If one can do a good thing, ought one do it? In this paper, I argue that capability is a strong source of moral obligation that can, in proper doses, override things like property rights. I will build a hypothetical case based on a fictional invention called the Replicator with enormous potential for use as a humanitarian tool and I’ll use it to display the way that capability to aid imposes powerful moral obligations on both individuals and organizations. Ultimately, I will use the model that I will develop to demonstrate that some real-world entities are not satisfying their moral responsibilities with regards to aiding the global poor, and will suggests ways in which they can fulfill those obligations.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:cmc_theses-1938 |
| Date | 01 January 2014 |
| Creators | Griffith, Adam |
| Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
| Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | CMC Senior Theses |
| Rights | © 2014 Adam Griffith |
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