This thesis examines Epictetus' view on Cynic philosophy, as it is being expressed in chapter 22 of the third book of Diatribai ("The Discourses"). The chapter has traditionally been seen as an idealized and deceitful portrait of the Cynic, and has been questioned as an intended justification of stoics and Cynics in the overall view on the history of philosophy. This thesis, however, attempts a different approach on the matter, based upon a thorough discussion regarding the field of research, as well as on different ways to read and understand the text at hand, in order to seek out a view that goes beyond the traditional distinction between practice and theory. The thesis thus challenges the view where the philosophy of Epictetus is seen as an instrumental practice of stoic theory, isolated to the field of ethics. The reading of the chapter focuses mainly on the philosophical purpose of the text and its intended practice, and finds that much of the stoic ascetic practice is not only taught through instructions, but also performed in the lecture and Epictetus' way of speaking. Epictetus' portrait of the philosophical Cynic is thus understood, not only as an extreme end that serves as an ascetic role-model, but also as a basic archetype of what it actually means to practice a philosophical way of thinking, that is of central importance to Epictetus philosophy. This sheds a new light on both the traditional distinction between stoic theory and practice, and on much of the research performed on the field of stoicism this far, as well as on that of Cynicism.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:sh-32277 |
| Date | January 2016 |
| Creators | Majling, Oscar |
| Publisher | Södertörns högskola, Filosofi |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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