This thesis will critique Gilbert Harman's moral relativism. Harman argues for a form of
moral relativism he calls a "conventionalist" account of morality. He supports this by defending
a view of explanations, a view of simplicity, and a view of the moral "ought." However, the
anthropological literature contains strong evidence against his drawing of this relativist
conclusion — and in support of a contrary one. According to anthropologists, there is a universal
belief in the moral wrongness of incest, the "incest taboo": its existence suggests that Harman
may have better supported a form of moral realism than the relativism he endorses. Thus, at the
very least, Harman's argument does not prove that relativism is true; more strongly, it may prove
that relativism is false, and realism true. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UBC/oai:circle.library.ubc.ca:2429/14987 |
| Date | 05 1900 |
| Creators | Rawlings, Adam D.H. |
| Source Sets | University of British Columbia |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis/Dissertation |
| Format | 3707927 bytes, application/pdf |
| Rights | For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use. |
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