<p>There is longstanding interpretive dispute between
commentators over Spinoza’s commitment to <i>necessitarianism</i>, the doctrine
that all things are metaphysically necessary and none are contingent. Those who
affirm Spinoza’s commitment to the doctrine adhere to <i>the necessitarian
interpretation</i> whereas those who deny it adhere to what I call <i>the
semi-necessitarian interpretation</i>. As things stand, the disagreement
between commentators appears to have reached an impasse. Notwithstanding, there
seems to be no disagreement among commentators on the question of
necessitarianism’s philosophical plausibility as a metaphysical view: the
doctrine is wildly untenable.
This consensus view is more relevant to the interpretive debate than few have
recognized, since leading
semi-necessitarian commentators take the doctrine’s alleged absurdity to be one
of the most compelling reasons (if not <i>the</i> most compelling reason) to
prefer their reading over the necessitarian interpretation: for, as a matter of
methodological principle, great philosophers like Spinoza should not be
ascribed ridiculous views in the absence of better evidence. </p>
<p>This dissertation seeks to
defend Spinoza’s commitment to necessitarianism on both the interpretive and
philosophical fronts. I argue not only that the necessitarian interpretation of
Spinoza is more plausible than the semi-necessitarian interpretation on textual
grounds, but that Spinoza’s necessitarianism is a serviceable philosophical
view whose tenability has been almost entirely overlooked and perfunctorily
rejected. The principal basis upon which I build this defense is Spinoza’s rich
and fascinating view of essences—what I simply refer to as his <i>essentialism</i>.
Spinoza’s essentialism forms the bedrock of his metaphysics and is significant
not least because it underlies and informs doctrines like his necessitarianism.
Spinoza’s essentialism supplies resources to answer not just interpretive
problems associated with necessitarianism, but philosophical challenges to the
plausibility of the doctrine. My defense of Spinoza’s necessitarianism on
philosophical grounds also offers a novel way of getting past much of the
current interpretive impasse among commentators by effectively undercutting the
methodological motivation for the semi-necessitarian reading. In addition to my
defense on the interpretive front, then, my defense on the philosophical front
provides supplementary reason to <i>a fortiori</i> favor the necessitarian
reading of Spinoza.</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:purdue.edu/oai:figshare.com:article/15081042 |
| Date | 30 July 2021 |
| Creators | Brandon Rdzak (11208369) |
| Source Sets | Purdue University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis |
| Rights | CC BY 4.0 |
| Relation | https://figshare.com/articles/thesis/_It_is_of_the_nature_of_reason_to_regard_things_as_necessary_not_as_contingent_A_Defense_of_Spinoza_s_Necessitarianism/15081042 |
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