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The United Nations Does (Not) Wage War : The Role of Hostility and Commitment in UN Peace Enforcement Missions

While there exists a considerable body of literature on the development of UN peace operations: from traditional peacekeeping operations to today’s robust enforcement missions; scrutinizing their efficiency and the challenges they face – little attention has been paid to why various levels of military action are used by a mission. This study addresses this research gap by comparing three UN enforcement operations: MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UNMISS in South Sudan, and MINUSMA in Mali. This study specifically investigates how the level of hostility in the conflict and commitment from the troop-contributing countries affect the level of enforcement actions taken in each conflict. The arguments are tested using a Structured Focused Comparison. The study finds that increased levels of hostility generated an increase in the level of enforcement in all three cases studied, while the level of commitment did not have the same distinct effect.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-385500
Date January 2019
CreatorsWennberg, Sofia
PublisherUppsala universitet, Institutionen för freds- och konfliktforskning
Source SetsDiVA Archive at Upsalla University
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeStudent thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text
Formatapplication/pdf
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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