The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – supervised by the European Court of Human rights (ECtHR) – coexists with other normative (human rights) instruments that have been created at the national, regional, and international level, both by State and non-State actors. The ECHR represents one legal piece of this normative ‘jungle’, characterized by legal ‘fragmentation’. Whereas a lot is said about the negative aspects of this diverse world, this doctoral thesis aims to focus on its positive sides. To support its interpretation and application of the ECHR, the Strasbourg Court makes reference to a diverse range of instruments other than the ECHR, which we call external instruments. The Grand Chamber-case of Demir and Baykara v. Turkey of 12 November 2008 provides a rare overview of the characteristics of this ‘referencing practice’. In this judgment, the Court included a separate heading to specifically explain its interpretative use of international law, discussing the legal basis as well as the type of instruments that it considers relevant. Two major conclusions follow from the Court’s explanations: firstly, it puts external referencing in the light of some rules on interpretation provided in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) (particularly in Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT); secondly, it stresses that soft and non-ratified external instruments might equally offer support for (evolutively) interpreting the ECHR. These statements are controversial; the Court has been criticized for misinterpreting the rules of the VCLT, for not well justifying its references as well as for exceeding its powers by incoherently relying on (non-binding) external materials for interpretative purposes.The case of Demir and Baykara v. Turkey left many questions open in respect of the importation of external instruments. There is some confusion about the functions and the weight of (non-binding) external instruments in legal reasoning. In addition, the justificatory arguments developed in this case lack precision and persuasiveness. Addressing these gaps, this study firstly offers an elaborate ‘mapping’ of the usage of external instruments by the ECtHR. For that purpose, all references in each Grand Chamber-case since Demir and Baykara v. Turkey of 12 November 2008 (until the end of 2015) have been analyzed and categorized. Secondly, this work develops arguments to better justify the Court’s practice of using external instruments. Both from a legality and a users’ perspective, this thesis demonstrates how external referencing may (under certain conditions) be a valid method to give meaning to the provisions in the ECHR. The ‘mapping’ of the referencing practice demonstrates that, to support the interpretation and application of the Convention in the ‘law’-section of the decision, external instruments have been invoked by the Grand Chamber in almost 70 percent of the examined cases. This interpretative technique covers a wide variety of instruments, diverging according to their origin as well as to their scope ratione materiae, ratione personae and ratione loci. The legal status of the instruments constitutes an additional root of diversity; the ECtHR imports legal instruments that have been ratified by the Member States, instruments that have not been ratified by some of the Member States and/or by the respondent State, soft instruments created by politically (non-)representative bodies, and finally, case law developed by other (quasi-)judicial bodies. The Grand Chamber references these instruments for different purposes: to dismiss their content, to establish interpretative rules, to support the interpretation of notions and requirements of the Convention, to enable the creation of harmony between the Convention and external legal requirements, or to consider a State’s freedom of manoeuvre when applying the ECHR. An example of a contested – but rather rare – usage of external instruments consists of comparing a mixture of binding and non-binding instruments in order to progressively evolve (and change) the Court’s case law. Overall, however, the Grand Chamber adopts a rather traditional approach to its interpretative ‘sources’, not according to non-binding instruments an independent decisive weight.In the Grand Chamber cases issued after Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, the Court did not undertake efforts to further justify and explain its referencing practice. In our view, two provisions might nonetheless operate as valuable vehicles to enhance the legality of some references. It concerns, more particularly, Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT, inciting the Court to take into account external applicable norms, and Article 53 ECHR, offering a ‘safeguard’ for human rights. Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT is regularly used by the Court in connection to the method of ‘harmonious interpretation’, accommodating the obligations of the ECHR with external obligations (that risk to conflict with the Convention). We agree that Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT – covering a principle of ‘systemic integration’ – offers a legal basis for a coordinative integration of external applicable requirements. Some caution is nonetheless required; the creation of convergence between the ECHR and external legal domains should not supersede the aim of effective and progressive human rights protection. Therefore, when a conflict arises between the ECHR and an external provision, this should be clearly acknowledged instead of being artificially ignored under a pretext of ‘harmonisation’ and ‘anti-fragmentation’. Subsequently, the conflict should be solved by means of ‘hierarchical integration’ (giving precedence to human rights law) rather than by ‘coordinative integration’.Although the Court references Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT to support harmonious interpretation between the ECHR and external instruments outside the human rights domain, this case law study demonstrates that it does generally not cite this provision in respect of references to human rights catalogues other than the ECHR. For that reason, a criticism claiming that the Court misuses Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT to expand the ECHR on the basis of external higher human rights provisions, largely misses ground. This does not mean, however, that Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT has no relevance in respect of the importation of other human rights catalogues. Although this does not accord with the Court’s general practice, we are of the opinion that Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT mandates the Court to integrate (higher) protection standards applicable in all Member States of the Council of Europe. In other words, the ideal of ‘systemic integration’ is not only relevant in relation to the landscape of (general) international law, but should also permeate the domain of human rights law. As a harmonizing principle, it is supposed to encourage the Court to take account of ratified external human rights catalogues, including their authoritative interpretation by external monitoring bodies. Article 53 ECHR supports this argument too. This provision offers a human rights safeguard ensuring peaceful coexistence between the ECHR and higher protection standards. The message of Article 53 ECHR towards the Strasbourg judges is twofold. In its procedural dimension, the Court should use it directly, to sanction a State that, on the national level, did not give precedence to the highest applicable human rights standard. In its substantive dimension, this provision has effects similar to those of Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT. When higher and binding human rights standards are applicable in all Member States, Article 53 ECHR obliges the Court to substantively integrate them into its interpretation of the ECHR. In addition, we argue that Article 53 ECHR offers a symmetric human rights safeguard, preventing a downward evolution of the ECHR on the basis of external human rights instruments offering lower standards. The proposed interpretation of Article 53 ECHR is innovative, yet controversial; so far, the Court has not used it in this manner. In line with Articles 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT and 53 ECHR, we argue that external instruments, under certain conditions, exercise a binding authority. Apart from that, referencing could be exercised in an optional manner, for instance in order to support argumentative purposes such as ‘evolutive’, ‘practical and effective’, and ‘autonomous’ reasoning and/or the establishment of a ‘margin of appreciation’. Essentially, these interpretation principles are covered by a holistic reading of the rules of the VCLT. A concept that catches well a combined reading of the rules of the VCLT, without losing sight of the specificity of human rights law, is the search for ‘opinio juris under the treaty’. Under this interpretative framework, an emerging or an ambiguous State consensus may suffice to develop a dynamic interpretation of the ECHR, provided that the incomplete consensus is confirmed by an opinio juris. To establish an emerging or ambiguous State consensus, ‘hard’ and ratified legal instruments (of national or international origin) are of particular relevance. In addition, a wide variety of (non-binding) external instruments might be useful to demonstrate the opinio juris. Besides legal provisions, some other, less formal, users’ arguments may validate some aspects of the referencing practice. The usage of external human rights catalogues – possibly containing higher protection standards, rights of other ‘generations’, or more specialized and specific provisions – contributes to the creation of human rights that are effective, universal and indivisible. This serves the rights holders who have an interest in equal treatment by a law that operates as a ‘ius gentium’, and in an adjudication process that does justice to all specificities of their identity and lived experiences. In addition, referencing could contribute to progressively evolve the protection of human rights. The referencing practice also enhances the coherence of the system, which is beneficial for ‘legal certainty’ vis-à-vis all users of human rights. Moreover, external referencing may contribute to a more nuanced and ‘shared’ decision-making, inspired by the positions and insights of various actors. Indeed, by means of comparative law, judges can build a dialectic network of mutual influences and communicative enrichment on a global scale. When we acknowledge that it is the Court’s task to translate pluralism in balanced outcomes and to canalize the different interests underlying a case, the importation of external views from across the globe may help the Court is assuming that responsibility. The Strasbourg judges find particularly valuable tools in external instruments. Not only could their usage enhance the procedural economy and the deformalization of the decision-making process, external citations may also make a reasoning more convincing and authoritative towards the audience. However, these benefits only play to the extent that external referencing is transparent, consistent and systematically relies on a solid legal framework.To optimize the justification of the referencing practice, this doctoral thesis recommends the Court to better embed its external citations in both formal and informal arguments. We have done several suggestions as to how such arguments might be developed in practice. Their use could boost the valid usage of external instruments, which, under certain conditions, offers good opportunities for a persuasive interpretation and application of the ECHRWe started our research with a sketch of the present normative environment; it is disordered and can be metaphorically compared to a jungle. The Strasbourg judges walk through this area and use lianas to make connections between all elements that compose this forest. Through their referencing practice, they communicate, learn, and argue. In an ecosystem, all organisms are dependent on one another; they cannot survive in isolation. Following the rules of nature, the organisms mutually profit from each other’s existence and finally, provide each other with oxygen. In order to be good rangers in this jungle, the Strasbourg judges should recognize and acknowledge the existence and the value of all the other organisms. In addition, to ensure a high degree of balance in the ecosystem, they should keep an eye both on the system’s rules (legality) and on the views and interests of those that benefit from the system (the users of human rights). By handling the lianas in such manner, the Court contributes to more coherence of the system (combating ‘fragmentation’) and caters for the users’ needs. This does not mean that one day, the jungle will be turned into a nicely organized cornfield. Some diversity in global times is inevitable and necessary. After all, it is the chaotic context that offers us tools to advance the law, to persuade the public, etc. The art is not to replace pluralism by unity, but to find a balance between divergence and convergence by creating a form of justice that is shared by all. / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ulb.ac.be/oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/250143 |
| Date | 26 June 2017 |
| Creators | Staes, Dorothea |
| Contributors | Rorive, Isabelle, Van Drooghenbroeck, Sébastien, De Schutter, Olivier, Bribosia, Emmanuelle, Brems, Eva, Vanneste, Frédéric |
| Publisher | Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Université Saint-Louis, Faculté de Droit, CIRC, Université libre de Bruxelles, Faculté de Droit et de Criminologie, Bruxelles |
| Source Sets | Université libre de Bruxelles |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, info:ulb-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, info:ulb-repo/semantics/openurl/vlink-dissertation |
| Format | 469 p., No full-text files |
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