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Previous issue date: 2014-01-24 / This dissertation analyses quantitatively the costs of sovereign default for the economy, in a model where banks with long positions in government debt play a central role in the financial intermediation for private sector’s investments and face financial frictions that limit their leverage ability. Calibration tries to resemble some features of the Eurozone, where discussions about bailout schemes and default risk have been central issues. Results show that the model captures one important cost of default pointed out by empirical and theoretical literature on debt crises, namely the fall in investment that follows haircut episodes, what can be explained by a worsening in banks’ balance sheet conditions that limits credit for the private sector and raises their funding costs. The cost in terms of output decrease is though not significant enough to justify the existence of debt markets and the government incentives for debt repayment. Assuming that the government is able to alleviate its constrained budget by imposing a restructuring on debt repayment profile that allows it to cut taxes, our model generates an important difference for output path comparing lump-sum taxes and distortionary. For our calibration, quantitative results show that in terms of output and utility, it is possible that the effect on the labour supply response generated by tax cuts dominates investment drop caused by credit crunch on financial markets. We however abstract from default costs associated to the breaking of existing contracts, external sanctions and risk spillovers between countries, that might also be relevant in addition to financial disruption effects. Besides, there exist considerable trade-offs for short and long run path of economic variables related to government and banks’ behaviour / Este trabalho analisa de forma quantitativa os custos para a economia de um default soberano, num modelo onde bancos comprados em d´ıvida tˆem um papel central na intermedia¸c˜ao financeira para os investimentos do setor privado e enfrentam fric¸c˜oes financeiras que limitam sua alavancagem. A calibra¸c˜ao busca refletir economias da Eurozona, onde discuss˜oes sobre risco de calote das d´ıvidas e programas de resgate aos governos tem sido temas centrais. Os resultados mostram que o modelo captura um importante custo apontado pela literatura emp´ırica e te´orica, qual seja, a contra¸c˜ao do investimento que segue um epis´odio de default, o que pode ser explicado pela piora no balan¸co do setor financeiro, limitando cr´edito e liquidez para o setor privado e aumentando os custos para o seu financiamento. O custo em termos de perda de produto, no entanto, n˜ao ´e suficiente para explicar a existˆencia de mercados de d´ıvida e os incentivos dos governos em honrar seus compromissos. Assumindo que a reestrutura¸c˜ao do perfil de pagamentos da d´ıvida imposta num caso de default permite ao governo aliviar sua restri¸c˜ao or¸cament´aria e cortar impostos, o modelo apresenta resultados bastante distintos para impostos lump-sum e distorsivos. Para nossa calibra¸c˜ao, a resposta quantitativa de produto e utilidade mostra que ´e poss´ıvel que o efeito na oferta de trabalho gerado por cortes de impostos distorsivos domine a queda no investimento, causada pela escassez de cr´edito nos mercados privados. S˜ao abstra´ıdos, no entanto, os custos de default associados a quebras de contratos, san¸c˜oes externas e transbordamentos de risco entre pa´ıses, que podem ser bastante relevantes em adi¸c˜ao ao impacto sobre o cr´edito no sistema financeiro. Al´em disso, existem trade-offs consider´aveis na trajet´oria de curto e longo prazo das vari´aveis econˆomicas relacionados ao comportamento dos governos e dos bancos.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:bibliotecadigital.fgv.br:10438/11457 |
| Date | 24 January 2014 |
| Creators | Diniz, André Sander |
| Contributors | Teles, Vladimir Kühl, Gonçalves, Carlos Eduardo Soares, Escolas::EESP, Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos |
| Source Sets | IBICT Brazilian ETDs |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Source | reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas, instacron:FGV |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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