Three independent models are built based on information asymmetric to analysis discipline effects brought by banks` issuance of subordinated debts. The research results offer the theory of subordinated debts discipline effects.
First, an adverse selection model is built to examine banks¡¦ policies when issuing subordinated debts based on the banks¡¦ credit risks. The result shows that banks with lower credit risks are more likely to issue subordinated debts, since after the issuance, the yields of these debts are lower. When depositors observe the lower yields of the subordinated debts, they would presume that these banks have lower credit risks. As a result, banks with lower credit risks can decrease their operational costs by issuing subordinated debts. This model has demonstrated that the market can discipline banks indirectly through the issuance of subordinated debts.
Second, a moral hazard model to show that issuing of subordinated debts by banks can bring direct market discipline and indirect market discipline to make their loans less risky. The direct market discipline means that the risk level of bank will be evaluated by professional investors. The investors will require that the yields accord to the banks risk. For lowering the cost of issuing subordinated debts, banks will make their loans less risky. The indirect market discipline means that the depositors would take the yields of these debts as a significant signal indicating banks risk levels. The depositors will decide to withdraw their savings when the bank signals a higher risk, and keep their saving when the bank signals a lower risk. I prove that issuing of subordinated debts by banks can bring about these two kinds of market discipline. The model has also demonstrated that if the bank supervisor can utilize the information of issuing subordinated debts effectively, they will achieve higher supervisory goal.
Third, a reputation model is built to show that for reputation concerns, a bank would change its monitoring decisions if it issues subordinated debts. Reputation effect in banks is different in different scenarios. When the good banks probability of success is very high, reputation effect would induce the bad bank to start monitor it`s borrowers, and the efforts of bad banks monitoring would be increased by time. When the bad banks probability of success is very low, reputation effect would induce the good bank start monitoring its borrowers. and the efforts of bad banks monitoring would be decreases by time.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-1218106-210728 |
| Date | 18 December 2006 |
| Creators | Wang, Chih-Yung |
| Contributors | Shyan-rong Chou, Anlin Chen, Victor W. Liu, Hai-Chin YU, David Shyu, Roger C. Y. Chen |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-1218106-210728 |
| Rights | unrestricted, Copyright information available at source archive |
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