本研究係探析保險業在監理管制下，若有違監理標準之虞時，其經理人是否興起盈餘管理的動機，以避免不必要的監理成本。蓋保險監理最重要的目的為預防保險公司失卻清償能力，以保障被保險人的權益，並維持金融安定。在實施風險基礎資本制前，邊際清償能力的標準仍以保險法第143條第一項之規定為依歸，即保險業認許資產減除負債之餘額，未達實收資本之45%時，主管機關應命其於限期內，以現金增資補足之。若保險業不依第143條規定限期增資補足者，保險法第149條第二項授權主管機關應依情節輕重，分別處以派員監理、撤換負責人或有關人員、限期改組、甚至命其停業或解散。故本研究預期清償能力不佳的保險公司，其經理人會動用裁量性應計項目調整財務狀況，以跨過清償能力標竿，避免受到監理機關的注意與查核。另外，保險法對於保險業資金運用管道有所縮限，以驅使保險公司穩健地運用資金，預防保險公司因巨額投資損失致使清償能力敗壞。但隨著產業競爭度增強與低利率時代的來臨，保險公司在經營績效與保單預定利率的壓力下，是否會安於目前的投資限制，而放棄賺取投資報酬的機會。據此，本研究預期年度中持有短期有價證券總額超過或可能超過35%資金門檻的保險公司，其經理人會選擇處分位於利得部位的短期有價證券，以規避超過保險法第146條之1第一項第二款的門檻限制。同理，年度中持有合格的公司股票及公司債超過或可能超過35%資金門檻的保險公司，其經理人可能會選擇出售位於利得部位的股票或公司債，以規避超過146條之1第一項第三款的門檻限制。
在研究設計上，為捕捉各類操縱財務報表的淨影響，本研究採用總裁量性應計項目作為代理變數。在所有可用的裁量性應計項目估計模型中，研究指出Modified Jones模型顯示了相對較強的檢定力(Dechow et al. 1995)。因此本研究援引Modified Jones模型估計裁量性應計數字。其次，將該模型析出的裁量性應計數字與各類監理門檻距離組成一迴歸模型，以測試其關聯性強弱。實證結果如下：一、在產險業，保單持有人盈餘與實收資本之45%的距離愈小者，其盈餘管理幅度愈大。二、壽險業比較沒有利用裁量性應計項目來達到監理標準的動機。但依公司規模來看，大小公司行為仍有所差異，即相較於大公司，小公司利用裁量性應計項目來達到監理標準的動機較為強烈。根據本文實證研究結論，建議監理機關與被保險人應特別注意產險業及小壽險公司的財務狀況，並確認其清償能力之品質。 / This paper examined whether insurance companies have incentives to manipulate accounting accruals to appear more solvent and less risky. In Taiwan, virtually all industries are regulated to some degree, but insurance industry faces regulatory monitoring that is explicitly tied to accounting data. Insurance regulators required that insurers meet conditions for minimum financial health. It is frequency asserted that such regulations create incentives to manipulate financial statement to avoid regulatory intervention The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the incentive to manipulate financial statement is a decreasing function of the insurers’ difference between policyholders’ surplus and 45% of capital. This paper assumes that insurance managers use their reporting discretion to achieve solvency goal and avoid exceeding investment limits. Following Healy (1985), accruals-based measures are wide employed in test of earnings management hypothesis. In the past, the most frequency used techniques for estimating discretionary accruals are the cross-sectional versions of the modified Jones model. In this paper, the magnitude of earnings management is proxied by the discretionary accruals which are estimated by using a cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model and regressed by three differences of regulatory requirements which measure the insurers’ behavior under the regulation. The evidence indicates that when policyholders’ surplus of property-casualty insurers is closer to 45% of capital, the incentive to manipulate financial statement is stronger. On the other hand, life insurers have less incentive to manipulate financial statement, but relative to big size insurers, small size insurers have stronger incentive to meet regulatory requirements.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/A2010000461 |
| Creators | 李世欽 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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