I re-examine “rating shopping” and “rating catering” in the market for AAA rated collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) by replicating the study of Griffin and Tang (2013) using post-crisis data. I find a sharp increase in the amount of CDOs that received a single rating, suggesting that CDO underwriters were more cautious about formally soliciting multiple ratings. However, I also find a decrease in AAA rating disagreements between S&P and Moody’s, implying that issuers shopped their CDOs through informal conversations with agencies. Finally, I find investors correctly accepted tighter credit spreads for dual-rated CDOs because dual-rated CDOs experienced fewer rating downgrades than single rated deals. These results differ from the pre-crisis findings of Griffin and Tang (2013) and are consistent with the existence of rating shopping and disappearance of rating catering during the post-crisis period.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:cmc_theses-2390 |
| Date | 01 January 2016 |
| Creators | Owlett, Robert H |
| Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
| Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | CMC Senior Theses |
| Rights | © 2016 Robert H. Owlett, default |
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