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The Commander's Sword & the Executive's Pen: Presidential Success in Congress and the Use of Force.

Post-force congressional rally effects are presented as a new incentive behind presidential decisions to use diversionary behavior. Using all key roll call votes in the House and Senate where the president has taken a position for the years 1948 to 1993, presidents are found to receive sharp decreases in both presidential support and success in Congress shortly after employing aggressive policies abroad. Evidence does suggest that presidents are able to capitalize on higher levels of congressional support for their policy preferences on votes pertaining to foreign or defense matters after uses of force abroad. But, despite these findings, diversionary behavior is found to hinder rather than facilitate troubled presidents' abilities to influence congressional voting behavior.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:unt.edu/info:ark/67531/metadc3926
Date08 1900
CreatorsRagland, James Deen
ContributorsGreig, Michael, Meernik, James, Oldmixon, Elizabeth
PublisherUniversity of North Texas
Source SetsUniversity of North Texas
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis or Dissertation
FormatText
RightsPublic, Copyright, Ragland, James Deen, Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights reserved.

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