My aim in this essay is wholly constructive: it is to present the lines along which a satisfactory utilitarianism may be developed. Such a theory is satisfactory in respect of its being able to over, come or evade objections to previous utilitarianisms, specifically, to previous act_utilitarianisms; I have picked several of these objections to form the rock upon which the strength of a utilitarian is to be tested. The objections in question all center around the question of whether, given his consequential account of rightness, an act_utilitarian can support the useful social rules and institutions of our society; or whether his position, because of its consequential account of rightness, commits him to acting in such a way as to undermine these rules and institutions. I shall argue that a new form of act_utilitarianism, which I call tempered act_utilitarianism, can both retain its consequential account of rightness and yet can (a) accommodate these rules and institutions within it, (b) allow its proponents on act_utilitarian grounds to advocate adherence to them, as providing us with the beet chance of doing the right or optimific thing, (c) cater to the views of the 'plain man' in this important respect, and (d) achieve all this without recourse to rule_utilitarianism.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:455991 |
| Date | January 1973 |
| Creators | Frey, Raymond G. |
| Publisher | University of Oxford |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:5f1c1e63-5d11-470b-a60c-6fe27c0f2f2a |
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