Epistemologists and those involved in feminist philosophy have expanded philosophical analyses of epistemic injustices and its subparts over the last decade. In doing so, such authors have thoroughly discussed the role of credibility deficits and the harms they cause for those receiving the deficits. In this literature, however, credibility excesses have not received as much attention owing to their tendency to be socially advantageous for those receiving them. In this paper, I show that epistemic justice relies in part on taking these excesses into account. More specifically, I illustrate how adjusting only credibility deficits leads to a two-fold problem. On the one hand, it leads to an epistemic harm insofar as not taking the excesses into account can cause us to draw the wrong conclusion from furnished testimonies. If one persons testimonial excess is still greater than another's corrected deficit in a certain way, then the person with the excess will be favored over the other person even once the deficit is corrected. On the other hand, it can also lead to a moral harm that wrongs the person who received the eventually corrected deficit in their capacity as a knower. It does so in instances when it undermines the person's self-trust. As such, if we are willing to adjust credibility deficits up in the project of epistemic justice we also have to be willing to adjust credibility excesses down in at least some cases. / Master of Arts / Think of a time when someone did not believe you. For some persons holding historically marginalized identities, it is a fairly common occurrence to not be believed just because one is, or is perceived to be a woman, a person of color, queer, and immigrant etc. In philosophy, epistemologists have discussed these testimonial deficits and furnished solutions that call for adjusting such deficits up in the project of justice. However, testimonial deficits are not the only instances when a person may receive a non-proportional amount of credibility. For other persons holding historically majoritized identities, it may also be fairly common to be believed just because one holds or is perceived to hold an identity such as man, white, straight, etc. The presence of credibility excesses is not as discussed in philosophical literature and what, exactly, we ought to do about these excesses is an open question. In this paper, I argue that adjusting credibility deficits up is not sufficient for reaching a just state if or when we leave the excesses unadjusted in certain circumstances. While adjusting the credibility deficits up is part of the picture, we also have to be willing to adjust the credibility excesses down in at least some cases.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VTETD/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/83455 |
| Date | 04 June 2018 |
| Creators | Whittaker, Lindsay Melissa |
| Contributors | Philosophy, Wodak, Daniel, Hirji, Sukaina, Matheis, Christian, Klagge, James C. |
| Publisher | Virginia Tech |
| Source Sets | Virginia Tech Theses and Dissertation |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | ETD, application/pdf |
| Rights | In Copyright, http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
Page generated in 0.0031 seconds