Why do strong states, despite their far superior military capabilities, experience increasing difficulties in defeating small states in asymmetric conflicts? In this thesis I develop a conceptual framework based on Keohane & Nye's theory of complex interdependence, in which I argue that the increased degree of mutual interdependence among strong states leads to decreased cost-tolerance when exercising military power. This, in turn, leads to power being exercised in other forms such as different types of sanctions, influence on political agendas or through political pressure made possible by asymmetric vulnerabilities. The conceptual framework is tested with descriptive statistics and multiple linear regression on all 118 cases of asymmetric conflicts fought between 1945 and 2003. The results challenge existing knowledge about factors such as the importance of military power, troop commitment, external support, the nature of government and freedom of the press. At the same time, risks are identified in small states’ strategies that are based on external support. The result of the study indicates that such strategies lead to increased cost-tolerance among strong intervening states.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-9417 |
| Date | January 2020 |
| Creators | Holmberg, Andreas |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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