Thesis advisor: Pablo Guerron-Quintana / The dissertation consists of three independent chapters that study nonlinear effects in international finance and macroeconomics. The implications of presence of nonlinear effects are examined both in the context of a puzzle in international financial markets, a constrained policy within a closed economy, and are also ap- proached as a general problem in macro and macroeconometric modeling. I quantify the role of nonlinear effects in these contexts, and make a case for the application of nonlinear modeling techniques.The first chapter of the dissertation titled “Sovereign Default Risk and Currency Returns” is solo-authored. Many currencies exhibit non-zero average returns with respect to US dollar, in an apparent violation of textbook uncovered and covered interest parities. I first show that in the cross-section of countries foreign currency returns are positively related to the sovereign default risk, and then reconcile this finding with the standard theory via the “peso problem”. Market players collect premium for bearing the risk of sharp devaluation in case of default. Since defaults are rare in the data, default premium manifests itself in higher currency returns. To formalize the link between default risk and currency returns, I discipline quantitatively a model “with default” based on Arellano (2008) for a set of developing countries. I then use the implications of this model to construct an econometric model for cross-section of currency returns that I estimate using extended Fama and MacBeth (1973) method. I find strong evidence supporting the “peso problem” explanation: credit default swaps’ spreads serving as proxy for the risk of default explain around 25% of the cross-country variation of average currency returns. I also estimate that the market participants expect a 50% depreciation of national currency upon default. The second chapter is titled “Nonlinear Dynamic Factor Model in Application to Financial and Macroeconomic data”, and is joint work with Pablo Guerron- Quintana and Molin Zhong. Through the lens of a nonlinear dynamic factor model, we study the role of exogenous shocks and internal propagation forces in driving the fluctuations of macroeconomic and financial data. The proposed model 1) allows for nonlinear dynamics in the state and measurement equations; 2) can generate asymmetric, state-dependent, and size-dependent responses of observables to shocks; 3) and can produce time-varying volatility and asymmetric tail risks in predictive distributions. We find evidence in favor of the nonlinear factor model over its linear counterpart in applications that include interest rates with zero lower bounds, credit default swap spreads for European countries, and nonfinancial cor- porate credit default swap spreads in the U.S. We extract a shadow interest rate comparable to those in the literature. The results hint to an important role for a nonlinear internal propagation element to exogenous shocks during periods of tur- bulence such as the European debt crisis and the Great Recession. This nonlinear term allows the model to forecast better during the early stages of the Covid-19 crisis. The third chapter is titled “Local Government spending and business cycle” and is based on a solo-authored paper. Local government revenues and spending in the United States are procyclical due to constitutional constraints of states and municipalities. As a result, the local government policies can act as amplifiers of the business cycle. This paper introduces fiscal policy conducted by local governments to an otherwise standard New Keynesian closed economy model to assess quantitatively the contribution of spending policies into the business cycle. The procyclical nature of local government spending generates an amplification mechanism that accounts for around 15% of fluctuations in output and hours worked. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

Esta dissertação apresenta um modelo de equilíbrio geral dinâmico, com serviço contingente da dívida soberana, construído para analisar os impactos dos impostos sobre o bem-estar. Neste modelo, variações na estrutura tributária (oriundas de reformas) afetam o bem-estar dos agentes de forma direta, em decorrência de distorções alocativas, e também por meio de seus efeitos indiretos sobre o risco de default da dívida soberana. Avalia-se, quantitativamente, para o caso brasileiro, os custos de bem-estar associados a cada tipo de imposto. Obtém-se que a perda total de bem-estar devida aos impostos vigentes no Brasil é próxima de 19% do consumo de longo-prazo. O ranking dos tipos de imposto mostra-se robusto, seja em termos de custos de bem-estar por unidade de receita arrecadada (sob a tributação vigente), seja em termos de custos de bem-estar adicionais por unidade de receita adicional. Do mais eficiente para o menos eficiente: imposto sobre consumo, imposto sobre a remuneração do trabalho, imposto sobre a remuneração do capital. Observa-se que um aumento de receitas tributárias por meio da elevação do imposto sobre o consumo ou do imposto sobre a remuneração do trabalho pode gerar custos negativos de bem-estar. Esta possibilidade existe em economias nas quais a elasticidade da probabilidade de default da dívida com relação às receitas governamentais é suficientemente elevada, e os custos adicionais de default não são desprezíveis. Constata-se ainda que resultados perversos (no sentido de contra-intuitivos e indesejáveis) podem sobrevir a mudanças bem-intencionadas na estrutura tributária. / This dissertation presents a general equilibrium model, with contingent service of sovereign debt, constructed to analyze the impacts of taxes on welfare. In this model, variations on the tax structure (originated from reforms) impact welfare directly, in the form of allocative distortions, and also through their indirect effects on the probability of default on sovereign debt. I evaluate, quantitatively, for Brazil, the welfare costs associated to each type of taxation. I find that the total welfare loss due to current taxation in Brazil is close to 19% of long-term consumption. The ranking of tax types demonstrates to be robust, both in terms of welfare costs per unit of revenue raised (under the current tax structure), and in terms of additional welfare costs per unit of additional revenue raised. From the most efficient to the least efficient: consumption tax, labor income tax, capital income tax. I observe that a growth in tax revenues through the increase in either consumption or labor income tax can generate negative welfare costs. This is a possibility in economies in which the elasticity of the probability of default in relation to the level of government revenues is high enough, and additional costs of default are substantial. I also find that perverse results (in the sense of being counter-intuitive and undesirable) may be generated by well-intentioned changes in the tax structure.

Esta dissertação apresenta um modelo de equilíbrio geral dinâmico, com serviço contingente da dívida soberana, construído para analisar os impactos dos impostos sobre o bem-estar. Neste modelo, variações na estrutura tributária (oriundas de reformas) afetam o bem-estar dos agentes de forma direta, em decorrência de distorções alocativas, e também por meio de seus efeitos indiretos sobre o risco de default da dívida soberana. Avalia-se, quantitativamente, para o caso brasileiro, os custos de bem-estar associados a cada tipo de imposto. Obtém-se que a perda total de bem-estar devida aos impostos vigentes no Brasil é próxima de 19% do consumo de longo-prazo. O ranking dos tipos de imposto mostra-se robusto, seja em termos de custos de bem-estar por unidade de receita arrecadada (sob a tributação vigente), seja em termos de custos de bem-estar adicionais por unidade de receita adicional. Do mais eficiente para o menos eficiente: imposto sobre consumo, imposto sobre a remuneração do trabalho, imposto sobre a remuneração do capital. Observa-se que um aumento de receitas tributárias por meio da elevação do imposto sobre o consumo ou do imposto sobre a remuneração do trabalho pode gerar custos negativos de bem-estar. Esta possibilidade existe em economias nas quais a elasticidade da probabilidade de default da dívida com relação às receitas governamentais é suficientemente elevada, e os custos adicionais de default não são desprezíveis. Constata-se ainda que resultados perversos (no sentido de contra-intuitivos e indesejáveis) podem sobrevir a mudanças bem-intencionadas na estrutura tributária. / This dissertation presents a general equilibrium model, with contingent service of sovereign debt, constructed to analyze the impacts of taxes on welfare. In this model, variations on the tax structure (originated from reforms) impact welfare directly, in the form of allocative distortions, and also through their indirect effects on the probability of default on sovereign debt. I evaluate, quantitatively, for Brazil, the welfare costs associated to each type of taxation. I find that the total welfare loss due to current taxation in Brazil is close to 19% of long-term consumption. The ranking of tax types demonstrates to be robust, both in terms of welfare costs per unit of revenue raised (under the current tax structure), and in terms of additional welfare costs per unit of additional revenue raised. From the most efficient to the least efficient: consumption tax, labor income tax, capital income tax. I observe that a growth in tax revenues through the increase in either consumption or labor income tax can generate negative welfare costs. This is a possibility in economies in which the elasticity of the probability of default in relation to the level of government revenues is high enough, and additional costs of default are substantial. I also find that perverse results (in the sense of being counter-intuitive and undesirable) may be generated by well-intentioned changes in the tax structure.

This dissertation consists of three independent essays in macroeconomics. The first essay studies the transition to a low carbon economy using an extension of the neoclassical growth model featuring endogenous energy efficiency, exhaustible energy and explicit climate-economy interaction. I derive the properties of the laissez faire equilibrium and compare them to the optimal allocations of a social planner who internalizes the climate change externality. Three main results emerge. First, the exhaustibility of energy generates strong market based incentives to improve energy efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions without any government intervention. Second, the market and optimal allocations are substantially different suggesting a role for the government. Third, high and persistent taxes are required to implement the optimal allocations as a competitive equilibrium with taxes. The second essay focuses on coal fired power plants (CFPP) - one of the largest sources of CO2 emissions globally - and their generation efficiency using a macroeconomic model with an embedded CFPP sector. A key feature of the model is the endogenous choice of production technologies which differ in their energy efficiency. After establishing four empirical facts about the CFPP sector, I analyze the long run quantitative effects of energy taxes. Using the calibrated model, I find that sector-specific coal taxes have large effects on generation efficiency by inducing the use of more efficient technologies. Moreover, such taxes achieve large CO2 emissions reductions with relatively small effects on consumption and output. The final essay studies the procyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries, which is a well-documented empirical observation seemingly at odds with Neoclassical and Keynesian policy prescriptions. I examine this issue by solving the optimal fiscal policy problem of a small open economy government when the interest rates on external debt are endogenous. Given an incomplete asset market, endogeneity is achieved by removing the government's ability to commit to repaying its external obligations. When calibrated to Argentina, the model generates procyclical government spending and countercyclical labor income tax rates. Simultaneously, the model's implications for key business cycle moments align well with the data.

This dissertation consists of three independent essays in macroeconomics. The first essay studies the transition to a low carbon economy using an extension of the neoclassical growth model featuring endogenous energy efficiency, exhaustible energy and explicit climate-economy interaction. I derive the properties of the laissez faire equilibrium and compare them to the optimal allocations of a social planner who internalizes the climate change externality. Three main results emerge. First, the exhaustibility of energy generates strong market based incentives to improve energy efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions without any government intervention. Second, the market and optimal allocations are substantially different suggesting a role for the government. Third, high and persistent taxes are required to implement the optimal allocations as a competitive equilibrium with taxes. The second essay focuses on coal fired power plants (CFPP) - one of the largest sources of CO2 emissions globally - and their generation efficiency using a macroeconomic model with an embedded CFPP sector. A key feature of the model is the endogenous choice of production technologies which differ in their energy efficiency. After establishing four empirical facts about the CFPP sector, I analyze the long run quantitative effects of energy taxes. Using the calibrated model, I find that sector-specific coal taxes have large effects on generation efficiency by inducing the use of more efficient technologies. Moreover, such taxes achieve large CO2 emissions reductions with relatively small effects on consumption and output. The final essay studies the procyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries, which is a well-documented empirical observation seemingly at odds with Neoclassical and Keynesian policy prescriptions. I examine this issue by solving the optimal fiscal policy problem of a small open economy government when the interest rates on external debt are endogenous. Given an incomplete asset market, endogeneity is achieved by removing the government's ability to commit to repaying its external obligations. When calibrated to Argentina, the model generates procyclical government spending and countercyclical labor income tax rates. Simultaneously, the model's implications for key business cycle moments align well with the data.

This thesis explores the effects of institutions on macroeconomic performance. It does so in two main chapters, a summary of each of which is given below. In the first main chapter of the thesis, the interactions between government spending, government borrowing, political corruption and political turnover were examined. Incorporating these factors in a sovereign default model, we show how sovereign default decisions and business cycle fluctuations are affected by the level of corruption. In particular, we show that when there is turnover, corruption can generate higher risks of default and higher credit spreads when there is enough stability. Intuitively, we establish that a change in power from a less corrupt to a more corrupt government is more likely to cause default than the reverse. The results also shows that households suffer welfare losses as a result of corruption. As regards business cycles, the general effect of corruption is to alter business cycle statistics. Further, we estimate an empirical model using data on sovereign default, corruption, political stability and other macroeconomic variables for a sample of emerging economies. The results of this provide strong evidence of a positive relationship between both corruption and political stability and sovereign default. The second main chapter of the thesis looks at the effects of limited financial contract enforcement in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework where firms have access to both internal and external means of finance. The results shows how limited enforceability affects fluctuations in key macroeconomic variables (e.g., output, employment and price) through its impact on key financial variables (e.g., interest rates, risk premium, default risk and leverage). In particular, we find that weaker enforcement tends to amplify the effects of shocks, creating greater volatility, as well as lowering small firm funding. We provide some empirical evidence to support our results. Using cross-country data on measures of financial market imperfections, we find that limited enforcement has a negative effect on output and that this effect is exacerbated by poor credit information. We also find that weaker contract enforcement is associated with higher output volatility.

This master's thesis describes economic and socio-political development of Argentina from 1976 up until the current situation. The last chapter introduces the perspectives of the future development as well. During this period, Argentina experienced a lot of changes when the country switched from policy of ISI to neoliberalism which was the main policy of Argentina from 1976 until the default in 2001, with the exception of Alfonsín's presidency. The thesis deals with the main causes of this default. The next part of the work examines what led the country to the economic recovery after 2002 and explains the changes that have occured during the period of Kirchnerism.

Cette thèse porte sur l'étude des facteurs sous-jacents au risque du défaut souverain, tel que mesuré par les spreads des CDS souverains, au cours de la crise de la dette souveraine en Europe. En analysant les données mensuelles de janvier 2007 à septembre 2015 en utilisant un modèle à correction d'erreur (VECM), nous constatons que le risque de défaut souverain européen répond en partie à un environnement macroéconomique caractérisé par de mauvaises politiques budgétaires et une détérioration des facteurs économiques. Plus précisément, la hausse du taux de chômage, le niveau d'endettement et la réduction des soldes de la balance courante ont accru les spreads des CDS souverains. Ces résultats ne permettent pas de rejeter l’hypothèse selon laquelle le défaut souverain a été motivé par des fondamentaux économiques faibles. Mais l'importance relative de ces facteurs change avec le temps et le groupe de pays. La présence et l'absence de la Grèce ont joué un rôle clé dans l'évolution des spreads dans les pays de la zone euro. La dégradation des notations en Grèce et l'aversion accrue pour le risque de la part des Européens ont contribué à une augmentation significative des spreads de CDS des pays de la zone euro et des autres pays. Notre analyse VECM met en évidence des retombées directes de la Grèce vers la périphérie de la zone euro via des canaux non fondamentaux. Enfin, nos résultats suggèrent que l’émergence de la crise de la dette a été causée par des fondamentaux faibles, mais a également un caractère auto-réalisateur. / This thesis attempts to identify the factors behind the sovereign default risk, as measured by sovereign CDS spreads, during the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. By analyzing monthly data from January 2007 to September 2015 using vector error correction model with panel data, we find that European sovereign default risk is partly a response to a macroeconomic environment characterized by poor fiscal policies and deteriorating economic factors. Specifically, higher unemployment rate, debt levels and lower current account balances have increased the sovereign CDS spreads. These results do not allow us to reject the hypothesis that the sovereign default was driven by weak economic fundamentals. But the relative importance of these factors changes over time and group of countries. The presence and absence of Greece have played a key role in the developments of the spreads in the euro area countries. The rating downgrades in Greece and the higher European risk aversion had contributed to a significant rise in the CDS spreads of euro and non-euro area countries. Our VECM analysis does suggest direct spillovers from Greece to Euro area periphery via non-fundamental channels. Finally, our results suggest that the emergence of the debt crisis was caused by weak fundamentals but has also a self-fulfilling character.

Submitted by André Diniz (andrediniz89@yahoo.com.br) on 2014-02-04T18:20:18Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacaovf.pdf: 527587 bytes, checksum: 98ea804e4e4f494e3f3e89a534c12776 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2014-02-07T18:57:56Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacaovf.pdf: 527587 bytes, checksum: 98ea804e4e4f494e3f3e89a534c12776 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-02-07T18:58:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacaovf.pdf: 527587 bytes, checksum: 98ea804e4e4f494e3f3e89a534c12776 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-01-24 / This dissertation analyses quantitatively the costs of sovereign default for the economy, in a model where banks with long positions in government debt play a central role in the financial intermediation for private sector’s investments and face financial frictions that limit their leverage ability. Calibration tries to resemble some features of the Eurozone, where discussions about bailout schemes and default risk have been central issues. Results show that the model captures one important cost of default pointed out by empirical and theoretical literature on debt crises, namely the fall in investment that follows haircut episodes, what can be explained by a worsening in banks’ balance sheet conditions that limits credit for the private sector and raises their funding costs. The cost in terms of output decrease is though not significant enough to justify the existence of debt markets and the government incentives for debt repayment. Assuming that the government is able to alleviate its constrained budget by imposing a restructuring on debt repayment profile that allows it to cut taxes, our model generates an important difference for output path comparing lump-sum taxes and distortionary. For our calibration, quantitative results show that in terms of output and utility, it is possible that the effect on the labour supply response generated by tax cuts dominates investment drop caused by credit crunch on financial markets. We however abstract from default costs associated to the breaking of existing contracts, external sanctions and risk spillovers between countries, that might also be relevant in addition to financial disruption effects. Besides, there exist considerable trade-offs for short and long run path of economic variables related to government and banks’ behaviour / Este trabalho analisa de forma quantitativa os custos para a economia de um default soberano, num modelo onde bancos comprados em d´ıvida tˆem um papel central na intermedia¸c˜ao financeira para os investimentos do setor privado e enfrentam fric¸c˜oes financeiras que limitam sua alavancagem. A calibra¸c˜ao busca refletir economias da Eurozona, onde discuss˜oes sobre risco de calote das d´ıvidas e programas de resgate aos governos tem sido temas centrais. Os resultados mostram que o modelo captura um importante custo apontado pela literatura emp´ırica e te´orica, qual seja, a contra¸c˜ao do investimento que segue um epis´odio de default, o que pode ser explicado pela piora no balan¸co do setor financeiro, limitando cr´edito e liquidez para o setor privado e aumentando os custos para o seu financiamento. O custo em termos de perda de produto, no entanto, n˜ao ´e suficiente para explicar a existˆencia de mercados de d´ıvida e os incentivos dos governos em honrar seus compromissos. Assumindo que a reestrutura¸c˜ao do perfil de pagamentos da d´ıvida imposta num caso de default permite ao governo aliviar sua restri¸c˜ao or¸cament´aria e cortar impostos, o modelo apresenta resultados bastante distintos para impostos lump-sum e distorsivos. Para nossa calibra¸c˜ao, a resposta quantitativa de produto e utilidade mostra que ´e poss´ıvel que o efeito na oferta de trabalho gerado por cortes de impostos distorsivos domine a queda no investimento, causada pela escassez de cr´edito nos mercados privados. S˜ao abstra´ıdos, no entanto, os custos de default associados a quebras de contratos, san¸c˜oes externas e transbordamentos de risco entre pa´ıses, que podem ser bastante relevantes em adi¸c˜ao ao impacto sobre o cr´edito no sistema financeiro. Al´em disso, existem trade-offs consider´aveis na trajet´oria de curto e longo prazo das vari´aveis econˆomicas relacionados ao comportamento dos governos e dos bancos.

Submitted by Tiago Carvalho Machado de Souza (tiagocmsouza@gmail.com) on 2012-11-21T16:28:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Final.pdf: 587362 bytes, checksum: 312dd8e46588bdfe865a9741fdd287c1 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2012-12-20T18:29:41Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Final.pdf: 587362 bytes, checksum: 312dd8e46588bdfe865a9741fdd287c1 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-12-20T18:41:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Final.pdf: 587362 bytes, checksum: 312dd8e46588bdfe865a9741fdd287c1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-09-19 / This paper provides a general equilibrium model of sovereign default with agents' heterogeneity, but without banking or foreign sectors. The heterogeneity is due to different kinds of consumers in the economy with distinct wealth shocks (but identical in other aspects) and the government, which decides whether or not to default, considers these agents differently in its welfare function. The intuition is that the default decision may be related to the bonds' owners (the distribution among agents) and not only the total resources borrowed or the economic activity. This approach matches empirical evidence which found a negative, though surprisingly weak, relationship between economic output and default. It also sheds light on other aspects that might influence the default decision, such as the existence and operation of secondary markets of public bonds. / Este artigo propõe um modelo de equilíbrio geral com inadimplência de dívida soberana (default soberano), sem setor bancário ou setor externo, em que há heterogeneidade dos agentes da economia. Essa heterogeneidade surge a partir da existência de dois tipos de consumidores com choques de riqueza distintos (mas idênticos em outros aspectos) e o governo, que toma decisão de default, pondera esses agentes de maneira distinta na função de bem-estar. O principal motivador dessa ideia vem da intuição de que a decisão de um país não cumprir com as suas obrigações de dívida pode estar ligada não somente ao valor de face dos títulos emitidos ou à situação econômica, mas também a quem detêm esses títulos (sua distribuição entre agentes). Essa abordagem permitiu que se reproduzissem comportamentos já identificados em estudos empíricos presentes na literatura, os quais encontraram uma relação negativa, porém surpreendentemente fraca, entre moratória da dívida e atividade econômica e lança luz sobre aspectos importantes que podem influenciar a decisão de default, como funcionamento de mercados secundários de títulos públicos.