Epistemologists and those involved in feminist philosophy have expanded philosophical analyses of epistemic injustices and its subparts over the last decade. In doing so, such authors have thoroughly discussed the role of credibility deficits and the harms they cause for those receiving the deficits. In this literature, however, credibility excesses have not received as much attention owing to their tendency to be socially advantageous for those receiving them. In this paper, I show that epistemic justice relies in part on taking these excesses into account. More specifically, I illustrate how adjusting only credibility deficits leads to a two-fold problem. On the one hand, it leads to an epistemic harm insofar as not taking the excesses into account can cause us to draw the wrong conclusion from furnished testimonies. If one persons testimonial excess is still greater than another's corrected deficit in a certain way, then the person with the excess will be favored over the other person even once the deficit is corrected. On the other hand, it can also lead to a moral harm that wrongs the person who received the eventually corrected deficit in their capacity as a knower. It does so in instances when it undermines the person's self-trust. As such, if we are willing to adjust credibility deficits up in the project of epistemic justice we also have to be willing to adjust credibility excesses down in at least some cases. / Master of Arts

Hermeneutisk orättvisa är en orättvisa där en del av ens sociala erfarenheter görs obegripliga pågrund av ett hermeneutisk glapp i de kollektiva hermeneutiska resurserna. Följaktligen drabbas ett subjektav en objektiv svårighet i antingen 1) förstå sina sociala erfarenheter och/eller 2) kommunicerasina sociala erfarenheter. Fricker argumenterar för att det är ett strukturellt fenomen utan en individuellförövare. Därav uppkommer inte frågan om ansvar. Medina, å sin sida, argumenterar att ansvar uppkommeräven om det kan vara begränsat. I den här uppsatsen avser jag undersöka Medinas och Frickersståndpunkter för att utvärdera den större frågan om ansvar i förhållande till hermeneutisk orättvisa.Jag argumenterar, med Woomers begrepp misslyckat upptag, att Medina ger en bredare definitionav hermeneutisk orättvisa än Frickers ursprungliga definition. Vidare diskuterar jag Frickers och Medinasdelvis olika syn på ansvar. Jag argumenterar att individer kan hållas ansvariga för att bidra till hermeneutiskmarginalisering. Följt detta bär de något slags ansvar för att skapa möjligheten för att hermeneutiskaorättvisor kan existera. Med Goetzes distinktion mellan kognitiv och kommunikativ skadaav hermeneutisk orättvisa argumenterar jag vidare att individer trots allt kan hållas ansvariga i relationtill den kommunikativa skadan av orättvisan, men inte den kognitiva. Således håller jag delvis med bådeFricker och Medina. / Hermeneutical injustice is the injustice of having some part of ones social experiences unintelligibledue to a hermeneutical gap in the collective hermeneutical resources. Consequently, a subject suffersan objective difficulty in either 1) understanding his/her social experiences and/or 2) communicatinghis/her social experiences. Fricker argues that it is a structural phenomenon with no individual perpetrator.Hence, the question of responsibility does not arise. Medina, on the other hand, argues thatresponsibility does arise though it may be limited. In this paper my aim is to examine Medinas andFrickers position in order to evaluate the larger question of responsibility in relation to hermeneuticalinjustice. I argue, with Woomers notion of uptake failure, that Medina gives a wider definition of hermeneuticalinjustice than Frickers original definition. Furthermore I discuss their partially differentviews of responsibility. I argue that individuals can be held responsible for contributing to hermeneuticalmarginalization. They therefore bear some kind of responsibility for creating the possibility forhermeneutical injustices. With Goetzes distinction between the cognitive and communicative harm ofhermeneutical injustice I further argue that individuals can be held responsible in relation to the communicativeharm of the injustice, but not the cognitive. I therefore in some aspects agree with bothMedina and Fricker.

British composer Peter Racine Fricker (1920-1990) is known among violists for his masterly Concerto for Viola and Orchestra, Op. 18, dedicated to and premiered by the famous Scottish violist William Primrose. He wrote two other works that feature the viola: Three Movements for Viola Solo, Op. 25, and Fantasy for Viola and Piano, Op. 44. Fricker was a well-respected and prolific composer, one of the foremost young composers to emerge in England after World War II. After his move to the United States in 1964, the prominence he had established in his homeland virtually disappeared, and he never became a household name in America. Despite this, it is my contention that his music deserves study and a place in our repertoire. The above-mentioned Concerto has remained available in print since its initial publication. Fantasy for Viola and Piano was published in 2014 by the American Viola Society. This essay gives an introduction to these two works which are currently in circulation. The Concerto is considered from the standpoint of viola technique and pedagogy, while the Fantasy is briefly analyzed in terms of Fricker’s stated compositional ideals. The culmination of this work is a performance edition of the Three Movements, to be published later this year by the American Viola Society.

Epistemic injustice is a relatively new philosophical term for a rather old phenomenon. A situation is said to be epistemically unjust when someone is wronged in his capacity to possess or convey knowledge. While anyone can be the victim of a testimonial injustice, the epistemic injustice that occurs in an exchange of testimony, people with marginalized identities systematically suffer from this kind of injustice. By relying on negative identity prejudices, a person in a position of power consciously or subconsciously undermines a marginalized individual’s capacity for knowledge. In this paper, I argue that persistent testimonial injustice can inhibit the formation of one’s identity. Then I explore the role that communities may play in ameliorating this harm. I suggest that communities are conceptualized differently depending on their purpose (e.g. psychological melioration or political resistance). In the final part of this paper, I examine two conceptions of communities put forth by María Lugones and Iris Marion Young and determine whether they can provide both psychological and political resources for resistance.

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:55:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000443318-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 939226 bytes, checksum: 27096ec87ebd2e9af399245932005708 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / This paper will address the Epistemology of Testimony in view of the reductionist theory, taking into perspective the debate between it and Anti-reductionism about the role of testimony in justification of belief. Thus, we will try promoting an investigation of the epistemic possibilities of the testimony that the reductionist point of view, seems to have no relevance as transindividual element in the formation of belief. At first, as general objective, we will investigate the nature and origin of reductionism, from historical reasons the role of testimony in the justification of beliefs according to the thought of David Hume. In the second chapter we will review the Local reductionist version proposed by Elizabeth Fricker, his notion of prima facie reliability alternative to a priori Anti-reductionist, as well as his conception of the epistemic role of testimony in the justification of belief based on it. In contrast, we will bring the criticism of Peter J. Graham regarding the exclusion of testimony as a relevant epistemic factor to justification. Graham proposes a combination of independent and testimonial grounds for the justification of testimonial belief, stating that the testimony is not a secondary or irrelevant in the justification and acquisition of beliefs. / Este trabalho abordará a Epistemologia do Testemunho na visão da teoria Reducionista, tendo em perspectiva a discussão entre esta, e o Antirreducionismo, acerca do papel do testemunho na justificação da crença. Dessa forma, tentaremos promover uma investigação das possibilidades epistêmicas do testemunho que, do ponto de vista reducionista, parece não ter relevância como elemento transindividual na formação da crença. Em um primeiro momento, como objetivo geral, pesquisaremos a natureza e origem do Reducionismo, a partir das razões históricas quanto ao papel do testemunho na justificação das crenças, de acordo com o pensamento de David Hume. No segundo capítulo faremos uma análise da versão Reducionista Local proposta por Elizabeth Fricker, sua noção de fidedignidade prima facie alternativa ao a priori Antirreducionista, bem como sua concepção acerca do papel epistêmico do testemunho na justificação da crença nele baseada. Em contraponto, traremos a crítica de Peter J. Graham quanto à exclusão do testemunho como elemento epistêmico relevante para a justificação. Graham propõe a conjugação de razões inferenciais e não inferenciais para a justificação da crença testemunhal, afirmando que o testemunho não é um elemento secundário ou irrelevante na aquisição de crenças.

In dieser Arbeit wird Die Verwandlung von Franz Kafka als akuter Schlaganfall interpretiert. Die Schwester Grete fungiert hier als pflegende Angehörige, die in der Erzählung verschiedenen Belastungen ausgesetzt ist und unterschiedliche Emotionen durchlebt. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es herauszufinden, ob diese mit den aus der Pflegeforschung herausgearbeiteten Belastungsfaktoren und Emotionen pflegender Angehöriger übereinstimmen. Zusätzlich zu Kafkas Erzählung wird Ursula Frickers reiner Schlaganfall-Roman Außer sich analysiert. Dieser wird ebenfalls auf die Erkenntnisse der Pflegeforschung appliziert samt mit den Ergebnissen der Analyse der Erzählung von Kafka verglichen. Die Belastungsfaktoren und Emotionen von pflegenden Angehörigen, die in der Pflegeforschung hervorgehoben werden, wurden in eigene Kategorien eingeteilt, um eine übersichtliche Analyse beider literarischer Texte zu ermöglichen. Die Analyse der beiden Texte ergab, dass die pflegenden Angehörigen in sowohl Kafkas Erzählung als auch in Frickers Roman in allen analysierten Kategorien der wissenschaftlich belegten Belastungsfaktoren und Emotionen Übereinstimmungen aufwiesen. Die Texte wiesen ebenfalls Gemeinsamkeiten zueinander auf, doch gabes hier individuelle Unterschiede. Das Ergebnis dieser Arbeit zeigt, dass die Interpretation der Erzählung Die Verwandlung von Kafka als Schlaganfall-Geschichte schlüssig ist. Dies wird durch die Ergebnisse der Analyse im Hinblick auf das Erleben der Schwester als pflegende Angehörige deutlich.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 443318.pdf: 939226 bytes, checksum: 27096ec87ebd2e9af399245932005708 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-08-20 / This paper will address the Epistemology of Testimony in view of the reductionist theory, taking into perspective the debate between it and Anti-reductionism about the role of testimony in justification of belief. Thus, we will try promoting an investigation of the epistemic possibilities of the testimony that the reductionist point of view, seems to have no relevance as transindividual element in the formation of belief. At first, as general objective, we will investigate the nature and origin of reductionism, from historical reasons the role of testimony in the justification of beliefs according to the thought of David Hume. In the second chapter we will review the Local reductionist version proposed by Elizabeth Fricker, his notion of prima facie reliability alternative to a priori Anti-reductionist, as well as his conception of the epistemic role of testimony in the justification of belief based on it. In contrast, we will bring the criticism of Peter J. Graham regarding the exclusion of testimony as a relevant epistemic factor to justification. Graham proposes a combination of independent and testimonial grounds for the justification of testimonial belief, stating that the testimony is not a secondary or irrelevant in the justification and acquisition of beliefs. / Este trabalho abordar? a Epistemologia do Testemunho na vis?o da teoria Reducionista, tendo em perspectiva a discuss?o entre esta, e o Antirreducionismo, acerca do papel do testemunho na justifica??o da cren?a. Dessa forma, tentaremos promover uma investiga??o das possibilidades epist?micas do testemunho que, do ponto de vista reducionista, parece n?o ter relev?ncia como elemento transindividual na forma??o da cren?a. Em um primeiro momento, como objetivo geral, pesquisaremos a natureza e origem do Reducionismo, a partir das raz?es hist?ricas quanto ao papel do testemunho na justifica??o das cren?as, de acordo com o pensamento de David Hume. No segundo cap?tulo faremos uma an?lise da vers?o Reducionista Local proposta por Elizabeth Fricker, sua no??o de fidedignidade prima facie alternativa ao a priori Antirreducionista, bem como sua concep??o acerca do papel epist?mico do testemunho na justifica??o da cren?a nele baseada. Em contraponto, traremos a cr?tica de Peter J. Graham quanto ? exclus?o do testemunho como elemento epist?mico relevante para a justifica??o. Graham prop?e a conjuga??o de raz?es inferenciais e n?o inferenciais para a justifica??o da cren?a testemunhal, afirmando que o testemunho n?o ? um elemento secund?rio ou irrelevante na aquisi??o de cren?as.

In this essay I attempt to show that both the weak interpretation and the strong interpretation of what John Searle calls the principle of self–referentiality for social phenomena should be abandoned. This, I argue, is because they give rise to what I, following Burman (2023), call ”location problems” for opaque social phenomena and for social wholes, as well as a faulty understanding of social power. Instead, I propose that we understand social phenomena as constitued by social practices, in turn constituted by individuals who have the know–how necessary to participate in the social practices (in the sense that they are reliably able to do so), while not necessarily knowing that they are participating in them. In doing this, I draw on Robert B. Brandom’s notion of a social practice from Making it Explicit (1994).