Study project (MAcc)--Stellenbosch University, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The most basic principle of agency theory is that an individual will always serve his own
interest best. According to Eisenhardt (1989) agency theory describes individuals as rational,
risk averse en motivated by egotism. Agency theory also deals with the conflict that exists
between different parties in an organization due to people's egoism. This self-interest can lead
to goal incongruence if a person is placed in an environment where he has to serve somebody
else's interest.
Ownership and management vested in the same party until about 130 years ago. These roles
were however separated with the development of the modem organization. The principal or
owner is now represented by the shareholder and management serves as the agent. The
principal thus appoints the agent to serve and manage his interest in the organization
optimally.
The principal's goal is the maximising of his shareholders' wealth. The agent's goal to carry
out his task with the minimum effort and or to obtain maximum benefit for himself. It is thus
clear that the goals of the principal and agent might often differ and this will give rise to goal
Incongruence.
This goal incongruence may give rise to some managerial actions which will be detrimental to
optimal value of the company. The agency conflict, which is caused by man's self interest,
manifests in the modem organization in a number of ways. These are referred to agency
problems in this assignment. Agency problems are found both on a micro- and macroeconomical
level.
Agency cost is the sum of the difference between the real and optimal value of the company,
the monitoring costs of the principal and the bonding costs of the agent. This cost is to the
disadvantage of the principal and might even be to the disadvantage of the agent. It is thus
essential that agency conflict and agency costs are reduced to a minimum.
A number of measures are taken to address the agency problems and to reduce their negative
effect on the organization. None of these measures will be efficient enough ifused in isolation.
An optimal combination of solutions will depend on the company's specific circumstances. An empirical study was conducted to determine to what extent the agency problems manifest
during the demutualisation of a big insurance business. The measures taken to address these
problems were also investigated as well as the extent to which these were successful. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die basiese aanname van agentskapsteorie is dat die individu sy selfbelang altyd eerste sal
stel. Volgens Eisenhardt (1989) beskryf agentskapsteorie individue as rasioneel, risikoongeneigd
en gemotiveer deur selfbelang. Agentskapsteorie handel verder oor die konflik
wat tussen die verskillende belanghebbende partye binne 'n organisasie as gevolg van
persone se selfbelang ontstaan. Hierdie selfbelang van die mens kan lei tot
doelwitinkongruensie, indien die persoon in 'n omgewing geplaas word waar daar van hom
verwag word om 'n ander se belange te dien.
Eienaarskap en bestuur was tot ongeveer 130 jaar gelede gevestig in dieselfde party. Met die
totstandkoming van die moderne onderneming, is hierdie rolle egter geskei. Die prinsipaal of
eienaar word nou verteenwoordig deur die aandeelhouer en die bestuur dien as die agent. Die
prinsipaal stel dus die agent aan om na sy belang in die onderneming om te sien en dit
optimaal te bestuur.
Die prinsipaal se doel is die maksimering van sy aandeelhouerswelvaart. Die agent poog om
sy taak met minimale inspanning te voltooi en of uitsonderlike voordeel vir homself te behaal.
Dit is duidelik dat die prinsipaal en agent se doelwitte meermale sal verskil en
doelwitinkongruensie ontstaan dus.
Hierdie doelwitinkongruensie word vergestalt in sekere aksies wat bestuur soms neem en wat
daartoe lei dat die optimale waarde van die firma nie bereik word nie. Die agentskapskonflik
wat as gevolg van die partye se selfbelang ontstaan manifesteer in die moderne onderneming
op 'n verskeidenheid van wyses, wat in hierdie werkstuk as agenskapsprobleme gedefinieer
word. Agentskapsprobleme kom op 'n mikro- sowel as op 'n makro-ekonomiese vlak voor.
Die verskil tussen die werklike en optimale waarde van die organisasie, plus die prinsipaal se
moniteringskoste en die agent se gebondenheidskoste, verteenwoordig agentskapskoste.
Hierdie koste strek tot die nadeel van die eienaars en meermale ook tot die nadeel van die
bestuur. Dit is dus noodsaaklik dat agentskapskonflik en die gepaardgaande agentskapskoste
tot 'n minimum beperk word.
Daar word van 'n verskeidenheid van maatreëls gebruik gemaak ten einde die
agenskapsprobleme aan te spreek en hul negatiewe impak op die onderneming te versag. Nie een van hierdie oplossings kan in isolasie gebruik gemaak word nie en afhangend van die
onderneming se spesifieke omstandighede, sal daar hoogstens 'n optimale kombinasie van
oplossings ontwikkel kan word.
Daar is vervolgens in hierdie werkstuk 'n empiriese ondersoek uitgevoer ten einde te bepaal in
hoe 'n mate die agenskapsprobleme tydens die demutualisering van 'n groot
versekeringsonderneming manifesteer. Die neem van regstellende stappe om hierdie
probleem aan te spreek is ondersoek, sowel as die mate waartoe hierdie maatreëls suksesvol
was al dan nie.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:sun/oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/52080 |
| Date | 12 1900 |
| Creators | Du Toit, C. E. (Catherina Elizabeth) |
| Contributors | De Jager, W., Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences. School of Accounting. |
| Publisher | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | af_ZA |
| Detected Language | Unknown |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 96 p. |
| Rights | Stellenbosch University |
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