Our emotions tell us that something is happening. When we experience or express an emotion, it is a reaction to a situation that is happening to or around us. This thesis project seeks to address the social and political inequalities that obstruct certain individuals and groups from being able to access and express the unique form of information that emotions provide. Emotional epistemic injustice concerns the ways in which our emotions can be used against us as an epistemic agent along gendered, racial, and ableist lines. Our capacity as a knower is influenced by social rules – and these same social rules dictate which kind of people can feel what, and in which situations. The first two chapters of this project are focused on identifying and analyzing two existing kinds of emotional epistemic injustice – misogynistic emotion reframing and emotional epistemic exploitation. By explicitly acknowledging these phenomena, I provide two new actionable hermeneutical resources, demonstrate the significance of our emotional experiences, and establish the need for a recategorization of emotions as a significant and unique source of information. The third and final chapter focuses on how this recategorization can be done. By specifically identifying socio-epistemically significant emotions, I argue for the recategorization of emotions as an invitation to further investigation of our experiences within the context of existing social and political inequalities. Our emotions, both felt and expressed, have the potential to be powerful tools for real social and political change – and in order for them to have this impact, they must be embraced as their own unique and significant source of information. / Thesis / Master of Philosophy (MA) / The primary goal of this thesis project is to formally acknowledge the role of emotions in how we are able to acquire and contribute to knowledge construction, and successfully communicate said knowledge to others. Our gender, race, sexuality, socio-economic status, and ability all influence how we are allowed to express our emotions, and to what extent they will receive uptake from a given audience. These social feeling rules allow others to “justifiably” dismiss the information our emotions are signaling based on our social position, and results in the expression of emotion being used to undermine our reason-based testimony or communication as well. By identifying two specific ways in which this is already happening via misogynistic emotion reframing and emotional epistemic exploitation, as well as presenting a new way of categorizing our emotions as unique forms of information, I will demonstrate that the information our emotions provide can be a powerful tool for real social and political change.

Despite reform efforts to broaden historically underrepresented populations across STEM disciplines, the data continues to highlight gaps of achievement across racial demographics. In an effort to address educational inequity, current reform efforts have touted the implementation of learning progressions as a promising strategy that can produce equality of outcomes across racial groups in STEM. Despite this promising effort, few studies have examined how to integrate practices of equity within learning progressions for groups such as African Americans that have been traditionally excluded from science and STEM. This study argues that an equity oriented learning progression should be responsive to sociohistorical factors of epistemic injustice that dissociated African Americans identities from being producers of knowledge. This study argues that the construction of a learning progression to advance the epistemic participation of African American students is aligned with goals of social justice related to diversifying STEM. The aims of this study explored how African American students progressed toward epistemic agency as STEM learners as a result of identity transformation through the engagement of the epistemic practices of engineering. This study used qualitative methodology to explore how student participants demonstrate epistemic development in their artifacts and discourse when engaging in engineering activities across a learning progression designed to develop epistemic agency. The findings from this study contribute to a broader understanding of how equity-oriented learning progressions can be designed to promote epistemic justice, how sociocultural positionings influence epistemic communities, and how students can become epistemic agents to raise STEM awareness within their local community. Advancing students epistemic practices of engineering and epistemic agency as STEM learners is key to creating meaningful pathways into STEM for students in K-12. / Doctor of Philosophy / National imperatives to broaden the STEM participation of underrepresented groups remains a prominent priority across educational research. Due to marginal effectiveness associated with racialized minorities, researchers continue to explore equity oriented initiatives. In an effort to address educational inequity, current reform efforts have touted the implementation of learning progressions as a promising strategy that can produce equality of outcomes across racial groups in science and STEM. Educational inequity prevents underrepresented populations, such as African Americans, from having the types of educational experiences that position them as significant contributors in STEM and more specifically engineering. This study argues that the construction of a learning progression to advance the epistemic participation and agency of African American students in STEM is a sociohistorical response to a legacy of epistemic injustice. Qualitative methodology was used to explore how African American students progressed toward epistemic agency as STEM learners as a result of identity transformation through the engagement of the epistemic practices of engineering. The findings indicated that the engineering design activities within the curriculum positively influenced students' identity, self-efficacy, and demonstration of epistemic agency across the learning progression. Additionally, the findings indicated the effectiveness of using the epistemic practices of engineering to facilitate the cognitive development of the engineering habits of mind. Lastly, the findings indicated the significance of using the epistemic practices of engineering to reposition African American students' identities as epistemic contributors both within the classroom and within their local community.

Moral encroachment theses (MET) operate like pragmatic encroachment theses. When the stakes of belief are high, so are the standards for evidence. This means that evidence which is sufficient in a low stakes-of-belief scenario may be insufficient when the stakes are raised. Simply, METs aim to appeal to the varying moral intuitions that one may have in cases with different moral stakes and build an epistemological difference out of that moral distinction. For example, one might think that in cases of racial profiling, because the moral stakes of belief are high, what would otherwise constitute good evidence for belief is insufficient. However, most METs assume that the probabilistic evidence on which one relies to form their belief is good evidence. Instead of examining the reliability of statistical generalizations, like those used in cases of racial profiling, the moral encroacher focuses on the moral facts of the circumstance of belief formation to explain why the subsequent belief is wrong epistemically. I will focus on Sarah Moss's account because she focuses on cases in which one forms an opinion on the basis of probabilistic evidence. I use Moss's version of the MET as a target to illustrate the challenges METs face in general. Broadly, Moss holds that a judgment's moral risk bears on its epistemic status. In Section 1, I briefly outline Sarah Moss's MET and explain why it fails to identify which cases produce epistemically problematic judgments and fails to explain why those judgments are epistemically problematic. In Section 2, I offer an alternative account, which explains why statistical generalizations about marginalized social groups are likely unreliable as evidence. Thus, use of this kind of evidence leads to epistemically problematic beliefs. I conclude by introducing epistemic risk as an explanation for why the inference made in Shopper is epistemically problematic while the inference made in Fraternity Member is not. / Master of Arts / Imagine a shopkeeper who has just realized something was stolen from his shop. There are two possible suspects: a young white man and a young Black man. He did not see the shoplifting occur, and the only evidence he has is the statistical evidence that young Black men are 70% more likely to shoplift than young white men. By all accounts, he is not racially biased, this is simply a statistical fact that he is aware of. Based on this evidence, he forms the judgment that the young Black man is the likely culprit. Let's call this case Shopper. Now imagine a student on a college campus whose friend has been assaulted. There are two possible suspects: a young man who is not a fraternity member and a young man who is in a fraternity. The only evidence that the student has is the statistical evidence that men involved in fraternities are 70% more likely to have committed sexual violence than average. By all accounts she is not anti-fraternity, she is simply aware of this statistical evidence. Based on this evidence, she forms the judgment that the fraternity member is the likely assailant. Let's call this case Fraternity Member. I think there's a difference between these two cases. Specifically, I think it's okay to make the inference in the latter case, but not in the former. Even if you don't quite share my intuition, you might still think that however 'icky' it feels to draw the above sort of inference in Fraternity Member, it feels ickier still to draw it in Shopper. Either way, I don't think these intuitions are merely responsive to the moral facts of the cases: I think there's something different about the evidence relied upon in these cases. Specifically, we have reason to thinks that the processes with which we produce the evidence relied upon in Shopper are biased.

Epistemologists and those involved in feminist philosophy have expanded philosophical analyses of epistemic injustices and its subparts over the last decade. In doing so, such authors have thoroughly discussed the role of credibility deficits and the harms they cause for those receiving the deficits. In this literature, however, credibility excesses have not received as much attention owing to their tendency to be socially advantageous for those receiving them. In this paper, I show that epistemic justice relies in part on taking these excesses into account. More specifically, I illustrate how adjusting only credibility deficits leads to a two-fold problem. On the one hand, it leads to an epistemic harm insofar as not taking the excesses into account can cause us to draw the wrong conclusion from furnished testimonies. If one persons testimonial excess is still greater than another's corrected deficit in a certain way, then the person with the excess will be favored over the other person even once the deficit is corrected. On the other hand, it can also lead to a moral harm that wrongs the person who received the eventually corrected deficit in their capacity as a knower. It does so in instances when it undermines the person's self-trust. As such, if we are willing to adjust credibility deficits up in the project of epistemic justice we also have to be willing to adjust credibility excesses down in at least some cases. / Master of Arts / Think of a time when someone did not believe you. For some persons holding historically marginalized identities, it is a fairly common occurrence to not be believed just because one is, or is perceived to be a woman, a person of color, queer, and immigrant etc. In philosophy, epistemologists have discussed these testimonial deficits and furnished solutions that call for adjusting such deficits up in the project of justice. However, testimonial deficits are not the only instances when a person may receive a non-proportional amount of credibility. For other persons holding historically majoritized identities, it may also be fairly common to be believed just because one holds or is perceived to hold an identity such as man, white, straight, etc. The presence of credibility excesses is not as discussed in philosophical literature and what, exactly, we ought to do about these excesses is an open question. In this paper, I argue that adjusting credibility deficits up is not sufficient for reaching a just state if or when we leave the excesses unadjusted in certain circumstances. While adjusting the credibility deficits up is part of the picture, we also have to be willing to adjust the credibility excesses down in at least some cases.

Anti-immigrant rhetoric undermines Latinx parents' epistemic legitimacy as producers of valued parental knowledge, irrespective of immigrant status. Little is known about the epistemic harm to Latina mothers who must negotiate their maternal scripts against the backdrop of a parenting discourse steeped in deficit thinking. This study used testimonio to explore the experiences of Latina mothers of young children living in the borderlands of South Texas via a Chicana/Latina feminist epistemological framework that conceptualizes the self as multiplicitous and responsive to the straddling of multiple cultures, nationalities, races, languages, and physical borders. The research questions guiding the study included: (1) How do Latina borderland mothers experience epistemic harm in the context of mothering knowledge? and (2) What strategies do borderland mothers employ to nurture strength and counter epistemic harm? Two theoretical constructs emerged from data analyses. First, the borderland was a site of recurring credibility battles as well as a site of "in-the-flesh" encounters that deepened human connection. Supporting themes included "Brown-on-Brown conflict vs. like-me counters" and "situating injustice vs. denying injustice." The second theoretical construct asserted that borderland mothers' ways of knowing are polyvocal and reflect a Brown body ethic of care. Its two supporting themes included "co-family as sources of epistemic strength vs. credibility denying authorities" and "powerless childhoods vs. what the Brown body knows."

Stereotype threat is a psychological phenomenon that occurs when individuals become aware that their behavior could potentially confirm a negative stereotype. Though stereotype threat is a widely studied phenomenon in social psychology, there has been relatively little scholarship on it in philosophy, despite its relevance to issues such as implicit cognition, epistemic injustice, and diversity in philosophy. However, most psychological research on stereotype threat discusses the phenomenon by using an overly narrow picture of it, which focuses on one of its effects: the ability to hinder performance. As a result, almost all philosophical work on stereotype threat is solely focused on issues of performance too. Social psychologists know that stereotype threat has additional effects, such as negatively impacting individuals’ motivation, interests, long-term health, and even their sense of self, but these other effects are often downplayed, or even forgotten about. Therefore, the “standard picture” of stereotype threat needs to be expanded, in order to better understand the theoretical aspects of the phenomenon, and to develop broader, more effective interventions. This dissertation develops such an “expanded picture” of stereotype threat, which emphasizes how the phenomenon can negatively impact both self-identity and epistemic agency. In doing so, I explore the nature of stereotypes more generally and argue that they undermine groups’ moral status and contribute to what is called “ontic injustice.” I also show how stereotype threat harms members of socially subordinated groups by way of coercing their self-identity and undermining their epistemic agency, which I argue is a form of epistemic injustice. Lastly, I analyze the expanded picture’s implications for addressing the low proportion of women in professional philosophy. I critically engage recent arguments that these low numbers simply reflect different interests women have, which if innate or benign, would require no intervention. My expanded picture shows the mistakes in this sort of reasoning, which is also present in discussions on the underrepresentation of women in science. The expanded picture of stereotype threat that this dissertation develops is not only practically important, but also advances key philosophical debates in social epistemology, applied ethics, and social metaphysics.

Epistemic injustice is a relatively new philosophical term for a rather old phenomenon. A situation is said to be epistemically unjust when someone is wronged in his capacity to possess or convey knowledge. While anyone can be the victim of a testimonial injustice, the epistemic injustice that occurs in an exchange of testimony, people with marginalized identities systematically suffer from this kind of injustice. By relying on negative identity prejudices, a person in a position of power consciously or subconsciously undermines a marginalized individual’s capacity for knowledge. In this paper, I argue that persistent testimonial injustice can inhibit the formation of one’s identity. Then I explore the role that communities may play in ameliorating this harm. I suggest that communities are conceptualized differently depending on their purpose (e.g. psychological melioration or political resistance). In the final part of this paper, I examine two conceptions of communities put forth by María Lugones and Iris Marion Young and determine whether they can provide both psychological and political resources for resistance.

Based on the theory of the emotions proposed by Martha Nussbaum, the present paper proposes a theory of rationality and judicial reasonability that includes emotions as a necessary element. With this, it is possible to pass from a purely deliberative-abstract model of judicial argument to a narratively open one, in which empathy and literary imagination play a fundamental role. I will argue that emotions have a concrete manifestation in at least three relevant circumstances: the value of testimony, that of empathy, and that of literary imagination. However, the place of emotions for the project of judicial rationality is subject to institutional restrictions such as rules of law, procedures and precedents. With this in mind, a sketch of theory on the narrative rationality in judicial contexts is presented in the last section of this paper. / A partir de la teoría de las emociones de Martha Nussbaum, el presente trabajo propone una teoría de la racionalidad y razonabilidad judicial que incluya a las emociones como un elemento necesario. Con ello se pasa de un modelo puramente deliberativo-abstracto de argumentación judicial a uno de tipo narrativamente abierto, en el cual la empatía y la imaginación literaria desempeñan un papel fundamental. Sostendré que las emociones tienen una manifestación concreta en al menos tres circunstancias relevantes: el valor del testimonio, el de la empatía y el de la imaginación literaria. Sin embargo, el lugar de las emociones para el proyecto de la racionalidad judicial está sometido a restricciones institucionales tales como reglas del derecho, procedimientos o precedentes. Con ello, un bosquejo de teoría sobre la racionalidad narrativa en sede judicial es presentado en la última sección.

Almost since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Sweden has been criticised for doing too little to stop the spread of the virus. No lockdowns have been implemented and schools have stayed open throughout the pandemic. In his book Pandemic Ethics, Ben Bramble argues that lockdowns are necessary and that Swedes may become ”somewhat colder” and ”less able to flourish” as a result of Sweden’s pandemic response. In this essay I discuss whether or not the Swedish people are being failed as moral agents by Swedish authorities during the COVID-19 pandemic. I analyse two senses in which the people could be morally wronged: (1) by having too much moral responsibility placed upon them, and (2) by becoming less virtuous or less able to flourish as a result of actions and words of the authorities. In answering (1), I argue that an individual moral agent has little or no moral responsibility from a utilitarian point of view. From a virtue ethics point of view, the cause behind the action is more important than its consequences, so being handed the responsibility for stopping the spread of coronavirus would not be significantly different from other instances where citizens are free to act in a way that may lead to them causing harm to others. By analysing examples of how citizens can exercise their moral virtues in states with differing responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, I show that citizens becoming more or less virtuous does not follow from the pandemic response of the country they live in, thereby refuting (2). I then briefly discuss two ways in which I believe authorities could fail its citizens as moral agents.

This is a dissertation in philosophy of psychiatry and ethics focused on the question of how does one live and react responsibly to the experience of mood disorders such as depression and anxiety. In looking to the current state of psychiatry and cultural understandings of mental disorder, I identify what I call being “epistemically adrift” – the sense that individuals face too many conflicting opinions and a constant debate of how to live with depression that they are unable to process for themselves what their best options for living are. This feeling of being epistemically adrift is all the more complicated by the experience of mood disorder itself, which often makes individuals feel morally inadequate and pressured to do the right thing without clear direction. In the absence of a clear path regarding depression and anxiety, this dissertation proposes an ethics for depression and anxiety disorders – drawing a virtue theory from the existentialist tradition that focuses on the outskirts of mental disorder in order to create an inclusive ethical system for those generally excluded in moral philosophy. The first chapter outlines the general theory of being epistemically adrift in relation to depression and anxiety and how the themes of uncertainty in these conditions inherently lead to different epistemic insights. This chapter establishes the dissertation’s roots in existential phenomenology and epistemic injustice literature in order to sketch out how the combined uncertainty in interdisciplinary understanding of mental illness with the uncertainty experienced within mood disorders lead individuals to feeling adrift and unable to determine what they should do for themselves in living good lives. Meanwhile I argue that the insights of depression and anxiety attune individuals to the world in different ways than their non-depressed peers, which imports interesting questions regarding our responsibility toward one another. The second chapter explores a case study of this sort of insight, arguing that the experience of excessive or “delusional” guilt within depressive disorders can provide a deeper insight into our general moral responsibility towards one another. I compare this feeling of guilt to Karl Jaspers’ conception of “metaphysical” or collective guilt in his analysis of the German people after the Second World War and Holocaust. These sorts of guilt feelings within depression is often incapacitating and hard to make sense of for individuals, but it additionally has a transformative ability to reevaluate moral life. I argue that parallel to the concept of “depressive realism” where individuals with depression have different and sometimes better insights than others, depressive guilt differently attunes individuals to how they relate to others and the world at large. From there, the third chapter engages with how psychiatric diagnosis shapes and limits one’s perceptions of their freedom and agency. More specifically, this chapter employs an existentialist analysis of how one can react to their diagnosis in bad faith – deflecting their own responsibility either by indulging into diagnostic patterns as inherent destiny or denying the condition’s effect on their motivations. I argue that there must be a middle path where one takes responsibility for one’s situation as being depressed or anxious, which both acknowledges the condition but also sees it as a personal challenge to improve on one’s life. The final chapter of the dissertation culminates in the development of an ethical theory that directly centers itself within the experience of mood disorders. This theory stems from both existentialism for its commitment to projecting meaning on uncertainty and absurdity along with virtue theory which allows for a sense of imperfection and improvement over time. I have been developing a set of virtues for how to be responsible for one’s depression or anxiety. “Responsibility” in this sense is the question of how one responds to their moods and other symptoms related to mood disorders, that is, an account of responsibility that resists narratives of fault or blame. These virtues are meant to be a set of therapy-informed guidelines to help those with depression and anxiety counteract the worst feelings of being adrift and foster autonomy and dignity for themselves. / Philosophy