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Spinoza's Version of the PSRSchaeffer, Erich 31 March 2014 (has links)
Michael Della Rocca has provided an influential interpretation of Spinoza relying heavily on the principle of sufficient reason. In order to challenge this interpretation, I identify three assumptions Della Rocca makes about the PSR and demonstrate that it is not clear Spinoza shares them. First, Della Rocca contends that the PSR is unlimited in scope. I show that the scope of Spinoza’s version of the PSR is ambiguous. While it is clear that substances and modes are included, it is unclear just how widely the scope extends. Second, Della Rocca argues that the PSR demands there are no illegitimate bifurcations. I argue that Della Rocca’s account of illegitimate bifurcations is too strong. I show that Spinoza offers a distinction in explanatory types that should be considered illegitimate and inexplicable according to Della Rocca’s definition of illegitimate bifurcations. Third, Della Rocca argues that explanations which satisfy the demands of the PSR must be in terms of the concepts involved. I show that Spinoza does not use conceptual explanations. Instead, in almost all cases, the explanations Spinoza relies on to satisfy the demands of the PSR are in terms of a thing’s cause. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2014-03-28 11:35:29.035
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Leibniz e Hobbes: causalidade e princípio de razão suficiente / Leibniz and Hobbes: causality and principle of sufficient reasonHirata, Celí 31 August 2012 (has links)
O escopo desta pesquisa de doutorado é examinar a relação entre a doutrina hobbesiana da causalidade e o princípio de razão suficiente em Leibniz, assinalando a aproximação e o distanciamento entre um e outro. Se, por um lado, o filósofo alemão é claramente influenciado por Hobbes na formulação de seu princípio, por outro, é por meio desse próprio princípio que ele critica alguns dos aspectos mais decisivos da filosofia de Hobbes, como o seu materialismo, necessitarismo, bem como a sua concepção de justiça divina e a sua tese de que Deus não pode ser conhecido pela luz natural. Em alguns textos de sua juventude, Leibniz prova que nada é sem razão pela identificação da razão suficiente com a totalidade dos requisitos, demonstração que praticamente reproduz aquela pela qual Hobbes defende que todo efeito tem a sua causa necessária. Entretanto, em oposição a Hobbes, que reduz a realidade a corpos em movimento, Leibniz utilizará o conceito de razão suficiente para demonstrar que somente um princípio incorporal pode dotar os corpos com movimento. É igualmente por meio do princípio de razão suficiente e da sua distinção em relação ao princípio de contradição que Leibniz defende que os eventos no mundo não são absolutamente necessários, mas contingentes. Por fim, é utilizando-se deste princípio que o autor da Teodiceia argumentará que Deus pode ser conhecido pela razão natural e que a justiça divina consiste na sua bondade guiada pela sua sabedoria, em contraste com a definição hobbesiana de justiça fundamentada no poder. Assim, se Leibniz se apropria de certos elementos da doutrina hobbesiana da causalidade é para submeter a causalidade eficiente e mecânica que é defendida pelo inglês a uma determinação essencialmente teleológica da realidade. / The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the Hobbesian doctrine of causality and the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz, indicating the closeness and distance between them. If, on the one hand, the German philosopher is clearly influenced by Hobbes in the formulation of his principle, on the other hand is through this very principle that he criticizes some of the most decisive aspects of the philosophy of Hobbes, as his materialism, necessitarianism, as well his conception of divine justice and his thesis that God can not be known by natural light. In some texts of his youth, Leibniz proves that nothing is without reason by means of the identification of the sufficient reason with the totality of all requisites, demonstration that almost reproduces that one by which Hobbes argues that every effect has a necessary cause. However, in opposition to Hobbes, that reduces the reality to bodies in motion, Leibniz uses the concept of sufficient reason to demonstrate that only an incorporeal principle can provide body with movement. It is also through the principle of sufficient reason and its distinction from the principle of contradiction that Leibniz argues that events in the world are not absolutely necessary, but contingent. Finally, it is using this principle that the author of the Theodicy argues that God can be known by natural reason and that divine justice consists in his goodness guided by wisdom, in contrast to the Hobbesian definition of justice based on power. So, if Leibniz appropriates certain elements of the Hobbesian doctrine of causation is in order to submit the mechanical efficient causality defended by Hobbes to an essentially teleological determination of the reality.
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Os conceitos de representação em schopenhauerCarvalho, Diego Uchôa Souza 16 August 2013 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2013-08-16 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The present dissertation aims at exposing the representation concepts and their respective
consequences regarded to Arthur Schopenhauer s world conception. The underlying
representation concepts to Schopenhauerian philosophy answer to issues regarding to human
knowledge and formulated since classical Antiquity, which justifies the plenty relevance of
the theme. It is also very important the urgent need of underlining, in Schopenhauer thoughts,
some subtle aspects of the general representation concept, to which the due importance wasn t
given by many of those who study the matter. In the achieve of this, in a first moment, the text
intends to delimit and expose the theoretical pressupositions which are indispensable to its
right comprehension. Afterwards, it attempts to formulate the above-mentioned general
concept. Thereafter, has the purpose of ordinating the specific representation concepts
according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Finally, it has the objective of relating the
preceeding ideas to the notion of Will as noumenon or thing-in-itself, besides explaning,
based on this Will understanding, a new representation concept, which will be, this time,
independent of the above-reffered principle. / A presente dissertação tem como finalidade expor os conceitos de representação e suas
respectivas consequências na concepção de mundo de Arthur Schopenhauer. Os conceitos de
representação inerentes à filosofia schopenhaueriana respondem a questionamentos relativos
ao conhecimento humano formulados desde a Antiguidade Clássica, o que justifica a plena
relevância do tema. É também de assaz importância a preemente necessidade de sublinhar-se,
no pensamento do filósofo, sutilezas acerca do conceito geral de representação às quais não
foi dada a devida importância por parte dos estudiosos da matéria. Para tanto, num primeiro
momento, o texto busca delimitar e expor os pressupostos teóricos imprescindíveis para sua
compreensão. Em seguida, pretende formular o referido conceito geral. Logo após, tem o
propósito de ordenar os conceitos específicos de representação de acordo com o Princípio de
Razão Suficiente. Por fim, objetiva relacionar as ideias precedentes à noção de Vontade como
númeno ou coisa-em-si, além de explanar, com base nessa, um novo conceito de
representação, dessa vez, independente daquele princípio.
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Leibniz e Hobbes: causalidade e princípio de razão suficiente / Leibniz and Hobbes: causality and principle of sufficient reasonCelí Hirata 31 August 2012 (has links)
O escopo desta pesquisa de doutorado é examinar a relação entre a doutrina hobbesiana da causalidade e o princípio de razão suficiente em Leibniz, assinalando a aproximação e o distanciamento entre um e outro. Se, por um lado, o filósofo alemão é claramente influenciado por Hobbes na formulação de seu princípio, por outro, é por meio desse próprio princípio que ele critica alguns dos aspectos mais decisivos da filosofia de Hobbes, como o seu materialismo, necessitarismo, bem como a sua concepção de justiça divina e a sua tese de que Deus não pode ser conhecido pela luz natural. Em alguns textos de sua juventude, Leibniz prova que nada é sem razão pela identificação da razão suficiente com a totalidade dos requisitos, demonstração que praticamente reproduz aquela pela qual Hobbes defende que todo efeito tem a sua causa necessária. Entretanto, em oposição a Hobbes, que reduz a realidade a corpos em movimento, Leibniz utilizará o conceito de razão suficiente para demonstrar que somente um princípio incorporal pode dotar os corpos com movimento. É igualmente por meio do princípio de razão suficiente e da sua distinção em relação ao princípio de contradição que Leibniz defende que os eventos no mundo não são absolutamente necessários, mas contingentes. Por fim, é utilizando-se deste princípio que o autor da Teodiceia argumentará que Deus pode ser conhecido pela razão natural e que a justiça divina consiste na sua bondade guiada pela sua sabedoria, em contraste com a definição hobbesiana de justiça fundamentada no poder. Assim, se Leibniz se apropria de certos elementos da doutrina hobbesiana da causalidade é para submeter a causalidade eficiente e mecânica que é defendida pelo inglês a uma determinação essencialmente teleológica da realidade. / The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the Hobbesian doctrine of causality and the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz, indicating the closeness and distance between them. If, on the one hand, the German philosopher is clearly influenced by Hobbes in the formulation of his principle, on the other hand is through this very principle that he criticizes some of the most decisive aspects of the philosophy of Hobbes, as his materialism, necessitarianism, as well his conception of divine justice and his thesis that God can not be known by natural light. In some texts of his youth, Leibniz proves that nothing is without reason by means of the identification of the sufficient reason with the totality of all requisites, demonstration that almost reproduces that one by which Hobbes argues that every effect has a necessary cause. However, in opposition to Hobbes, that reduces the reality to bodies in motion, Leibniz uses the concept of sufficient reason to demonstrate that only an incorporeal principle can provide body with movement. It is also through the principle of sufficient reason and its distinction from the principle of contradiction that Leibniz argues that events in the world are not absolutely necessary, but contingent. Finally, it is using this principle that the author of the Theodicy argues that God can be known by natural reason and that divine justice consists in his goodness guided by wisdom, in contrast to the Hobbesian definition of justice based on power. So, if Leibniz appropriates certain elements of the Hobbesian doctrine of causation is in order to submit the mechanical efficient causality defended by Hobbes to an essentially teleological determination of the reality.
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Den Fullkomligaste Världen: Om Fullkomlighet i den Necessitaristiska läsningen av Spinoza. / The Most Perfect World: On Perfection in the Necessitarian reading of Spinoza.Lemon, Elliot January 2024 (has links)
In various parts of Ethics, Spinoza explains both the existence and the necessity of the existence of things, like God, through their perfection(Proofs and Scholium to theorem 11 of part 1 and Scholium 2 for Theorem 33 of part 1). In this paper I attempt to elaborate on the suggestion made by Don Garrett, in Spinoza's Necessitariansim (2018), that Spinoza might have thought that no other world is possible but the one that expresses the greatest possible perfection. I will show that Spinoza's understanding of perfection is intimately connected with "Spinoza's PSR" and his understanding of casuality, to make Garrett's suggestion more probable. The paper is motivated by Koistinen's concerns, in Spinoza's Proof of Necessitarianism (2003), that Garrett's suggestion is too weak to entail necessitarianism. I'll show that Koistinens presented concerns can be rebutted and that the explication for the perfection of the world or "system of finite modes" that he ascribes to Garrett is flawed because it doesn't reflect how Spinoza uses the notion of perfection in Ethics. / <p>Höstterminen 2023</p>
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The rational psychology of perfect being theology : towards a new Islamic hermeneuticsAhmed, Babar January 2010 (has links)
Some of the attributes of a perfect being (e.g. first cause, necessary being, intelligent creator) are established on the basis of theological arguments such as the cosmological and the teleological. At the deepest level, these theological arguments are based on principles of rational psychology such as simplicity and sufficient reason. Moreover, belief that the perfect being is the moral omnipotent God is an act of trust and thus based on the rational psychology of trust. Theists in the Abrahamic tradition subscribe to first cause/necessary being/intelligent creator theology and must therefore remain faithful to any psychological principles (simplicity, sufficient reason, trust) that are the rational grounds for believing in the existence of their God. But such faithfulness results in a deep tension within Judeo-Christian theism. For example, a Christian theist who believes in the Trinity must at the same time remain faithful to the principle of simplicity that rejects the Trinity. Because simplicity is the rational basis for the deeply cherished attributes of the Christian God (first cause/necessary being/intelligent creator), it is argued that faithfulness to psychological principles such as simplicity discipline Christian theistic belief, in particular the belief in the Trinity. Examples of this nature offer a framework for a similar disciplining of Islamic hermeneutics on the basis of rational psychology. Muslim interpreters tend not to systematically engage in the philosophy of religion, and for this reason do not explicitly articulate the psychological principles that gave them their theistic Muslim identity. As a result, they deviate from such principles when it comes time to interpret the original sources of Islam (Quran and Sunna). Consistency is one of the demands of rationality, and it is inconsistent to assume principles in arriving at a theistic Muslim identity and then subsequently fail to apply those principles consistently to the task of textual interpretation.
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"It is of the nature of reason to regard things as necessary, not as contingent": A Defense of Spinoza's NecessitarianismBrandon Rdzak (11208369) 30 July 2021 (has links)
<p>There is longstanding interpretive dispute between
commentators over Spinoza’s commitment to <i>necessitarianism</i>, the doctrine
that all things are metaphysically necessary and none are contingent. Those who
affirm Spinoza’s commitment to the doctrine adhere to <i>the necessitarian
interpretation</i> whereas those who deny it adhere to what I call <i>the
semi-necessitarian interpretation</i>. As things stand, the disagreement
between commentators appears to have reached an impasse. Notwithstanding, there
seems to be no disagreement among commentators on the question of
necessitarianism’s philosophical plausibility as a metaphysical view: the
doctrine is wildly untenable.
This consensus view is more relevant to the interpretive debate than few have
recognized, since leading
semi-necessitarian commentators take the doctrine’s alleged absurdity to be one
of the most compelling reasons (if not <i>the</i> most compelling reason) to
prefer their reading over the necessitarian interpretation: for, as a matter of
methodological principle, great philosophers like Spinoza should not be
ascribed ridiculous views in the absence of better evidence. </p>
<p>This dissertation seeks to
defend Spinoza’s commitment to necessitarianism on both the interpretive and
philosophical fronts. I argue not only that the necessitarian interpretation of
Spinoza is more plausible than the semi-necessitarian interpretation on textual
grounds, but that Spinoza’s necessitarianism is a serviceable philosophical
view whose tenability has been almost entirely overlooked and perfunctorily
rejected. The principal basis upon which I build this defense is Spinoza’s rich
and fascinating view of essences—what I simply refer to as his <i>essentialism</i>.
Spinoza’s essentialism forms the bedrock of his metaphysics and is significant
not least because it underlies and informs doctrines like his necessitarianism.
Spinoza’s essentialism supplies resources to answer not just interpretive
problems associated with necessitarianism, but philosophical challenges to the
plausibility of the doctrine. My defense of Spinoza’s necessitarianism on
philosophical grounds also offers a novel way of getting past much of the
current interpretive impasse among commentators by effectively undercutting the
methodological motivation for the semi-necessitarian reading. In addition to my
defense on the interpretive front, then, my defense on the philosophical front
provides supplementary reason to <i>a fortiori</i> favor the necessitarian
reading of Spinoza.</p>
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