After Gettier came Plantinga.In this essay I explore the concepts of justification and warrant. Are they just two words with the same meaning? Starting with Edmund Gettier’s famous 1963 paper Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? as a backdrop, I investigate Alvin Plantinga’s Proper Functionalism, his analysis of warrant, that property enough of which turns mere true belief into knowledge. Then we put Plantinga’s proper functionalism to the test with challenges from a selection of essays from philosophers critical to Plantinga’s views on warrant. We end up in a summary, where I defend the thesis that Plantinga’s proper functionalism has deepened our understanding of warrant to the point that we can say that it is the best starting point when investigating what warrant is, and how it thus helps us in our understanding what constitutes knowledge. The question of whether Plantinga’s account of warrant can be said to be a solution of Gettier cases will depend on our willingness to allow some vagueness in Plantinga’s definition of the cognitive ”mini environment”. Otherwise, a reductive analysis of knowledge and its parts seem doomed. In the end I give a slightly adjusted revision or addendum of proper functionalism, adding what I call the elements of recognition and surprise in being prepared for truth’s either validating or refuting my belief. I also shortly, in a postscript, discuss possible ways forward for those who want to explore more about Plantinga’s design plan condition, whether it should be interpreted in a theistic or naturalistic framework.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:umu-149697 |
| Date | January 2018 |
| Creators | Boström, Dan |
| Publisher | Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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