The purpose of the essay has been to analyze if the Swedish Army ground forces, can be looked upon as a learning organization as the doctrines declare. This in the perspective that a working, collective Lessons Learned-process does not exist in the Swedish Army with the possible long term effects of diminishing its war-fighting capabilities. The method is a qualitative text analysis of the recently published report from the Swedish Army Land Warfare Center. The report focuses on tactical experiences from the Swedish ground forces perspective through the years 2009-2012, in the over a decade long Afghanistan-operation. The result indicates that the specified organization, the Army and its ground forces, can be seen as a learning organization but with great flaws. The flaws can be seen in all chosen theoretical disciplines, but are the most palpable in the most important one - the system thinking - which is essential for long term learning. But the analysis also gives some good news. The discipline that embraces the most indications of learning is the personal mastery. The inner strength, will and skill sets of the personnel are striking. The analysis points out that a deep learning exists, specifically on individual and lower levels, but is hindered by the system. Hence, the organization is filled with tacit knowledge. The conclusion is that the war-fighting capabilities might actually have been strengthened, but mainly on individual and low level but not as the organization should have. It lacks a working system for it.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-7573 |
| Date | January 2016 |
| Creators | Saedén, André |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
Page generated in 0.0024 seconds