Counterinsurgency is still believed to be of relevance in modern time and affect military organizations. Kilcullen and Galula, two theorists who have been of high relevance for the development of strategies for population-centric counterinsurgency used in the modern era. In 2010, Operation Moshtarak was conducted with Field Manual 3-24, which is based on these theorists. Despite this, there is a discrepancy if the operation was conducted with a population-centric counterinsurgency and if Kilcullen and Galula theories can be applied in a modern era. The purpose of this study is to examine why operation Moshtarak, which was supposed to implement the aspects of population centric counterinsurgency resulted in failure. The study uses a qualitative case study and even though the theories didn’t reach the expected elucidatory level, the results of the study indicate that the initial steps of the operation demonstrate that population-centric counterinsurgency were used, but after the initial successes in the expulsion of insurgents, problems arised for the coalition. The study also indicates that more research is necessary to understand the outcome of the case and the relevance of these theories.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-7613 |
| Date | January 2018 |
| Creators | Söreke, Joel |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
Page generated in 0.0013 seconds