Three principal forms of structural realism are distinguished in this thesis: weak epistemic structural realism (WESR), strong epistemic structural realism (SESR) and ontic structural realism (OSR). In chapter 1, it is argued that the positive argument in favour of WESR, i.e. the claim that it can accommodate the no miracles argument and the pessimistic induction is unconvincing, because (i) the no miracles argument is flawed, so it is no particular virtue of WESR that it can accommodate it and (ii) it is not clear that WESR really can accommodate the pessimistic induction. In chapter 2, it is argued that there are unresolved difficulties in drawing the observable/unobservable distinction (or an appropriate alternative distinction) in a way that is suitable for the WESRist's purposes. In chapter 3, it is argued that the main argument for SESR is unconvincing, because it is based on Russell's principle of acquaintance (or a modern variant of this principle), a principle for which no substantial argument has been given and which has absurd consequences (as shown in appendix 2). In chapter 4, it is argued that neither the WESRist nor the SESRist has provided a convincing response to Newman's objection. In chapter 5, it is argued that, depending on how one interprets the doctrine, OSR is either (i) wholly untenable or (ii) conventional scientific realism (or antirealism) combined with the traditional metaphysical view that objects are bundles of properties and that in the latter case the doctrine has some plausibility, but the arguments that have been adduced in favour of it are inconclusive. The thesis is concluded with a sketch of the sort of position in the scientific realism debate that I find more attractive.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

This is an Integral and Phenomenological Inquiry into the experiences of 'belonging' and 'not-belonging'. Using Wilber's Integral Operating System and its AQAL model as a basis, the inquiry brings together the interior and exterior dimensions of individual and collective experiencing. With an emphasis on embodiment, its approach to method incorporates a Participatory axiology and leans upon Gendlin's philosophy for its interpretative framework. The thesis considers some of the complex individual and social phenomena which are implicit to a sense of alienation and the behaviour of marginalisation, as well as those inherent to the movements of integration, healing and growth. Multiple methodologies combine to integrate evidence which reflects the four quadrants of the AQAL model. Included here is a Case Study of the social dynamics of a Norfolk town and the perceptions of 'marginal' groups within that community. Gendlin's approach of ‘Thinking At the Edge’ is used, as well as individual and group contemplations which contribute to building the overall narrative of the thesis. Discourses of individual and community development, identity and consciousness are considered along with those of attachment, trauma and Gendlin's idea of 'stuck processes'. Even with its inherent risks, in this thesis it becomes clear that the experience of not-belonging is as fundamental and vital to individual and collective development as is that of belonging. Our belonging and not-belonging are two protagonists in a grand narrative. Between them an essentially creative, evolutionary dynamic emerges – a dance between love and consciousness.

This thesis is a constructivist defence of the foundations of rights. Rights are the product of a choice-situation between rational agents; that is, agents who seek the greatest share of certain basic goods but who also recognize that their deliberations are constrained by moral considerations. The conceptual character of rights as prerogatives to pursue one's interests is a reflection of this construction procedure. It is crucial to the argument that the goods over which agents deliberate be of equal intrinsic value, and this requires that we have a certain conception of rational agency and a defensible metaphysics of the self. Much of the thesis is concerned with exploring the problems associated with different conceptions of the self and self-interest. It is argued that language, or communicative competence, is central to the development of both self-consciousness and deliberative rationality, and this fact has significant implications for how we should conceive of the moral foundations of rights. Constructivism stands opposed to intuitionism and utilitarianism and in Part I (after an initial conceptual analysis of rights) all three theories are discussed. Part II is devoted to a consideration of the nature of self-interest (or prudence) and the self (personal identity), whilst Part III advances a "solution" to the problems raised in Part II. Writers whose work receives critical attention include Rawls, Hare, Nagel, Parfit, Searle, Habermas and Apel.

This thesis consists of a critical examination and comparison of Hegel's philosophy of history and Nietzsche's doctrine of nihilism. The thesis argues that the result of Hegel's thought is the collapse of the transcendent dualist world-view, with the resultant need to project values attached to life: Nietzsche's positive philosophy is such an attempt. Hegel's philosophy of history is followed in the Master/Slave dialectic as elaborated in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This leads to an examination of the notion of the end of history, which is the culmination of the dialectic as the State, politically, and as the Sage, philosophically. The thesis argues that despite Hegel's thoroughgoing appropriation of values, accessible to humanity through Reason, our practical experience is of loss only: of the disappearance of an objective world of values. Far from realising the inherently meaningful nature of the human world, the result of the Hegelian revolution is nihilism. The discussion of Nietzsche's notion of nihilism turns on his distinction between the 'other-worldly' nihilism inherent in the transcendent dualist world view, and the radical nihilism which is the effect of expecting values to emerge from such a world, but despairing of ever knowing them. Nietzsche's solution is to perceive values as the projection of a beyond from out of the richness and fullness of life---what he calls 'will to power. ' And this, the thesis argues, is a return to Hegel, giving content to the Idea, to the relation of selves in the world which is one of actual freedom, and complete responsibility. Both philosophers approach the question of meaning from the same negatively conditioned perspective of the collapse of transcendent dualism. Their positive philosophies are their attempts to adopt an attitude towards the objectivity of values as the beyond within life.

This dissertation attempts to provide a realist position about science that is defensible against anti-realist arguments motivated by the history 'of science. It first investigates two versions of Pessimistic Meta-induction (PMI) for anti-realism: the enumerative inductive argument that our current theories will be shown false as the past ones have, and the argument by counterexample (Ladyman 2002) that only require one recalcitrant case that is successful yet false to sever the triad relations between success, truth and reference, undermining the no-miracles argument (NMA). While the first can be answered, the latter calls realists to study the past scientific theories and provide a realist explanation for their successes. The phlogiston theory is chosen as the case study for this dissertation, and it is shown that the phlogiston theory enjoyed various successes including novel predictive successes, and that a comparison between the theory and our contemporary chemical theory reveals a significant amount of continuity. Then the realist accounts to respond to PMI are examined, starting with attempts to restore referential continuity by means of devising an appropriate theory of reference, with varying degrees of success. The dependence of PMI on reference, and that realism is not hinged upon the issue of reference but that of approximate truth, make this particular approach superfluous to defending realism. Realist accounts with the 'divide and conquer' strategy are then assessed, starting from Psillos (1999) to epistemic structural realism (ESR), ontic structural realism (OSR) and Chakravartty's semirealism, some faring better than others. However, Kyle Stanford's 'trust' argument is presented to show that all the realist accounts that use the' divide and conquer' strategy are susceptible to the charge of being ad hoc in selection over the theoretical constituents. In response to the' trust' argument, I present my own realist account: objective blind realism (OBR). It is a minimal realist position, which appeals to NMA for approximate truth of genuinely successful scientific theories but does not attempt to locate which parts of the theories are approximately true. Potential objections to objective blind realism are explored and answered.

Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic arguments are closely affiliated with arguments for, and against, structuralism. In this thesis I show that this is no coincidence. Internal realism and structural realism are similarly motivated by worries about intentionality,the way that our language and theories "latch onto" the world. Putnam's model-theoretic arguments challenge a traditional epistemological duality thesis that posits an underlying noumenal world beneath the appearances described by our theories. Internal realism and ontic structural realism both deny that there is such a duality. So, one conclusion I draw is dialectical: that there are strong similarities between internal realism and ontic structural realism in both their motivation and their claims. I also address whether ontic structuralists are right to argue that worries about the way that our theories latch onto the world means that we ought to opt for a structural ontology. Might the problem instead lie with the theories' representation of the facts? I consider this question in relation to mathematical structuralism, and argue for an alternative to the ontic structuralist position about mathematics which responds to the same worries about intentionality in terms of the underdetermination of representation, rather than to the structural nature of the objects being described.