This study examines the theory of Robert Leonhard about combined arms and in what extent it can explain the outcome of the Six-day war and the second Lebanon war. Since both the Six-day war and the second Lebanon war involved Israel but the outcome differs, a gap and the need for further studies appears. The theory of combined arms consists of three principles that to some extent needs to be fulfilled in order to optimise the chances of winning. Since some of the Swedish Armed Forces doctrines are based out of this theory, it is of importance to further test the ideas of Leonhard. By testing the explanatory value of the theory, the study aims to create deeper and wider knowledge to the subject which in a broader perspective also contributes to the strengthening of the Swedish Security Politics as well as the Swedish Armed Forces. The result of this multiple case study shows that the theory to a high degree can explain the outcome of the wars. Since few studies have analysed the theory applied on a small state like Israel, the ability to generalize has increased with this study, although further studies are needed.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-9971 |
| Date | January 2021 |
| Creators | Rasteby, Anton |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
Page generated in 0.0239 seconds