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1	Epistemic Injustice and Communities of Resistance Lipman, Alexia 01 January 2018 (has links) Epistemic injustice is a relatively new philosophical term for a rather old phenomenon. A situation is said to be epistemically unjust when someone is wronged in his capacity to possess or convey knowledge. While anyone can be the victim of a testimonial injustice, the epistemic injustice that occurs in an exchange of testimony, people with marginalized identities systematically suffer from this kind of injustice. By relying on negative identity prejudices, a person in a position of power consciously or subconsciously undermines a marginalized individual’s capacity for knowledge. In this paper, I argue that persistent testimonial injustice can inhibit the formation of one’s identity. Then I explore the role that communities may play in ameliorating this harm. I suggest that communities are conceptualized differently depending on their purpose (e.g. psychological melioration or political resistance). In the final part of this paper, I examine two conceptions of communities put forth by María Lugones and Iris Marion Young and determine whether they can provide both psychological and political resources for resistance. Epistemic injustice Epistemology Community Miranda Fricker Testimonial Injustice María Lugones Epistemology Ethics and Political Philosophy Feminist Philosophy
2	Sociala helheter och sociala praktiker : att kunna delta i den sociala världen Carlshamre, Nathan January 2024 (has links) In this essay I attempt to show that both the weak interpretation and the strong interpretation of what John Searle calls the principle of self–referentiality for social phenomena should be abandoned. This, I argue, is because they give rise to what I, following Burman (2023), call ”location problems” for opaque social phenomena and for social wholes, as well as a faulty understanding of social power. Instead, I propose that we understand social phenomena as constitued by social practices, in turn constituted by individuals who have the know–how necessary to participate in the social practices (in the sense that they are reliably able to do so), while not necessarily knowing that they are participating in them. In doing this, I draw on Robert B. Brandom’s notion of a social practice from Making it Explicit (1994). social ontology opaque social facts Amie Thomasson John Searle Åsa Burman Robert B. Brandom power deontology status functions Miranda Fricker holism social wholes economic class capitalism racism social ontologi opaka sociala fakta Amie Thomasson John Searle Åsa Burman Robert B. Brandom makt deontologi statusfunktioner Miranda Fricker holism sociala helheter ekonomisk klass kapitalism rasism Philosophy Filosofi

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Epistemic Injustice and Communities of Resistance

Sociala helheter och sociala praktiker : att kunna delta i den sociala världen