La presente tesis, “La ontología de lo social. Una aproximación a partir de John Searle”, es el primer trabajo en lengua castellana sobre la teoría de la realidad social de John Searle. Nos hemos centrado, principalmente, en dos aspectos de su vasta producción teórica: la teoría del lenguaje, por un lado; y la teoría de la sociedad, por otro. En un primer momento, hemos defendido su posición realista externa, la cual supone que existe un mundo que se ubica por fuera de las representaciones y del lenguaje humano; posteriormente, hemos revalorizado –junto con Apel- al lenguaje y su prioridad metodológica respecto a la conciencia intencional, a la hora de abordar el problema del significado. Las problemáticas referidas a su teoría de los actos de habla no han ocupado un lugar central debido a que éste ha sido un problema largamente debatido por la tradición filosófica en la segunda parte del siglo pasado. Finalmente, nos hemos centrado, a partir de Ernst Tugendhat y Michael Tomasello, en la antropología filosófica en tanto que prima philosophy; ello ha sido necesario para elaborar una teoría de la realidad social porque ésta es construida por seres humanos, y la pregunta central de la antropología filosófica es, justamente, “¿qué somos los seres humanos?” Searle advierte que, no sólo el lenguaje es el elemento que nos diferencia a nosotros, los animales humanos, del resto de los animales de nivel superior sino que, además existen otros elementos tales como, la intencionalidad colectiva, la asignación de función, y las normas constitutivas. La intencionalidad colectiva es, básicamente, la capacidad estrictamente humana de cooperar, de hacer cosas juntos, fijando objetivos y metas a realizar. Esta capacidad humana se ve posibilitada por nuestra capacidad de generar acuerdos, y ello sólo es posible gracias a la existencia de un lenguaje proposicional, de un lenguaje que no se encuentra guiado por el instinto sino, más bien, por convenciones lingüísticas. Por otra parte, los seres humanos tenemos la capacidad de otorgarle un estatus determinado, a un objeto que no tiene una función específica intrínsecamente; las fibras de celulosa, por ejemplo, operan en las sociedades modernas, como papel moneda. Estas funciones de estatus, como Searle las denomina, tienen la forma lógica, “X cuenta como Y en el contexto C”. Finalmente, las normas constitutivas son aquellas que no sólo regulan una actividad, sino que la constituyen, la posibilitan. Su forma lógica es exactamente igual a la que poseen las funciones de estatus, “X cuenta como Y en el contexto C”. Los ejemplos más claros de éste tipo de normas son los juegos; las reglas del fútbol no sólo regulan la actividad sino que, además, hacen que la propia actividad sea posible. La realidad institucional posee un fuerte carácter normativo. Por otro lado, y para concluir nuestro trabajo, hemos propuesto una interpretación de los "conceptos institucionales" que se emparenta con la noción kripkeana de "designadores rígidos". La indagación pretende avanzar hacia una novedosa interpretación de este tipo de conceptos.

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / O objetivo deste trabalho à propor uma classificaÃÃo do naturalismo biolÃgico de John Searle em uma das concepÃÃes teÃricas de Filosofia da Mente. Para tanto, apresentarei uma visÃo panorÃmica das principais teorias e uma exposiÃÃo das teses que compÃem o naturalismo biolÃgico, com o intuito de comparar este com aquelas. O prÃprio Searle resiste em rotular o naturalismo biolÃgico, jà que, segundo ele, todas as teorias da tradiÃÃo em Filosofia da Mente partem de um pressuposto equivocado, a saber, o dualismo conceitual, segundo o qual hà uma exclusÃo mÃtua entre as categorias fÃsica e mental: o fÃsico à nÃo mental, e o mental à nÃo fÃsico. Para Searle, fenÃmenos mentais sÃo biolÃgicos e, portanto, sÃo fÃsicos. No entanto, isso nÃo significa que hà uma reduÃÃo ontolÃgica do mental ao fÃsico, pois existe uma distinÃÃo ontolÃgica entre esses dois nÃveis â ontologia de primeira pessoa e ontologia de terceira pessoa, respectivamente. O problema à que com tal distinÃÃo ontolÃgica, Searle acaba por criar um novo tipo de dualismo, que em vez de contrapor o fÃsico ao mental, contrapÃe o objetivo (ontologia de terceira pessoa) ao subjetivo (ontologia de primeira pessoa). Por defender o fisicalismo ontolÃgico e, ao mesmo tempo, endossar que os eventos mentais sÃo reais, causalmente eficazes e ontologicamente irredutÃveis, a concepÃÃo de Searle converge em muitos pontos com o fisicalismo nÃo-redutivo e com o dualismo de propriedade. Compararei o naturalismo biolÃgico com ambas as teorias e, ao final, terei subsÃdios para argumentar o porquà de classificÃ-lo em uma delas e nÃo na outra. / The objective of this work is to propose a classification of John Searle‟s biological naturalism in one of theoretical conceptions of Philosophy of Mind. In order to do that, I will present a panoramic vision of principal theories and a presentation of theses of biological naturalism in order to compare this with those. Searle himself resist to label the biological naturalism since, according him, all theories of tradition in Philosophy of Mind start from a mistaken assumption, that is, the conceptual dualism, according to which there is a mutual exclusion between the physical and mental categories: the physical is not mental, and mental is not physical. For Searle, mental phenomena are biological and, therefore, physical. However, this does not mean that there is an ontological reduction of mental to physical, because there is an ontological distinction between these two levels â first-person ontology and third-person ontology, respectively. The problem is that with such ontological distinction, Searle ends up creating a new kind of dualism, that instead of countering the physical to the mental, opposes the objective (third-person ontology) to the subjective (first-person ontology). By defending the ontological physicalism and, at the same time, to endorse that mental events are real, causally effective and ontologically irreducible, Searle‟s conception converges at many points with the non-reductive physicalism and property dualism. I will compare the biological naturalism with both theories and â at the end â I will have subsidies to argue why classify it in one and not the other.

LIMA FILHO, Maxwell Morais de. Naturalismo biológico: a solução dualista de John Searle para o problema mente-corpo. 2010. 111f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2010. / Submitted by Gustavo Daher (gdaherufc@hotmail.com) on 2017-09-25T16:18:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_mmlimafilho.pdf: 892023 bytes, checksum: 131fe0da09ffcc192f087ebe8de7f10f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-09-25T17:08:44Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_mmlimafilho.pdf: 892023 bytes, checksum: 131fe0da09ffcc192f087ebe8de7f10f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-25T17:08:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_mmlimafilho.pdf: 892023 bytes, checksum: 131fe0da09ffcc192f087ebe8de7f10f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / The objective of this work is to propose a classification of John Searle‟s biological naturalism in one of theoretical conceptions of Philosophy of Mind. In order to do that, I will present a panoramic vision of principal theories and a presentation of theses of biological naturalism in order to compare this with those. Searle himself resist to label the biological naturalism since, according him, all theories of tradition in Philosophy of Mind start from a mistaken assumption, that is, the conceptual dualism, according to which there is a mutual exclusion between the physical and mental categories: the physical is not mental, and mental is not physical. For Searle, mental phenomena are biological and, therefore, physical. However, this does not mean that there is an ontological reduction of mental to physical, because there is an ontological distinction between these two levels – first-person ontology and third-person ontology, respectively. The problem is that with such ontological distinction, Searle ends up creating a new kind of dualism, that instead of countering the physical to the mental, opposes the objective (third-person ontology) to the subjective (first-person ontology). By defending the ontological physicalism and, at the same time, to endorse that mental events are real, causally effective and ontologically irreducible, Searle‟s conception converges at many points with the non-reductive physicalism and property dualism. I will compare the biological naturalism with both theories and – at the end – I will have subsidies to argue why classify it in one and not the other. / O objetivo deste trabalho é propor uma classificação do naturalismo biológico de John Searle em uma das concepções teóricas de Filosofia da Mente. Para tanto, apresentarei uma visão panorâmica das principais teorias e uma exposição das teses que compõem o naturalismo biológico, com o intuito de comparar este com aquelas. O próprio Searle resiste em rotular o naturalismo biológico, já que, segundo ele, todas as teorias da tradição em Filosofia da Mente partem de um pressuposto equivocado, a saber, o dualismo conceitual, segundo o qual há uma exclusão mútua entre as categorias física e mental: o físico é não mental, e o mental é não físico. Para Searle, fenômenos mentais são biológicos e, portanto, são físicos. No entanto, isso não significa que há uma redução ontológica do mental ao físico, pois existe uma distinção ontológica entre esses dois níveis – ontologia de primeira pessoa e ontologia de terceira pessoa, respectivamente. O problema é que com tal distinção ontológica, Searle acaba por criar um novo tipo de dualismo, que em vez de contrapor o físico ao mental, contrapõe o objetivo (ontologia de terceira pessoa) ao subjetivo (ontologia de primeira pessoa). Por defender o fisicalismo ontológico e, ao mesmo tempo, endossar que os eventos mentais são reais, causalmente eficazes e ontologicamente irredutíveis, a concepção de Searle converge em muitos pontos com o fisicalismo não-redutivo e com o dualismo de propriedade. Compararei o naturalismo biológico com ambas as teorias e, ao final, terei subsídios para argumentar o porquê de classificá-lo em uma delas e não na outra.

Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-04-28T18:50:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Márcio Francisco Rodrigues Filho.pdf: 2008728 bytes, checksum: 55f666836e537fcdf2341ba136ee8f80 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-28T18:50:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Márcio Francisco Rodrigues Filho.pdf: 2008728 bytes, checksum: 55f666836e537fcdf2341ba136ee8f80 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-01-31 / Nenhuma / Esta dissertação é um estudo analítico de duas concepções muito influentes sobre a consciência na filosofia contemporânea da mente. O foco principal desta pesquisa é duplo. Primeiro, ela pretende descrever da forma mais detalhada possível as abordagens de John Searle e de Daniel Dennet sobre a consciência. Além disso, pretende apresentar as críticas de Searle à abordagem funcionalista da Dannett. Ambas as abordagens serão descritas e avaliadas e as diferenças mais relevantes entre esses dois autores serão postas em contraste. Por não fornecer um conceito que inclua a característica qualitativa da consciência, será argumentado que o funcionalismo de Dennett não é capaz de explicar a consciência humana. Sua filosofia da mente também não resolve o problema das outras mentes, uma vez que o conceito de consciência exposto por Dennett não diferencia seres humanos conscientes de zumbis inconscientes. / This dissertation is an analytical study of two very influential conceptions of consciousness in contemporary philosophy of mind. The main focus of this research is twofold. First, it intends to describe both John Searle's and Daniel Dennett approach on consciousness, and, second, to expose Searle's criticism to Dannett's functionalist approach. Both approaches will be described and evaluated, and the relevant differences between these two authors will be put in contrast. In not providing a concept that includes the qualitative characteristic of consciousness, it will be argued that Dennett's functionalism cannot explain human conscious experiences. His philosophy of mind also cannot solve the problem of other minds, since the concept of consciousness exposed by Dennett does not differentiate conscious human beings from unconscious zombies.

La tesi fa un estudi intens i crític de l'obra filosòfica del professor nordamericà John Searle, qui va formalitzar el que es coneix com "teoria dels actes de parla". Es presenta una investigació sobre els temes principals del pensament de Searle: llenguatge, ment i "background" així com les conexions que hi ha entre ells. Aquest estudi suposa una crítica a alguns aspectes poc clars de la concepció del llenguatge de Searle, i, a la vegada, una aposta a possibles solucions a aquestos aspectes.

The purpose of this study is to investigate how different fitness Instagram influencers use persuasive speech acts in their marketing posts. Another aim is to look at the similarities and differences between the influencers’ use of linguistic strategies and speech acts. A study was conducted on 200 Instagram posts from four different fitness influencers. A total of 638 speech acts were coded using a typology by John Searle (1979). The typology consists of the speech acts representatives, directives, commissives, expressives and declaratives. Two speech acts were also added by the researchers; inquires and quotations. Furthermore, the speech acts were also coded for sentence forms (declarative, imperative and interrogative) and also whether they were direct or indirect speech acts. The study also discusses the different aspects of online communication and how these might affect someone’s marketing decisions. This shows that the language someone uses online might affect his or her online identity. There was also a comparison of the results to identify similarities and differences among the selected influencers. The results show a variation of usage of Searle’s (1979) speech acts. All speech acts were used at least once but directives showed the highest frequency among all influencers since they would often command or request their followers to perform a certain action. Another result was that many of the speech acts had a certain sentence structure but a different intention or function, namely, they were indirect speech acts. The intention and function of these speech acts were often to persuade the audience and were therefore persuasive speech acts.

Searle’s theory of Biological Naturalism has been largely ignored in the philosophical literature and Searle’s commentators are confused by his seemingly contradictory views. In this dissertation I attempt to make sense of Biological Naturalism. In chapter 2 I will ascertain which concerns prevent Searle’s readers from understanding his position. The remaining chapters aim to dissolve the tensions and dispel any confusion. Chapter 3 considers Searle’s notion of first-person ontology, finding that it expresses a belief that experiences are essentially subjective and qualitative. In chapter 4 I consider the notions of levels of description, causal reduction and what Searle means by causation and realisation. Chapter 5 turns to the question of how to categorise Searle’s position. Many of his critics charge him with being a property dualist. By highlighting the difference between the meaning of irreducibility intended by the property dualist and Searle I show that there is sufficient difference in their use of the term so as to reject an interpretation of Biological Naturalism as a form of property dualism. Chapter 6 is where I turn to the other end of the physicalism/dualism spectrum and assess whether Searle should be seen as holding a form of identity theory. I first argue for a neutral form of identity that I call real identity, which does not include the inherent reductive privileging of standard identity. I then argue that Searle should be seen as advocating a form of real identity theory; a form of token identity theory which does not privilege the physical over the mental. In chapter 7 I return to the main barriers to making sense of Biological Naturalism which I identified in chapter 2 and lay out my response to each. I conclude with a coherent interpretation of Searle’s position.

It has often been argued that John Searle’s theory of mind, biological naturalism, due to its commitment to mental irreducibility amounts to no more than disguised property dualism. I suggest that a thorough analysis of Searle’s somewhat unusual views on the nature of reduction reveals this irreducibility to be not a metaphysical relation between mental properties and physical but one concerned only with the semantics of the respective terms used to refer to these. As a result, I argue, irreducibility in his sense is insufficient to support a metaphysical conclusion like property dualism. Finally, to reinforce this point I give a concrete example of a potential physicalist view which is compatible with the analysis of irreducibility as semantic but not as metaphysical and hence on my reasoning remains open to Searle.

Given that public television is involved in the public and political life of our society, we believe that it should be necessary to study the debating skills of moderators and especially their role in stimulating public discussion. We explored the role of the moderator, socio-professional aspects of the profession, with emphasis on the study of verbal expression and specific speech acts, which are used in specific discourse. The aim of the study of the public television moderator's communication strategies is to focus on language skills, competences and facilities in terms of moderators defending the public interest - start from the Act on Czech Television and Czech Television Codex. We focused on specific techniques and strategies of the moderator's discourse. We investigated how the induction of the host achieves cooperation and clarity in communication, as well as how the moderator achieves a minimum of manipulative or persuasive communication. Moderators should in particular avoid any signs of manipulative or persuasive rhetoric, and they should be able to recognise this. For this they may use the entire system of the language and all types of speech acts.

This dissertation is an empirically responsive philosophical exploration into the incorporation of technological tools within a framework comprising the structures of experience laid out in the early phenomenological tradition and an analysis of agency drawing from the analytical tradition. Technological tools have become so deeply integrated in our lives that they function like a part of us, transforming what we feel we can do and even who we are. Although new spaces of autonomous agency have been opened up, since the inner workings of technological tools can remain invisible, we risk diminishing our own capacities. Since we are fundamentally embedded in the world, we cannot understand ourselves without reference to the world and we cannot understand the world without reference to the way we are. The uniqueness involved in our use of technological tools grows out of a more primordial uniqueness that makes technological tool use possible and sets us apart from our closest evolutionary relatives. Several animals extend their physical influence on the environment by means of tools. We humans, however, use tools to extend our cognitive abilities as well. And since the computer is the most universal human tool, which can be put to sensorimotor and cognitive purposes alike, we take the computer to be...