The purpose of this dissertation is to show a yet undiscovered link between identity claims and the survival of political leaders. Diversionary theory posits that starting foreign conflicts during domestic hardship may increase the popular approval ratings of the leader and maintain him in power. I suggest that leaders may resort to initiating identity claims as a diversionary action to stay in power. Indeed, using survival analysis, this study finds a connection between the desire of leaders to protect their ethnic kin in neighboring countries and the leaders' own popularity and survival at home. Yet, identity claim initiation and escalation significantly decrease the chances of leaders to remain in office. At first sight, this is in sharp contrast with the diversionary theory literature, which suggests that leaders may employ foreign wars as a means to distract from domestic problems and increase their survival in office. Yet, the realization that the escalation of conflict may backfire does not necessarily deter leaders from diverting. Therefore, this analysis offers a new perspective in the field of rationalist explanations for war.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of Security Studies / Dale R. Herspring / North Korea and the ruling Kim regime continues to present a unique security dilemma to both East Asia and the international community. The Kim regime's actions, which often include hostile military and diplomatic foreign policy actions, often seem inconsistent with parallel efforts to peacefully engage the international community. This research examines the following question: what has been the historic relationship between North Korea’s domestic conditions and its propensity to engage in “hostile” diplomatic and military activities? I also consider whether the concept of diversionary theory, the idea that leaders pursue external conflict when faced with domestic problems, is an explanation for these actions. The study initially proposes there is a relationship between North Korea’s domestic challenges and its willingness to engage in conflict activities aimed primarily at South Korea and the United States. To test these ideas, I conduct a quantitative analysis of North Korean event data collected from both US and Korean sources from 1960-2011 and a qualitative analysis of three case studies. My findings provide only limited support to the idea that internal conditions faced by the Kim regime influence its conflict behavior. More influential are a select number of external conditions, especially those involving South Korea, which often prompt North Korean responses and heightened conflict levels. This research also finds that the ruling Kim regime has often turned to diversion-type actions as a means to achieve domestic goals, yet diversionary theory itself is insufficient to explain these activities. North Korea represents an ongoing security dilemma for both East Asia and the international community and in this study, I demonstrate how historical and political science methods can be used to examine and explain the actions of this reclusive state.

Post-force congressional rally effects are presented as a new incentive behind presidential decisions to use diversionary behavior. Using all key roll call votes in the House and Senate where the president has taken a position for the years 1948 to 1993, presidents are found to receive sharp decreases in both presidential support and success in Congress shortly after employing aggressive policies abroad. Evidence does suggest that presidents are able to capitalize on higher levels of congressional support for their policy preferences on votes pertaining to foreign or defense matters after uses of force abroad. But, despite these findings, diversionary behavior is found to hinder rather than facilitate troubled presidents' abilities to influence congressional voting behavior.

Plus de 70 ans après la création de l'État d'Israël, un quart de siècle depuis la signature des accords d'Oslo, les espoirs de paix entre l'État d'Israël et les Palestiniens s’estompent. Le conflit israélo-palestinien ne s’en trouve pas forcément exacerbé, mais plutôt bien enlisé. Étonnamment, la sortie de cette impasse ne semble pas être une priorité pour les actuels leaders politiques des parties au conflit, le premier ministre israélien, Benyamin Netanyahou, et le président de l'Autorité palestinienne, Mahmoud Abbas. S’appuyant sur des travaux en analyse de politique étrangère argumentant que les conflits interétatiques peuvent s’avérer un moyen de diversion utilisé par les leaders politiques pour esquiver des problèmes de politique interne, ce mémoire se penche sur les raisons qui pourraient expliquer l’intérêt des leaders israéliens et palestiniens à maintenir le statu quo dans le conflit. La période observée s’étend de 2009 à 2019, soit une période à laquelle les deux hommes politiques se trouvent respectivement au pouvoir. Basé sur des travaux scientifiques, sur des analyses de think-tanks et sur de l’information collectée dans les médias israéliens et palestiniens, le mémoire s’appuie également sur une série d’entrevues menées entre décembre 2019 et mai 2020 en Israël et en Cisjordanie avec des universitaires, journalistes et décideurs tant israéliens que palestiniens. Question de recherche: « Si un règlement au conflit israélo-palestinien semble souhaitable, pourquoi les leaders israéliens et palestiniens ne font-ils pas davantage d’efforts pour résoudre le conflit? » / More than 70 years after the creation of the State of Israel and a quarter of a century since the signing of the Oslo Accords, hope for peace between the State of Israel and the Palestinians is fading. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not necessarily exacerbated, but rather immobilized. Surprisingly, ending this stalemate does not seem to be a priority for the current political leaders of the warring parties, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas. Building on foreign policy analyses which argue that inter-state conflicts may be a diversion used by political leaders to evade domestic issues, this research looks at the reasons that might explain the interest of both the Israeli and Palestinian leaders in maintaining the status quo of the conflict. The researched period extends from 2009 to 2019 – a period in which the two politicians are respectively in power. Based on scientific work, think-tanks analyses, and information collected in Israeli and Palestinian media, the work also draws on a series of interviews conducted between December 2019 and May 2020 in Israel and in the West Bank with Israeli and Palestinian scholars, journalists, and policy-makers. Research question: "If a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems desirable, why are Israeli and Palestinian leaders Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas not making more efforts to resolve the conflict?"