The authors develop a simple analytical framework to study the welfaremaximizing environmental standards when market entry is endogenous and firms can
circumvent regulation by bribing corrupt officials. Corruption changes the tradeoff in environmental policy. Corruption leads more polluting firms to enter into the market, which requires tighter environmental regulation. However, corruption also makes trading in some environmental protection for a marginally higher market entry optimal for the government.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:DRESDEN/oai:qucosa:de:qucosa:70661 |
| Date | 29 May 2020 |
| Creators | Biswas, Amit K., Thum, Marcel |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Source Sets | Hochschulschriftenserver (HSSS) der SLUB Dresden |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, doc-type:article, info:eu-repo/semantics/article, doc-type:Text |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Relation | 1355-770X, 1469-4395, 10.1017/S1355770X16000218 |
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