本研究在探討家族、非家族控制企業與私有資訊交易之關係，私有資訊交易是以當未預期盈餘為負時，在每季盈餘宣告前之異常融券放空為判斷依據。我們希望了解家族控制企業相對於非家族控制企業是否存在較多之私有資訊交易。實證結果指出當未預期盈餘為負時，在每季盈餘宣告前，家族控制企業相較於非家族控制企業確實存在較多異常融券放空之現象。另外，我們從實證結果亦發現當未預期盈餘為負時，則家族成員涉入經營程度愈高、家族盈餘分配權愈低以及股份盈餘偏離程度愈高之公司，在每季盈餘宣告前，其融券放空之行為相對於其他企業會比較多，由此推論出家族控制特性與所有權結構和隱含資訊之融券放空行為有關。此外，研究結果亦指出巨量融券放空可以用來預測股票未來之異常報酬，但家族控制企業之巨量融券放空相對於非家族控制企業並沒有提供較多有用資訊來預測股票未來之超額報酬。 / We investigate the relation between the information content of short sales and organization structure. We want to know that informed trading occurs more readily in family-controlled firms than in nonfamily firms. Our analysis indicates that family-controlled firms experience substantially greater abnormal short sales prior to negative earnings shocks than nonfamily firms. The analysis also indicates that family-controlled firms sustain marginally less abnormal short sales prior to positive earnings surprises than nonfamily firms. Supplementary testing indicates that characteristics of family control and ownership intensify informed short selling. Further analysis suggests that high short-selling tend to be informative in predicting future returns. However, we find that high short-selling in family-controlled firms do not contains more useful information in forecasting stock returns than nonfamily firms.

本文主要分別探討家族控制、負債與高階經營團隊薪酬的關係。實證結果發現，根據利益一致效果，家族企業通常會發放較少變動薪酬給高階經營團隊。然而，當家族企業偏離問題較嚴重，且由家族成員擔任高階經理人時，則會支付較高變動薪酬給家族高階經營團隊，此種現象在非電子業中尤為明顯。本文亦探討負債與薪酬的關係，結果發現，負債與高階經營團隊薪酬呈非線性關係，再將負債進一步細分，發現長期銀行負債對薪酬的監督效果高於短期銀行負債及一般公司債。本文也發現相較於非家族企業，負債對高階經營團隊薪酬的監督效果在家族企業中較弱。 / This paper investigates the variable compensation of top management teams. Prior literature suggests that compensation policy can help firms reduce the agency problem between principals and agents. Most of these studies, however, emphasize the agency problem between shareholders and managers, and only a few examine those between controlling and minority shareholders and between shareholders and debtholders. This study investigates the effects of family control and debt on top management compensation, respectively. The empirical results show that, on average, family-controlled firms are associated with a lower proportion of variable compensation, which is consistent with the alignment effect. However, family-controlled firms with greater control divergence and whose CEO is a family member, which gives rise to a central agency problem, pay higher variable compensation to family top management, as evident in the non-electronic industry. Furthermore, the empirical results find a U-shaped relationship between debt and top management compensation. In addition, the monitoring effect of long-term bank debt on top management compensation is greater than that of short-term bank debt and common bond. Finally, the monitoring effect of debt on top management compensation is weaker in family-controlled firms than in non-family-controlled firms.