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Driving a hard bargain: U.S. sanctions strategies

Policymakers and scholars are deeply divided on the purpose and effectiveness of sanctions, but recent work has given attention to the strategy of using positive sanctions or incentives. This study investigates the conditions under which the U.S. uses a punitive sanctions policy (indicated by all negative sanctions) or an engagement policy (indicated by a mix of positive and negative sanctions). Applying materialist (Schelling, 1960, 1966; Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Axelrod, 1984; Fearon, 1994) and sociological (Schoppa, 1999; Wendt, 2000; Lebow, 2007) bargaining perspectives, this study will consider factors such as the level of target threat, the target's nuclear weapons capability, the extent of international support for sanctions, and the relationship between the U.S. and target. This study analyzes the case studies of the U.S-led sanctions against Iraq (1990-2003), North Korea (1993-present), and Libya (1972-2006). / by Jason Levitt. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2010. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2010. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:fau.edu/oai:fau.digital.flvc.org:fau_3576
ContributorsLevitt, Jason., Dorothy F. Schmidt College of Arts and Letters, Department of Political Science
PublisherFlorida Atlantic University
Source SetsFlorida Atlantic University
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeText, Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
Formatvii, 116 p. : ill. (some col.), electronic
CoverageUnited States, United States, 20th century, United States, 21st century
Rightshttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/

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