This project examines the determinants of political responsiveness to
bureaucratic performance. A large literature exists that has examined how bureaucratic
agencies are responsive to political institutions. While policy theory contends that the
reverse is also true – that is, political institutions engage in political assessment of
policies – there is little empirical literature examining this important question. Indeed,
research in public administration suggests that political responsiveness only occurs
following massive bureaucratic failure or policy crises. Using data from Texas public
school districts, this dissertation explores the role of policy salience in determining the
likelihood of political responsiveness to bureaucratic outputs and outcomes.
The findings suggest that issue salience is the key determinant of political
involvement in administration. Furthermore, this project incorporates the concepts of
descriptive and substantive representation in examining these questions. The results
indicate that policy salience depends on the composition of the interests of political
institutions. Furthermore, race and ethnicity work to shape those preferences and, in
turn, condition what policy makers deem as salient. The findings suggest that descriptively unrepresentative political institutions are less likely to be responsive to the
needs of those who are not represented (e.g. Latino students). Thus, representation is
central to political responsiveness when the policy outputs or outcomes in question are
not universally salient.
Finally, this project examines whether political institutions can influence policy
outcomes, and, more importantly, what factors – environmental, organizational,
managerial – either facilitate or constrain the political influence of elected officials. The
findings suggest that goal and preference alignment between political institutions and
bureaucratic agencies is critical in enhancing political influence – a finding that is
commonly argued in formal models of political control, but rarely tested empirically.
This research also finds that bureaucratic power or independence can work to hinder
political influence of policy outputs.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:tamu.edu/oai:repository.tamu.edu:1969.1/ETD-TAMU-3044 |
| Date | 15 May 2009 |
| Creators | Hawes, Daniel Prophet |
| Contributors | Meier, Kenneth J. |
| Source Sets | Texas A and M University |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Book, Thesis, Electronic Dissertation, text |
| Format | electronic, application/pdf, born digital |
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