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Empty names are names which do not refer to anything. Apparently empty names are used in many different ways, and an analysis which looks good for one kind of use can look bad for another. I aim to get a wide enough angle on the issues that the solutions I propose won’t run into that problem. Chapter one is about names which are empty because they were introduced in the context of mistakes and lies. I see how we can assign truth values to utterances containing such names. I also look at how genuinely empty names could be meaningful at all, and examine how they could fit into a Davidsonian theory of meaning. Chapter two is about mental states corresponding to the names dealt with in chapter one. I try to give an account of how beliefs could be subject to rational norms without appealing to their propositional contents. I do this by showing that puzzles about co-referring names can motivate such an account independently, and that the empty name beliefs can fit into this framework easily. Chapter three is about attitude ascriptions and propositions. I consider different ways of responding to the problem of having propositions but no objects for the propositions to be about. I defend an account involving gappy Fregean propositions, and give a semantics for attitude ascriptions which incorporates them. Chapter four is about the names that occur in fiction. I argue that we should take these to be polysemous between a use referring to an artistic creation and a use primarily suited to pretence. For the first use, I survey proposals for ontologies of fictional characters, and suggest one of my own. To make sense of the second use, I use a two- dimensional semantics, which also helps with the problem of negative existentials.

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This study compares two prevalent notions in postmodern philosophy and critical-cultural theory: the sacred and the icon. On the one hand, the sacred has often been described as the exposure to an abyssal reality that is completely foreign to human perception and control. This deeply subversive event is presented through two of its most influential thinkers, Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot. On the other hand, the icon marks the experience of a sensitivity to the singular selfhood of the other. It comprises a loving receptivity to its unique identity, in particular the identity of the human or divine stranger who is excluded or victimized by human narratives and structures. Intrinsic to the ethical scene, as I show through Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Kearney, is an interaction rather than a subjugation of the subject by the other. This project seeks to present the similarities and differences between the sacred and the icon. In particular, it calls for a certain relationship between them, allowing both to be observed in each other’s respective light. Both are thus re-examined through their relation to each other. Moreover, this bond is seen to be ethically significant for either phenomenon and it helps redefine the sacred and the icon in a manner that is closer to actual experience. It also perceives either one in terms of a practical efficacy. To exemplify these views, the Christian mystical experience known as the ‘passive dark night of the soul’ is explored insofar as it constitutes one of the most radical instances of the icon. Crucial to this relationship is its exposure of the possible shortcomings and misjudgements of previous conceptions of the sacred. A potential new role for the sacred is indicated: a function that is at once more ethical and constructive. Above all, the underlying concern of this study is the very nature of this interaction of the two extremes. Throughout, it shows this affiliation as dialectical by nature. Between the sacred and the icon, a process of a mutual coinciding and estranging takes place.

Summary In chapter one I reject the thesis that a relation of partial entailment holds between probability evidence and conclusion, as also the claim that the propositions of applied geometry are synthetic a priori. By way of balance, I suggest that there may be a sense in which necessary conditions of discourse transcend the distinction between a priori and empirical. In chapter two I reject the claim that logical relations in the form of intrinsic probability enter into the no-miracles argument, which I suggest is frequency-connected in its more systematic applications, so that it belongs within a system. I begin chapter three with a critique of an attempted formal probability solution to Hume’s problem, and I now suggest that inductive inference has application only within a system in which its validity is pre-supposed in its premises, a concomitant of which is that the sceptic about induction cannot stop short of global scepticism. Since my aim is to show that global scepticism is self-refuting, given that intentionality may be analysed in terms of a system, I now develop that analysis by devoting chapter four to an examination of Wittgenstein on meaning and understanding. In chapter five I reject his thesis equating meaning and understanding with use, arguing instead that they are irreducible and subject to dispositionality conditions, and in furtherance of that argument I try to solve the problem of the authoritativeness of belief avowals by showing again that there are necessary conditions of discourse. These are such that selfascribing belief, crediting oneself with understanding and with being suitably disposed, are inherent in reasoning. In chapter six I weave the threads of the previous discussion into a solution by arguing that the sceptic about induction, who is committed to global scepticism, necessarily refutes himself. In chapter seven, on the problem of other minds, I attempt a solution by modifying the arguments used against inductive scepticism.

This thesis has two goals. Firstly, we consider the problem of model selection for the purposes of prediction. In modern science predictive mathematical models are ubiquitous and can be found in such diverse fields as weather forecasting, economics, ecology, mathematical psychology, sociology, etc. It is often the case that for a given domain of inquiry there are several plausible models, and the issue then is how to discriminate between them – this is the problem of model selection. We consider approaches to model selection that are used in classical [also known as frequentist] statistics, and fashionable in recent years methods of Akaike Information Criterion [AIC] and Bayes Information Criterion [BIC], the latter being a part of a broader Bayesian approach. We show the connection between AIC and BIC, and provide comparison of performance of these methods. Secondly, we consider some philosophical arguments that arise within the setting of the model selection approaches investigated in the first part. These arguments aim to provide counterexamples to the epistemic thesis of scientific realism, viz., that predictively successful scientific theories are approximately true, and to the idea that truth and predictive accuracy go together. We argue for the following claims: 1) that none of the criticisms brought forward in the philosophical literature against the AIC methodology are devastating, and AIC remains a viable method of model selection; 2) that the BIC methodology likewise survives the numerous criticisms; 3) that the counterexamples to scientific realism that ostensibly arise within the framework of model selection are flawed; 4) that in general the model selection methods discussed in this thesis are neutral with regards to the issue of scientific realism; 5) that a plurality of methodologies should be applied to the problem of model selection with full awareness of the foundational issues that each of these methodologies has.

"Partial realism" is a common position in the contemporary philosophy of science literature. It states that the "essential" elements of empirically successful scientific theories accurately represent corresponding features the world. This thesis makes several novel contributions related to this position. Firstly, it offers a new definition of the concept of “empirical success”, representing a principled merger between the use-novelty and unification accounts. Secondly, it provides a comparative critical analysis of various accounts of which elements are "essential" to the success of a theory, including structural realism and the divide et impera strategy. A novel account of essentialness, entitled the “empirically successful sub-theory "account", is defended. Thirdly, it is argued that the realism/anti-realism debate should put to the side metaphysical questions and focus instead on partial realism's commitment to the continuity of science. Because this commitment lacks metaphysical implications, it is referred to as "deflationary realism". Anti-realists cannot reject deflationary realism as a matter of a priori principle; its overall viability (and therefore that of partial realism) can therefore only be assessed by a careful examination of the history of science. Finally, another consequence of partial realism, named "partial rationalism", is defended. Partial rationalism states that, in cases where several competing theories have been suggested, scientists are rational just in case they accept the essential elements of each of the scientific theories on offer. This novel position subverts the existing literature on scientific "revolutions", as it sometimes demands that scientists devise a synthesis between competing scientific theories, instead of "choosing" only one. The philosophical points defended in this thesis are illustrated and supported by case studies from the history of science, including Fresnel’s wave theory of light, the Copernican revolution, the "neo-Darwinian synthesis" in evolutionary biology, the "prion revolution" in molecular biology, the miasma theory of disease, and the chemical revolution.

I present seven empirical studies that investigate two main themes regarding two main approaches of optimism: explanatory style and dispositional optimism. The first theme incorporates measurement issues and conceptual ideas of optimism and the second involves optimism interventions on depressive symptoms. In Study 1 I explored the potential psychometric structure of causal attributions and dispositional optimism. Attributions may be best viewed as reflecting large differences in cognitive style, and smaller independent positive- and negative-event biases. For dispositional optimism, a two-factor model was supported. Study 2 examined correlations between optimism and the Five-Factor Model of personality. Dispositional optimism and explanatory style had similar association patterns with personality, although there were some differences. Study 3 tested and supported a model in which dispositional optimism mediates the link between explanatory style and psychological well-being. Study 4 compared the levels of optimism expression in two ethnic groups, finding that Mainland Chinese participants were more optimistic and less pessimistic than White British. Study 5 examined attributional biases and found that individuals show more optimistic biased style for themselves than for other people. Studies 6 and 7 tested effectiveness of optimism interventions on depressive symptoms. It demonstrated that self-monitored optimism interventions on a daily basis could effectively reduce depressive symptoms and increase optimistic explanatory style. Taken together, the studies replicated some previous investigations regarding measurement issues and conceptual ideas of optimism, and explored novel approaches to examining the essence of attributional bias and effectiveness of optimism interventions in depression treatment. My investigation of attributional bias is the first to test this idea using new and comparable measures of attributions. Practicing self-administered optimism interventions is, to my knowledge, also the first time these interventions have been applied in a sample with mild-to-moderate depressive symptoms. This may provide an easily monitored and low-cost alternative to traditional treatments of depression.

The first part of our thesis will explore the nature and history of the development of Hegel’s reconciliatory self-determining philosophical science, by demonstrating how Hegel radicalises and reformulates the essence of skepticism as the principle of determinate negation. We will attempt to elucidate precisely why the persistence of external skepticism represents nothing more for Hegel than abstract dogmatism and philosophical naivety. In the second part of our thesis we will concentrate upon early 19th century post-Hegelian skeptical responses to Hegel’s speculative idealism. We will argue that Schelling, Feuerbach and Kierkegaard all attempt to disrupt what they see as the oppressive self-satisfaction of Speculative Reason by elaborating a skeptical attack upon Hegelianism in the name of the particular. Each thinker attempts to articulate a skeptical opposition to what they respectively argue to be Hegel’s illegitimate effacement of the particular within the totality of speculative reason itself. They each seek to return to an irreducible point of entry take Hegel back with them, to take him back ‘outside’ of the system of reason and return him to the particular. We will begin by analysing Schelling’s attempts to confront Hegel with the ‘Real Being’ he accuses Hegel of effacing from the very beginning through the illegitimate identity of thought and being. We will then examine Feuerbach’s attempt to deconstruct Hegel’s dialectic of sense certainty in an effort to return Hegel to the irreducible sensory quality of Being. We conclude this part with an analysis of Kierkegaard’s arguments for what he understands as the ‘paradox’ of faith. We will show that Kierkegaard’s efforts are aimed at bringing Hegel into proximity with this paradoxical faith in order to demonstrate his failure to comprehend the true nature of faith. The skeptical attacks of all three thinkers will be rigorously examined in the light of Hegel’s understanding of the relationship between skepticism and philosophy that we will have outlined in the first part of our thesis. Our aim will be to show precisely how and why they ultimately fail to articulate a radically heterogeneous skeptical position with regard to Hegel’s speculative idealism. By demonstrating the precise nature of their failure we will set the scene for our discussion of Levinas’s skeptical relation to Hegel in the third part of this thesis. It will be our contention that Levinas successfully elaborates a response to Hegel’s speculative reason that clearly continues upon the trajectory initiated by the three 19* century post-Hegelian skeptics that we have examined, and that what ultimately marks his success in articulating a genuinely heterological thought will be the extent to which he precisely avoids the failures we have identified.

In whisky production, there is very little information regarding the influence of wort insoluble material on the fermentation. Therefore, an investigation into the influence of wort solid material on the fermentation of whisky wort by yeast was undertaken. Initial studies involved assessing the effects of wort solids on a small-scale fermentation system. Fermentation parameters, such as decrease in wort specific gravity (SG) and free-amino nitrogen (FAN) were assessed during fermentations of clarified and cloudy wort. Results showed fermentation of cloudy wort to be faster and more complete. Shaking fermentations of clear wort appeared to negate these effects, allowing fermentation to proceed like that of cloudy wort, but differences in the amount of FAN consumed were apparent. Clarification of wort by centrifugation resulted in altered fermentation parameters compared to addition of wort solids back to clear wort, suggesting a role for the physical nature of the solids. Clarified wort was shown to contain an elevated C02 concentration after 5 and 8 hours fermentation (ca. 5 g/L), but addition of an inert material (diatomaceous earth (DE)) decreased the concentration to levels observed in cloudy wort (ca. 2 gIL). Bentonite, another inert material, did not have the same ability as DE. Environmental Scanning Electron Microscopy revealed that the solids with porous surface topography (wort solids and DE) were more effective as CO2 nucleating agents. Static 1L fermentations of whisky wort were also carried out. A model was devised whereby clear wort was supplemented with DE at a concentration similar to that of solids in cloudy wort. Differences during fermentation were still apparent between cloudy wort and clear wort with DE, which could not be accounted for by elevated C02 concentrations. A series of fermentations were performed where clear wort with DE was supplemented with long chain fatty acids and fermented in conjunction with cloudy wort. There were no apparent effects after addition of hexadecanoic, octadecadienoic and octadecatrienoic acids, but fermentation was enhanced with the addition of the unsaturated fatty acids hexadecenoic acid and octadecenoic acids. Zinc addition enhanced fermentation slightly, but not to the same level as cloudy wort. The effects of differences in mashing technique in a commercial setting were investigated. There was a decrease in the initial concentration of FAN in worts where the first sparge temperature was 90°C, as opposed to 76 °C, and a higher concentration of solids and long-chain fatty acids. These worts fermented more quickly, in terms of consumption of FAN by yeast, during early fermentation. Differences were also observed in the concentration of volatiles (esters and higher alcohols) between worts after 50 hours fermentation. Dielectric measurements taken over a 72 hour, temperature-controlled fermentation period revealed fundamental differences in yeast cell behaviour during fermentation of wort from different distilleries. Worts were also produced in the 2 hL pilot plant at Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, to determine the effects of experimental differences in mashing regime on the subsequent wort. Again, fundamental differences were observed during fermentations, which appeared to be linked to differences in the components present in different worts. From these results it was hypothesised that the ability of yeast to consume and utilise a range of compounds in wort would render them more resistant to stress, particularly when more fatty acids were available.