1997年亞洲發生金融風暴後，國內亦發生多起企業舞弊案件，再加上2001年底美國大型公司會計醜聞案，公司所揭露的資訊是否仍為投資人所相信，似乎存有許多問號，加強公司治理機制應是一個較佳的解決方案，也逐漸為世界各國所重視。本研究以董監事會特性做為衡量公司治理機制良窳的代理變數，探討其與財務預測準確性之關聯性為何。
本研究以曾發佈民國九十年及九十一年強制性財務預測之上市公司為樣本，實證結果發現，當公司控制股東佔全體董事席次之比例愈高、次大股東佔全體董事席次之比例愈低、次大股東佔全體監察人席次之比例愈低、董事及監察人異動之比例愈高、公司有參與管理的情形、公司沒有獨立監察人的存在以及總經理發生異動時，公司所發佈之財務預測愈不準確，且其更新幅度愈大。 / Since the Asia financial crisis in 1997, there were much fraudulence of the listed companies in Taiwan. Then in the United States, Enron and Xerox were suffered from scandals in 2001. Do investors still believe the information companies disclose? We never know. But one way to recover the belief of investors is to reinforce the corporate governance mechanism and many countries have placed importance on it. Using the characteristics of board of directors and supervisors as the proxy of corporate governance mechanism, this paper examines the relationship between the characteristics of board of directors and supervisors and the financial forecast accuracy.
The research data are collected from listed companies that have released the financial forecast in 2001 and 2002. The empirical result suggests the larger proportion of board seats the controlling shareholders hold, the smaller proportion of board seats and supervisor seats the secondary major shareholders hold, the higher rate of changes of directors and supervisors, participation in management, no independent supervisor and the change of CEO would lead the financial forecast less accurate and the range of renewal larger.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0090353037 |
| Creators | 林柏全 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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