開始進行討論。然而，經過十年來的發展，仍然發生雷曼兄弟倒閉等事件的金融危機。除了銀行的表現之外，是否仍有其他因素會影響銀行的經營績效？因此，本文欲探討：銀行的控制股東，是否會影響銀行經營決策的方向，進而產生不同的營運表現。 本文先分析集團內部股份盈餘比差異，分析集團內部是否存在剝奪的動機。其中，相較於目前計算金字塔結構的現金流量權的方法，本文發展馬可夫鍊計算現金流量權(盈餘分配權)。除了金字塔結構之外，本方法亦可精確地計算交叉持股或者較複雜的股權結構的現金流量權。本文並利用簡單回歸，分析集團持股銀行的比例，是否會對銀行績效產生影響，藉此觀察其中產生的剝奪問題。本文進一步分析，當控制股東進入董事會之後，其董事會代表持股銀行比例，是否也會對銀行績效產生影響，產生剝奪問題。最後，本文歸納出可能發生的剝奪機制：控制股東利用放款的途徑，因而導致逾期放款比例的增加，降低銀行營運表現，進而達到剝奪的效果。