<p>This study examines the effects of credit risk and information disclosure in the new bank regulating system Basel II on bank and bank customer. The effects are then discussed in a perspective of the economic man and information asymmetric theories. Furthermore is the Basel II effects on the capital adequacy of Andelsbanken för Åland examined.</p><p>The approach of the study is qualitative and several interviews with individuals on different levels of the examined bank, Andelsbanken för Åland, have been carried out during the collecting of empirical facts about the effects of the regulating change from the Basel I system to Basel II.</p><p>The research findings are as follows:</p><ul><li>Andelsbanken för Åland have increased its capital adequacy ratio from 12,7 percent to 14,4 percent, mostly due to lower risk weights on housing mortgages compared to Basel I. </li><li>Andelsbanken för Åland have started to use a completely new credit risk and customer assessment system which classifies every customer and gives them a credit rating. The system cause a much heavier information gathering of the customers profile as well as a much better assessment of risk than the previous system, which the bank finds positive. The new system also cause differentiated pricing on loans. Additionally it has contributed to a renovation of the bank. The bank has also started to publish more information about its risk-taking and management. </li><li>Bank customers have to release much more information about themselves and their life, economically as well as personally during a more extensive interview in the credit process. The differentiated pricing cause interest rates to differ based on the customers rating. As an effect of the higher disclosure of bank information, customers can better compare banks. This effect is of greater importance for the bank customers that have depositions in excess of the government deposit assurance. </li><li>The new credit risk and customer assessment system is a rational development due to the new Basel II-rules. Without these rules the development wouldn’t have been rational due to high costs and the traditional pricing of loans. The higher disclosure on risk taking and management cause incentives for the bank to handle these better. </li><li>Bank customers today have higher incentives to better mange the aspects that are included in their rating due to the differentiated pricing on loans. Furthermore they, especially them with depositions in excess of the government deposit assurance, have greater incentives to compare banks due to the higher disclosure of bank information. </li><li>The more extensive information gathering of the customers profile as well as the higher disclosure of bank information have lowered the level of asymmetric information in the banks process of credit granting and the customers choice of bank, making these two more effective. </li></ul>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA/oai:DiVA.org:oru-8024 |
| Date | January 2009 |
| Creators | Eriksson, Joacim, Liljenroth, Ola |
| Publisher | Örebro University, Swedish Business School at Örebro University, Örebro University, Swedish Business School at Örebro University |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, text |
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