<p>This essay presents an alternative approach to the predominant democratic analysis of the European Monetary Union. As the Treaties stipulate the political conduct within Monetary Union and put certain restrictions on the European politicians they are to some extent constitutional in their character. </p><p>Essential for constitutional theory is the concept of precommitment; according to which a decision is made in t1 purposing to obstruct certain actions in t2. In light of this the aim of this essay is to investigate whether or not delegating monetary responsibility to the ECB can be seen as an example of constitutional precommitment and if so, if this constitutional perspective can add something to the predominant democratic analysis of the EMU. </p><p>According to the author the EMU is by and large a form of precommitment as the leading politicians in Europe figuratively have tied their hands from intervening in the common monetary policy. The author is also of the opinion that a constitutional approach can add something to the incomplete democratic analysis of the EMU. If a treaty has a constitutional character one cannot expect it to be changed using ordinary political means. Since it is instituted to safeguard certain values the amendment process has to be complex. This complexity does not however entail that it is impossible to change the mandate of the ECB. The European Union furthermore has a confederal character and the member states can thus, as a last resort, withdraw their membership, still making them the"Masters of the Treaties".</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA/oai:DiVA.org:liu-2206 |
| Date | January 2004 |
| Creators | Håkansson, Peter |
| Publisher | Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, Ekonomiska institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, text |
| Relation | Magisteruppsats i Statsvetenskap, ; 2004:4 |
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