本文主要分別探討家族控制、負債與高階經營團隊薪酬的關係。實證結果發現，根據利益一致效果，家族企業通常會發放較少變動薪酬給高階經營團隊。然而，當家族企業偏離問題較嚴重，且由家族成員擔任高階經理人時，則會支付較高變動薪酬給家族高階經營團隊，此種現象在非電子業中尤為明顯。本文亦探討負債與薪酬的關係，結果發現，負債與高階經營團隊薪酬呈非線性關係，再將負債進一步細分，發現長期銀行負債對薪酬的監督效果高於短期銀行負債及一般公司債。本文也發現相較於非家族企業，負債對高階經營團隊薪酬的監督效果在家族企業中較弱。 / This paper investigates the variable compensation of top management teams. Prior literature suggests that compensation policy can help firms reduce the agency problem between principals and agents. Most of these studies, however, emphasize the agency problem between shareholders and managers, and only a few examine those between controlling and minority shareholders and between shareholders and debtholders. This study investigates the effects of family control and debt on top management compensation, respectively. The empirical results show that, on average, family-controlled firms are associated with a lower proportion of variable compensation, which is consistent with the alignment effect. However, family-controlled firms with greater control divergence and whose CEO is a family member, which gives rise to a central agency problem, pay higher variable compensation to family top management, as evident in the non-electronic industry. Furthermore, the empirical results find a U-shaped relationship between debt and top management compensation. In addition, the monitoring effect of long-term bank debt on top management compensation is greater than that of short-term bank debt and common bond. Finally, the monitoring effect of debt on top management compensation is weaker in family-controlled firms than in non-family-controlled firms.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0093353505 |
| Creators | 陳昭蓉, Chen,Chao-Jung |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 英文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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