Why has Russia failed to establish air superiority over Ukraine despite its superiority in personnel and resources within the air force compared to Ukraine? Previous research mentions the failed SEAD/DEAD operations as a contributing factor, yet these studies have focused on the strategic and operational levels. This study examines the factors contributing to the failed SEAD/DEAD operations at the tactical level. This is conducted through a qualitative text analysis using a theoretical framework derived from Warden and Pape, as well as a study by Bucki. The factors examined in the operations include; high-technology combat aircraft and missiles, the ability to conduct low-altitude flying, the position of airbases relative to the operational area, disabling sensors, intelligence, and electronic warfare capabilities. The results indicate that Russia did not achieve any of these factors except for positioning. However, this did not prove advantageous as the ability to conduct longer low-altitude flights was limited.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-12421 |
| Date | January 2024 |
| Creators | Helenius, Jim |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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